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Abstract 
This work intends to shed light on the historical issue of the 
bilateral diplomatic relations between the United States and Brazil 
during the years of the Carter’s presidency and, more specifically, 
on the way the human rights issue affected this relationship. 
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, in the Southern Cone 
countries, namely Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil, 
fundamental civil and political liberties of citizens were 
systematically restricted or denied. The new presidential 
administration of the U.S. could not either ignore or tolerate those 
abuses. The fact that the United States and Latin America shared 
political and historical traditions, and participated in the same 
hemispheric defense system, substantially added to the view that 
the United States was obliged to promote human rights in this 
region. Carter’s primary and immediate aim in foreign policy 
seemed to be regaining U.S. moral authority.  
In the multifaceted world of détente and developing countries, the 
United States had to prove its primacy not only in the international 
economy, in the military capabilities, in the security systems, but had 
to prove of deserving that status, had to show of being promoter of 
values and ideals too. 
To advance human rights worldwide, and especially in Latin 
America, was the major tool that the Carter administration meant to 
use in its foreign policy. Since the beginning of its electoral 
campaign, Carter rejected the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger’s diplomatic 
style: the Realpolitik adopted in those years did not contemplate to 
raise human rights, because human rights promotion jeopardized 
other foreign policy goals. The new Democrat administration offered 
a clear break with the past practices, supporting and reinforcing the 
Congressional activity implemented since the early 1970s. The 
discussion on human rights abuses in the context of U.S. legislation 
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and policy became relevant, and human rights issues started to be 
raised regularly and vigorously in diplomatic channels. Moreover, 
the new administration did not mean to adopt a univocal human 
rights diplomacy toward Latin America, but would rather adopt a 
country-by-country stance. When the Carter administration set forth 
its own definition of human rights, it clearly had in mind the 
international framework that was slowly but efficiently implemented 
throughout the thirty years after the end of World War II: the UN 
Charter (1945); the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(both entered into force in 1976); and finally the American 
Convention on Human Rights – or Pact of San Jose – signed by the 
member states of the OAS in July 1978. 
The introduction of the thesis focuses on the way human rights 
entered the political discourse in the 1970s and on the attitude the 
U.S. government had toward Latin America, and Brazil in particular, 
in the first 1970s. Jimmy Carter immediately brought something new 
in the U.S. rhetoric since the weeks of the electoral campaign. 
The major part of this work attentively describes step-by-step the 
deep evolution that the bilateral relations experienced  through the 
four years: the sudden deterioration in the bilateral relations 
between the U.S. and Brazil, following the release of the human 
rights report on Brazil elaborated by the State Department, the 
consequent estrangement of the first months, that was repaired in 
less than one year thanks to the extraordinary effort that President 
Carter and his staff put to re-establish a dialogue with the Brazilian 
government. The availability of recently declassified diplomatic 
documents, collected both in U.S. and Brazilian archives, has 
allowed to analyze in detail all the diplomatic initiatives put into 
practice by the Americans. Brazil in the years of its liberalization 
process, and after fifteen years of military regime, badly tolerated the 
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U.S. interference in its internal affairs, but never interrupted the 
diplomatic relations and, indeed, Brasilia looked for an equal 
relationship with Washington. The thesis devotes particular 
attention to the high-level meetings that took place between June 
1977 and March 1978: Rosalynn Carter’s trip to Brasilia and Recife 
(June 1977); Secretary Vance’s voyage to Brasilia to participate in the 
talks within the framework of the 1976 Memorandum of 
Understanding (November 1977); and finally President Carter’s 
diplomatic visits in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro (March 1978). Besides 
the detailed description of the events, the thesis takes always into 
account the wider international scenario and always makes the effort 
to insert the bilateral events in the more complex Cold War system in 
the years of détente. 
Emphasis is given to 1979 as a turning point in the U.S.-Brazilian 
relations: João Baptista Figueiredo inaugurated his presidency in 
March 1979 and he would be the last President of the military 
regime. The new Brazilian President started immediately the 
liberalization process that, in six years, would lead Brazil toward a 
democratic regime. This change in the domestic political situation of 
Brazil deeply influenced also the diplomatic dialogue with 
Washington. On the other hand, 1979 was a demanding, difficult 
year for the United States as well: the second oil shock, the Iran 
hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, plus the electoral 
campaign for the 1980 presidential elections forced the Carter 
administration to divert its attention from the human rights 
diplomacy. 
Carter’s foreign policy, often described by the historiography 
as ineffective and too idealistic, is definitely re-evaluated in this 
dissertation: the choice of using idealism as a political tool was 
motivated by a realistic and pragmatic approach. The choice of 
making human rights a pivotal political discourse was strategically 
significant both for internal and international reasons. Human 
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rights were an issue warmly supported by the Congress, that 
received wide support from both wings of the Democratic party, 
that the public opinion acclaimed, and that internationally could 
prove -also in the years of détente- the ideological primacy of the 
United States with respect to the Soviet Union. Taking into 
consideration all these aspects, Carter’s idealism proves to be 
incredibly realistic. Jimmy Carter, despite the often criticized 
inexperience in international affairs, proved to have very clear in 
mind how to deal with the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate U.S. 
disillusion. Throughout the thesis this aspect emerges very clearly. 
Moreover, as regards the specific analysis of the U.S.-Brazilian 
relationship, Carter never forgot how strategically relevant Brazil 
was in the hemisphere as well as in the North-South dialogue, but 
nevertheless never stopped to raise the human rights issue and 
made the topic widely debated even outside the Brazilian borders. 
Jimmy Carter was a President who tried to give the U.S. foreign 
policy a new course and to overcome the Cold War bipolar logic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Jimmy Carter entered into office as 39th President of the 
United States on January 20, 1977. President Carter’s 
mandate was just of four years, in January 1981 he had to 
leave the White House after losing the electoral challenge 
against Ronald Reagan. The U.S. voters expressed their 
sentiments of dissatisfaction and disappointment toward a 
presidency perceived as weak and unlucky. This kind of 
perception remained as a historical inheritance in the 
following decades. The failure of the fifty-two American 
hostages’ rescue in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 were 
perceived as a proof of the weakness of the U.S. role in the 
world and of the ineffectiveness of its foreign policy. More 
generally, the global politics of the 1970s was for American 
pretty somber. As Mitchell writes: “They grappled with 
failure in Vietnam and strategic parity with the Soviet 
Union; they faced the Arab oil embargo and growing 
economic competition from the European Community and 
Japan. They suffered through Watergate, the congressional 
investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
stagflation. There seemed to be weekly reminders that the 
United States was losing power and influence”.1 The post-
                                                             
1 Mitchell, Nancy The Cold War and Jimmy Carter, in Leffler, Melvin P. and 
Westad, Odd Arne (eds.) The Cambridge History of the Cold War – Volume III  
Endings, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.66-88. 
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Vietnam, post-Watergate attitude that had made Carter win 
the elections in late 1976 wasn’t good anymore for the 
second Cold War, that on the contrary required a much 
more confrontational attitude in the international scenario. 
The fear of a newly aggressive Soviet Union could not deal 
with the idealistic rhetoric of détente any longer.  
Jimmy Carter's one-term presidency is remembered for 
the events that overwhelmed it—inflation, energy crisis, 
war in Afghanistan, and the hostage crisis in Iran. After one 
term in office, voters strongly rejected Jimmy Carter's 
honest but gloomy outlook in favor of Ronald Reagan's 
telegenic optimism. In the past two decades, however, 
there has been wider recognition that Carter, despite a lack 
of experience, confronted several huge problems with 
steadiness and idealism. Along with his predecessor Gerald 
Ford, Carter must be given credit for restoring the balance 
to the constitutional system after the excesses of the 
Johnson and Nixon "imperial presidency."2 
 
Even though a wide literature has already provided for 
a re-evaluation of the Carter presidency’s conduct3, it is 
probably necessary still today to recall the 
accomplishments of the Carter administration in the field 
                                                             
2 http://millercenter.org/president/carter/essays/biography/1  
3 It is worth recalling here some of the best known examples: Dumbrell, John 
The Carter Presidency: a Re-evaluation, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1993; 
Strong, Robert Working in The World – Jimmy Carter and the Making of 
American Foreign Policy, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000; 
Schoultz, Lars Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latina America, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981. 
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of foreign policy, through its four years. The Camp David 
Accords, the Panama Canal Treaties, the signature of the 
SALT II treaty (even though it was never ratified), the 
further improvement of the relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (formally recognized on January 1, 1979) 
were all important goals achieved by the Carter 
administration in just four years. But even more than for 
these diplomatic actions, the Carter presidency should be 
remembered for its new approach to international affairs. 
In open contrast with the Nixon/Kissinger realpolitik, Jimmy 
Carter attempted to bring the values of idealism and 
moralism into U.S. foreign policy. Sure, he did not invent 
human rights but he put the issue in the political discourse 
and made them become an effective tool. Human rights 
started affecting the quality of the diplomatic relations both 
with allies and foes.  
Several reasons can be found to explain the origins of 
Carter’s human rights policy. Personal beliefs mattered and 
Jimmy Carter placed since the first steps of his journey to 
the White House a strong focus on competence and 
compassion, on the importance of the values of the person 
more than on strategy and political bargaining. He had a 
moral ideology but lacked a political ideology. Human 
rights as a political discourse reflected in depth Carter’s 
strong moral impulses and tethered the principles to a set 
of political goals.4 
                                                             
4 Muravchik, Joshua The Uncertain Crusade, Hamilton Press, 1986, p.1. 
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 Protecting the individual from the arbitrary action of 
the state and promoting human freedom were not just 
Jimmy Carter’s personal aims. They reflected the spirit of 
the times, they were probably inspired by the détente mood 
of international relations, whose climax was represented by 
the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in the summer 1975. It 
was the final act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)5 and at the point VII of its 
Decalogue the “respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” was cited as one of the principles guiding the 
relations between the participating states. 
On the CSCE-human rights linkage, the historian 
Samuel Moyn observes: “the CSCE was a fruit of the very 
Cold War détente between the superpowers that human 
rights were eventually to unsettle. […] Yet there is no 
denying that without the further canonization of human 
rights in the Helsinki process of the Conference for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe and then Jimmy Carter’s 
explosive affiliation with the language in January 1977, 
human rights might have remained the preserve of 
                                                             
5 http://www.osce.org/who/43960. For an analysis of the Helsinki process see 
Romano, Angela From Détente in Europe to European Détente – How the 
West Shaped the CSCE, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang s.a., 2009. For a narrower 
study of the U.S. CSCE policy and the relationship with Moscow in those 
years, see by the same author Romano, Angela Détente, entente, or linkage? 
The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union, Diplomatic History, vol.33 n.4, 2009, pp.703-
722.  
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expanding but still minor advocacy groups and their 
international members and promoters”.6 
 
The human rights issue didn’t have just a moral or 
ethical dimension, of course. It was a topic that emerged in 
the writing of the 1976 Democratic Platform, because it was 
seen politically as a no-lose issue but, even more, “it was a 
rare point of unity in a bitterly divided party”.7 The 
Democratic Party was split into two major groups: on the 
one side was the “Jackson group”, whose aim was 
overcoming the American arrogance of power; on the other 
side was the “McGovern group”, animated by a strong 
anti-Soviet spirit and fearing a shift of the world order in 
favor of the Soviet Union.8 Carter was on neither side, was 
an outsider with “the goal of keeping everybody else 
reasonably happy, and keeping the party intact. There were 
some differences on domestic issues, but the real dividing 
line was over foreign affairs. On that there was almost no 
agreement, except, as it turned out, about human rights”.9 
On this point, Samuel Moyn also notes: “Jimmy carter was 
                                                             
6 Moyn, Samuel The Last Utopia – Human Rights in History, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
press, 2010, p.149. 
7 Muravchik, Joshua cit., p.2. 
8 A good description of these two trends within the Democratic Party is 
offered by Tulli, Umberto Tra Diritti Umani e Distensione: L’amministrazione 
Carter, il Congresso e l’Unione Sovietica, Contemporanea, a.XIII n.2, Aprile 
2010, pp.261-284. 
9 Muravchik, Joshua cit., p.4. 
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a coalitions candidate for president in a moment when the 
party was recovering from its failed post-Watergate feint to 
the left. […] In 1976, […] Carter emerged as the one whom 
different factions of the party disliked least. If there was 
anything in Carter’s campaign that linked him with the 
contemporary surge of human rights to that point, it was 
simply his stand for morality in general”.10 According to 
Muravchik, then, strategy played a major role rather than 
moral beliefs. Also Umberto Tulli stresses that human 
rights had the pragmatic aim of reconstructing consensus 
within the party.11 Sure, it was important having an issue 
that united both the liberal and the conservative wings of 
the Democratic Party in order to be fully supported during 
the presidential campaign. Secondly, but not less 
important, human rights was a subject that could become a 
beautiful campaign issue, was something on which the 
Ford administration was weak and vulnerable and the 
public opinion was particularly receptive. Thus, it was wise 
and appropriate to make it become one of the key points of 
Carter’s campaign. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 Moyn, Samuel cit., p.154. 
11 Tulli, Umberto cit., p.263. 
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1.1 How human rights entered the political 
discourse in the 1970s. 
“We ought to be a beacon for nations who search for 
peace and who search for freedom, who search for individual 
liberty, who search for basic human rights. We haven't been 
lately. We can be once again”12.  
These were the words that Jimmy Carter, Governor of 
Georgia, pronounced at the end of the debate of the 1976 
presidential campaign in which he participated with the 
outgoing president Ford. The human rights issue was 
pivotal in the political program of Jimmy Carter since the 
times of the electoral campaign. And it has to be noticed 
that soon after being elected, Carter and his administration 
started to work intensively on legal processes and 
institutionalization activities in order to build a solid 
framework for their human rights policy. 
Nevertheless, when Carter entered the White House in 
1977 the human rights policy had already done a long road 
in the U.S. Congress and, indeed, the development of 
human rights as an important element in U.S. diplomacy 
may largely be attributed to congressional initiative.13 A 
wide literature has studied the decisive role played by the 
                                                             
12 Ford, Gerald Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (from now 
onwards PPPUS), Presidential Campaign Debate, October 6, 1976. 
13 Salzberg, John P. A View from the Hill: U.S. Legislation and Human Rights, in 
Newsom, David D. (ed.) The Diplomacy of Human Rights, University Press of 
America, 2005, pp. 13-20. John Salzberg was special consultant on human 
rights to the Committee of International Relations of the House of 
Representatives during the years of the Carter administration.  
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Congress in the setting of the human rights foreign policy.  
In this regard, William M. Schmidli writes that, by mid-
Seventies, “growing support for human rights in Congress 
stimulated a rearguard action in the State Department to 
head off further legislative action”.14  
At the beginning of the Cold War and until mid-Sixties 
the United States “did not relinquish its identity as a rights-
promoting state, but rather subordinated it to its Cold War 
anticommunism”.15 The United States was promoting 
human and civil rights as complementary aspect of its 
anticommunism, was giving of itself the image of the 
bearer of the values of democracy and freedom, role that 
chose to adopt since the times of its decision to enter WW II 
and of Roosevelt’s speech on the four freedoms.16 
Starting from the early Seventies something began to 
change, because members of Congress started to be 
troubled that the U.S. foreign policy might be contributing 
                                                             
14 Schmidli, William M. Institutionalizing Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: 
U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1976-1980, Diplomatic History, Vol.35 N.2 (April 
2011), pp. 351-377, quotation at p.365. 
15Sikkink, Kathryn Mixed Signals – U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin 
America, The Century Foundation, Cornell University Press, 2004, p.52.   
16It is very well-known the 1941 State of the Union address pronounced by 
president F.D. Roosevelt on January, 6 1941 in which he proposed the four 
fundamental freedoms that people everywhere in the world should enjoy: 
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, 
freedom from fear. These were presented as four essential human freedoms 
and became the foundations of the 1948 United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
9 
 
to human rights violations abroad.17 “In one of those 
extraordinary convergences in which history is made”, 
Moyn writes, “human rights also became a potential 
language of the foreign policy of the Democratic Party in 
the United States in the early 1970s, before being canonized 
by his victorious presidential candidate Jimmy Carter in 
1977”.18 
Inside the Congress two major groups dealing with the 
human rights issue were born: one more concerned about 
the human rights violations in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, the other more interested in the right-wing 
authoritarian regimes that were U.S. allies and received 
military and economic aid from Washington. The leading 
role of this second group was played by Senators Edward 
Kennedy and Frank Church together with Representatives 
Donald Fraser and Tom Harkin. And were exactly these 
persons to highlight the profound conflict between the US 
history and identity and its support for dictatorships.19 
This new sensitivity to human rights was emerging not 
only in the Congress, but also within the many different 
groups that were involved, and the role of NGOs was 
particularly significant to provide information to U.S. 
policy makers about human rights abuses and to initiate 
specific human rights policies and to lobby for their 
                                                             
17Salzberg, John P. A View from the Hill..., in Newsom, David D. (ed.) cit., 
University Press of America, 2005, p. 13. 
18 Moyn, Samuel cit., p.150. 
19Sikkink, Kathryn cit., pp.53 and ff. 
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implementation. William Schmidli in fact states: “[…] the 
effort to institutionalize human rights in U.S. foreign policy 
reflected a remarkable degree of coordination between 
nongovernmental human rights advocates and sympathetic 
members of Congress”.20 Congressman Fraser in particular 
was personally and directly involved in articulating 
concerns about human rights. From 1973 through 1978 he 
was chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and 
International Organizations (also known as “The Fraser 
Subcommittee”). The scope of the committee was 
conducting hearings with witnesses, members of 
international human rights nongovernmental 
organizations, representatives of religious organizations 
who had direct knowledge of the human rights conditions 
in countries with which the United States had constant and 
close diplomatic relations. Throughout the six years of its 
activity, the Subcommittee held more than 150 hearings 
with more than 500 witnesses and wrote reports about the 
foreign governments scrutinized21. As Salzberg notes: “The 
complexity of the issue and the strong resistance within the 
Nixon administration to giving human rights the desired 
priority underlined the necessity for continuing 
congressional monitoring”.22 In this regard, also Samuel 
                                                             
20 Schmidli, William M. cit., pp.363-364. 
21It is worth recalling some of the countries on which the Fraser 
Subcommittee investigated: Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Argentina, Cuba, 
the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa, Israel and the USSR. See 
Salzberg, John P. A View from the Hill..., in Newsom, David D. (ed.) cit., 
University Press of America, 2005, p. 15. 
22 Idem. 
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Moyn observes that Donald Fraser’s initiatives were 
decisive to make human rights a central issue of 
Congressional debates: “[…] beginning in August 1973, 
Minnesota congressman Donald Fraser used his 
Subcommittee […] to spotlight human rights norms and 
mechanisms. […] One of Fraser’s most important 
conclusions was that the UN processes around human 
rights seemed unlikely to be performed, so that 
governments, in particular U.S. government, needed to 
move forcefully to propagate human rights values”.23  In 
this way, the human rights issue and U.S. foreign policy 
started to be increasingly intertwined.  
 The Congressional effort highlighted a strong 
contradiction and upset both the political and the public 
opinion: what kind of traditional values and principles did 
the U.S. foreign policy reflect, supporting non-democratic 
regimes perpetrating human rights violations? Or, to put it 
differently, what values had a country promoting such a 
contradictory foreign policy? The U.S. international 
leadership probably needed to take “a new look”, to be less 
conflicting and to give higher importance to moral beliefs. 
The international environment was going to this same 
direction, as the signature of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
proved: human rights were at the core of this document 
and were a central issue in international relations. 
 
                                                             
23 Moyn, Samuel cit., p.151. 
12 
 
Giving a new look to U.S. foreign policy was, at the 
beginning of the 1970s, a very challenging job. The 
positions of the Democratic Congress were constantly 
opposed by those of the Republican presidents Nixon and 
Ford. Congress was concerned about the realpolitik style of 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and affirmed the 
importance of morality in U.S. foreign policy. Marie 
Griesgraber writes: “Congress was especially concerned 
that the United States might be directly associated with the 
violations of human rights or in bolstering governments 
that perpetrated these violations. […] In the Latin 
American context, while Secretary Henry Kissinger was 
negotiating a special relationship between the United States 
and Brazil, Sen. Frank Church and Rep. Donald Fraser were 
conducting hearings on the use of torture, summary arrest, 
and execution by the same government of Brazil”.24 
But when in 1973 Augusto Pinochet overthrew 
Salvador Allende’s government with a military coup d’état 
and it resulted that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and secret U.S. economic boycott contributed to destabilize 
Allende, Senators Kennedy and Church started serious 
hearings about the U.S. involvement in the coup and 
promoted legislative initiatives in favor of human rights. 
Hence, in the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act three 
separate sections were related to human rights: section 32 
                                                             
24Griesgraber, Jo Marie Implementation by the Carter Administration of 
Human Rights Legislation Affecting Latin America, Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgetown University, 1983, p.34. 
13 
 
asserted the denial of any economic or military assistance 
to the government of any foreign country practicing the 
internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for 
political purposes; section 35 explicitly referred to measures 
to adopt in the Chilean case; and section 112 said that the 
Office of Public Safety (OPS) program could no longer 
provide police training abroad. But, as Griesgraber 
underlines: “Before Carter, the executive branch response 
to Congress’ human rights initiative was to ignore or 
circumvent the law. No aid was ever reduced because a 
government held political prisoners. “When OPS training 
of police overseas was explicitly forbidden, training 
programs for the same foreign police were stepped up 
inside the United States”.25 This is why the Congress’ 
attitude became tougher and led to passing further 
legislation. Indeed, in 1974 OPS training was forbidden 
both abroad and within the U.S. territory; furthermore, the 
1974 legislation regarding security assistance (section 502B) 
included a wider category of human rights violations that 
could be sanctioned. This amendment affirmed that “except 
in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall 
substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any 
government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights”; in 
this way, it became responsibility of the President to prove 
the existence of “extraordinary circumstances” that would 
                                                             
25 Idem, p. 39. 
14 
 
justify any continuation of assistance.26 An innovative 
aspect was represented by the requirement of reports that 
the executive branch had to draw up and send to the 
Congress about the human rights conditions in countries 
receiving security assistance. In case one of these countries 
resulted the theatre of gross and repeated violations of 
human rights, section 502B required the suspension of the 
security assistance unless extraordinary circumstances 
involving U.S. national security prevailed.27 As Sikkink 
notes, “the language of the section was carefully drafted by 
Fraser and his staff, who wanted to refer to international 
human rights standard, not just U.S. standards, and who 
were especially concerned about consistent patterns of 
gross violations not just incidents”.28 Still, before the 
beginning of Carter’s presidency, section 502B was never 
invoked before the Congress either to halt or to reduce any 
security assistance and the reports supposed to issue 
country-by-country analyses were on the contrary replaced 
by a general report about the human rights situation in all 
countries receiving U.S. security assistance. It was Secretary 
of State Kissinger to decide not to release these reports. 
According to him, all states violated human rights and it 
was not in the interest of the United States to single out any 
                                                             
26 Salzberg, John P. A View from the Hill..., in Newsom, David D. (ed.) cit, 
University Press of America, 2005, p. 17. 
27 A very good and useful article on the evolution of the section 502B of the 
U.S. foreign assistance legislation is by Cohen, Stephen B. Conditioning U.S. 
Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol.76 n.2 (April 1982), pp.246-279. 
28 Sikkink, Kathryn cit., pp. 69-70. 
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individual states.29 This is why in 1976 the Congress 
decided to revise again section 502B: on one hand the 
institutional figure of a human rights Coordinator was 
created inside the Department of State, on the other it was 
clearly stated the necessity of submitting human rights 
reports on each country receiving U.S. security assistance. 
An additional and decisive piece of legislation that created 
the hard core of the human rights policy was represented 
by the 1975 “Harkin Amendment”, according to which 
economic aid and loans to countries engaged in gross 
violations of human rights would be stopped unless the aid 
would directly benefit needy people. The human rights 
issue was not only linked to military assistance anymore, 
but also to the U.S. more general economic assistance and 
in this way the linkage between human rights and 
economic aid became mandatory. 
Judith de Neufville also highlights that it was a 
Congressional initiative likewise the establishment of the 
first country reports, “requiring for each country proposed 
for security assistance that annual report on human rights 
practices be submitted to Congress”.30 
This was the legal framework set up before Jimmy 
Carter became president and before he made the theme of 
                                                             
29 Salzberg, John P. A View from the Hill..., in Newsom, David D. (ed) cit, 
University Press of America, 2005, p. 18. 
30 De Neufville, Judith I. Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An 
Examination of the State Department Country Reports, Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol.8 n.4 (Nov. 1986), pp.681-699, quotation at p.684. 
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human rights the pivot of his foreign policy. Despite the 
decision of introducing the human rights issue into his 
policy agenda arrived quite late during his presidential 
campaign, he made it his own.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 What attitude toward Brazil before the 
Carter presidency? 
Civilian and political actors put also Latin American 
human rights issues on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The 
Brazilian case was recalled by Senator Kennedy in a speech 
held in October 197031 and in which, starting from a specific 
case, the Senator moved a wider critique to the U.S. 
political approach towards human rights and foreign 
policy: “Despite our strong tradition of democracy, the 
United States continues to support regimes in Latin 
America that deny basic human rights. We stand silent 
while political prisoners are tortured in Brazil […] I point 
                                                             
31 Kennedy, Edward The Alianza in Trouble: Beginning Anew in Latin America, 
Saturday Review, October 17, 1970 cited in Kathryn Sikkink, cit., p. 58. 
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this out […] because Brazil is ruled by a government that 
we fully support with money, arms, technical assistance, 
and the comfort of close diplomatic relations”. While 
discussing the possible activities that the OAS could 
implement he said: “It is responsibility of the nations of the 
hemisphere to focus the spotlight of international opinion 
on the outrages being committed in Brazil”. Brazil, the 
hemispheric ally, the Latin American country that since the 
beginning of its diplomatic relations with the United States 
aimed at a “regional special relationship”, received 
attention and importance because of the repressions, 
tortures and violations carried out by its military regime. 
President Ford’s working group was aware that the U.S. 
diplomatic attitude towards Brazil was not supported 
either by the Government or by the public opinion and 
that, already in mid-Seventies, human rights were a thorny 
issue. A June 1975 briefing memorandum32, drawn up 
before a meeting between Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and 
the Brazilian ambassador Castro, emphasized the 
importance to deal with the human rights situation in 
Brazil:  
“We have been working to give more substance to our 
bilateral relationship with the GOB in recognition of 
Brazil’s attributes as an emerging world power. […] A 
                                                             
32 Briefing Memorandum from Rogers to the Deputy Secretary Your Meeting 
with Brazilian Ambassador Araujo Castro – Friday, June 13 1:00 pm, June 12, 
1975, Confidential, General Records Of The Department Of State – “Office Of 
The Deputy Secretary, Office Of The Coordinator For Humanitarian Affairs. 
Office Of The Deputy Coordinator For Human Rights” – Human Rights Subject 
Files, 1975, NARA. 
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potential stumbling block to a continued cooperative 
relationship with Brazil is the question of human rights. 
Public and Congressional attention can be expected to 
continue and perhaps intensify. […] The new emphasis 
on human rights as an important element of USG policy, 
and legislative provisions linking human rights 
considerations to military and economic assistance make 
it necessary to again insert some careful references to this 
delicate question in our dealings with selected GOB 
officials”.33 
In the last months of the Ford administration, The State 
Department interpreted human rights as a potentially 
troublesome issue for the quality of the bilateral U.S.-Brazil 
relations. Congressional pressures and the existing 
legislation, that linked human rights performances to U.S. 
military and economic assistance, could give problems in 
maintaining a cooperative relation with Brazil. Hence, the 
State Department, and Henry Kissinger in particular, 
decided to sincerely welcome and support the Brazilian 
President Ernesto Geisel’s commitment to 
“decompression”, political liberalization and progress in 
the field of human rights. The U.S. support to Brazil was 
sanctioned by the signature of a Memorandum of 
Understanding in February 1976, passionately pursued by 
Secretary of State Kissinger. 
Within the Democratic Party, the neoconservatives 
discourse criticized “the immorality of Kissinger’s realism”. 
Historian Mario Del Pero writes: 
                                                             
33 Idem. 
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“In the 1970s human rights became a central issue in U.S. 
public debate and international relations. Occupying 
center stage in world politics, human rights were part of 
the ‘moment of…basic political restructuring’ that took 
place during the decade. And it was on the issue of 
human rights that the neoconservatives identified a 
potential vulnerability of Kissinger and his foreign policy 
that, if aptly exploited, could lead to his downfall and the 
end of détente”.34 
“Latin America occupied a special place also in Jimmy 
Carter’s discussions of human rights”35 and he mentioned 
several times the Chilean case as one of the most dramatic 
U.S. policy failures.  
Few months before the election, on March, 15 1976 at 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Carter stated the 
necessity of abandoning the traditional paternalism that the 
United States had always had towards Africa and Latin 
America; and citing the U.S.-Brazilian relations, affirmed: 
“The United States-Brazilian agreement, signed recently 
by Secretary of State Kissinger on his trip to Latin 
America, is a good example of our present policy at its 
worst. Kissinger’s remarks during his visit that “there are 
no two people whose concern for human dignities and 
for the basic values of man is more profound in day to 
day life than Brazil and the United States” can only be 
taken as a gratuitous slap in the force of all those 
                                                             
34 Del Pero, Mario The Eccentric Realist – Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of 
American Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2010, 
p.135. 
35 Sikkink, Kathryn cit., p. 75. 
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American who want a foreign policy that embodies our 
ideals, not subverts them”.36 
With his assertion, Carter “made Henry Kissinger look 
foolish and hypocritical for his remarks about the common 
destinees and respect for human rights of the United States 
and Brazil”37 and gave advance notice of the directions he 
intended to follow in his foreign policy. 
During the electoral campaign, Jimmy Carter had not 
outlined yet the way human rights could be used as a 
foreign policy tool: 
“When Carter mentioned human rights during an early 
stump speech, the small crowd cheered. He mentioned it 
again and again. It became a Rorschach test of the 
electorate: liberals assumed Carter was signaling that he 
would distance the United States from right-wing 
dictators in the Third World; conservatives thought he 
                                                             
36The agreement quoted here by Carter is the “Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning consultations on matters of mutual interest” 
signed by the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister Azeredo da Silveira on February 21, 1976. The agreement, besides 
reaffirming the tradition of friendship and cooperation between the two 
countries, planned bilateral consultations to be held twice a year about the 
full range of foreign policy matters: economic, political, security, cultural, 
legal, educational and technological subjects. Carter Quotes -  Latin America, 
March 15, 1976 - David R. MacDonald Papers, Folder 22 , Gerald Ford Library. 
37 Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, Your Request for Comments on the 
Brazil Memorandum, November 4, 1977,  White House Central File Subject 
File , BOX CO-13, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Jimmy Carter Library 
(Hereinafter JCL). 
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would apply pressure on the Soviet Union. The candidate 
did not elucidate”.38 
Nevertheless, it proved to be an appealing discourse for 
the most part of the Democratic party and the electorate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Mitchell, Nancy cit., p.71. 
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2. THE ELECTION OF JIMMY CARTER AND 
THE SET-UP OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
POLICY. 
 
2.1 The  first official speeches.  
As President, Jimmy Carter’s commitment to human 
rights issues was affirmed since the moment of the 
inaugural address, delivered at the Inaugural Ceremonies 
at the Capitol in Washington on January 20, 1977. Such 
commitment had to be absolute, in order to enhance 
equality and opportunity. The necessity to prove again that 
the U.S. had the dignity to play a decisive role in the 
international scenario was affirmed in several occasions:  
“Our Nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at 
home. And we know that the best way to enhance 
freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our 
democratic system is worthy of emulation”.39 
The aim was to restore moralism both in the domestic 
and foreign realm, and to make as soon as possible 
Watergate and Vietnam bad memories of a dark moment 
for the nation. The U.S. had to offer and project a new 
image of itself, had to gain anew its prestige and its leading 
role. Carter wanted to follow the “Helsinki spirit”, and 
                                                             
39 Inauguration of the 39th President, January 20, 1977 in Adam, Elaine P. (ed.) 
American Foreign Relations 1977 – A documentary record, New York 
University Press, 1979, p.155. 
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wanted to emphasize the importance of moral rather than 
military strength as a basis of national conduct.  
“The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. 
Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are 
craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun –not 
just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but 
for basic human rights”.40  
A few weeks later, Jimmy Carter spoke at the United 
Nations, where he explained the direction he intended to 
give to the U.S. foreign policy. Also in this case, he 
underlined how pivotal the human rights issue was for the 
U.S.. He in fact emphasized:  
“I see a hopeful world, a world dominated by increasing 
demands for basic freedoms, for fundamental rights, for 
higher standards of human existence. We are eager to 
take part in the shaping of that world”. 41  
Well aware of the difficulties that his staff could have, 
he nevertheless had very clear in mind and was meant to 
put a persistent effort “to maintain peace and to reduce the 
arms race”, “to build a better and a more cooperative 
international economic system”, and “to work with 
potential adversaries as well as our close friends to advance 
                                                             
40 Idem. 
41 Address by President Carter to Representative of United Nations Member 
States, New York, March 17, 1977 in Adam, Elaine P. (ed.) American Foreign 
Relations 1977 – A documentary record, New York University Press, 1979, 
p.158. 
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the cause of human rights”.42 In the first months of his 
presidency, Carter put a very strong effort in emphasizing 
that the U.S. foreign policy from that moment onwards had 
to follow a new route. All the major public events he was 
involved were used to broadcast his new political ideas. He 
took advantage of the Commencement Address at the 
University of Notre Dame on May 22, 1977 to talk once 
more of the new direction given to the foreign policy by his 
administration. Jimmy Carter started stating: 
“I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, 
that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power 
and influence, which we have, for humane purposes”.43  
He strongly believed in the American democratic 
values and he was confident in the resilience of the U.S. 
political system: the U.S. was “strong and influential and 
prosperous because we are free” and these principles were 
enough to “reject the arguments of those rulers who deny 
human rights to their people”.44 Carter was sure that to 
                                                             
42 Idem. In the Seventies, the United States formulated its human rights policy 
in terms of anti-torture rights; as Lars Schoultz has pointed out, the U.S. 
government gave a narrow definition of human rights for the implementation 
of its human rights policy, focusing on the rights to life, liberty, integrity of the 
person, due process of law and therefore cutting military and economic aids 
to those countries where torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of 
the person –including prolonged detention without trial– happened. Schoultz, 
Lars cit., p.3. 
43 Foreign Policy and National Character: Commencement Address by 
President Carter at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, May 
22, 1977 in Adam, Elaine P. (ed.) American Foreign Relations 1977 – A 
documentary record, New York University Press, 1979, p.172. 
44 Idem, pp.172 and 174. 
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fight for the protection of the individual from the arbitrary 
power of the state would have led the U.S. to regain the 
moral stature it once had:  
“Throughout the world today, in free nations and in 
totalitarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation 
with the subject of human freedom, human rights. And I 
believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that 
discussion, that debate, that contention alive. No other 
county is as well-qualified as we to set an example”.45  
Human rights held once again an important place in 
this speech and it was clear that the new administration 
knew what directions intended to take in its foreign 
relations.  
Secretary of State Vance became the spokesman of this 
commitment to human rights when he delivered a speech 
at the University of Georgia School of Law in Athens, 
Georgia, on April 30, 1977. According to Vance, the human 
rights policy had to be understood in order to be effective 
and needed therefore to be explained and described very 
carefully both in terms of contents and possible results. 
This was the first occasion in which was officially given a 
clear definition of what the administration meant for 
human rights.  
“First, there is the right to be free from governmental 
violation of the integrity of the person. […] Second, there 
is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, 
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shelter, health care and education. […] Third, there is the 
right to enjoy civil and political liberties. […] Our policy 
is to promote all these rights”.46  
The U.S. administration intended to fully respect the 
principles and the rights recognized in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  
“In pursuing a human rights policy, we must always 
keep in mind the limits of our power and of our wisdom. 
A sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, 
hubristic attempt to impose our values on others. A 
doctrinaire plan of action would be as damaging as 
indifference”.47 
That was why the administration considered various 
tools through which the policy could be implemented and 
Vance was pretty precise in listing them:  
“From quiet diplomacy in its many forms, through public 
pronouncements, to withholding of assistance. Whenever 
possible we will use positive steps of encouragement and 
inducement. Our strong support will go to countries that 
are working to improve the human condition. […] It is 
not our purpose to intervene in the internal affairs of 
other countries48, but […] no member of the United 
                                                             
46 Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Address by Secretary of State Cyrus R. 
Vance at the University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia, April 30, 
1977 in Adam, Elaine P. (ed.) American Foreign Relations 1977 – A 
documentary record, New York University Press, 1979, p.165. 
47 Idem. 
48 When Secretary Vance delivered this speech at the end of April 1977, the 
relations between Washington and Brasilia had already started to worsen. At 
the very beginning of March 1977 the State Department delivered the report 
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Nations can claim that violation of internationally 
protected human rights is solely its own affair”.49 
The Secretary of State underlined the importance of 
multilateral cooperation, both in the United Nations (UN) 
and in the regional organizations, first of all in the 
Organization of American States (OAS), central to give 
effectiveness to this endeavor.  
When the Carter administration set forth its own 
definition of human rights, it clearly had in mind the 
international framework that was slowly but efficiently 
implemented throughout the thirty years after the end of 
World War II: the UN Charter (1945); the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (both entered into force in 1976); moreover, it must 
be mentioned also the American Convention on Human 
Rights – or Pact of San Jose – signed by the member states 
                                                                                                                                     
about the human rights situation in Brazil, as required by the Foreign 
Assistance Act for all the countries receiving military and economic aid from 
the United States. After reading the report, the Brazilian government’s 
reaction was furious. The U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign 
country was, according to Brasilia, unacceptable and could not be tolerated. 
The dilemma between the international protection of human rights and the 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries would be crucial 
throughout the whole mandate of Carter’s presidency. 
49Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Address by Secretary of State Cyrus R. 
Vance at the University of Georgia School of Law, Athens, Georgia, April 30, 
1977 in Adam, Elaine P. (ed.) American Foreign Relations 1977 – A 
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of the OAS in July 1978, whose ratification was a Carter’s 
significant political achievement. It has been stated that 
foreign policy is first and last about people and that is also 
the art of the possible through the application of power and 
persuasion50: being this true, it is comprehensible why the 
Carter administration considered diplomacy a powerful 
tool to achieve some results on the human rights issue. As 
Vogelgesang affirms:  
“The diplomacy of human rights can be private or public, 
multilateral or bilateral, and punitive or positive. And, it 
can be several of the above at the same time. […] Private 
or so-called ‘quiet diplomacy’ is the course most 
governments prefer. It entails working behind the scenes, 
whether in an unpublicized discussion between junior 
US Embassy officials and their counterparts at the host-
country foreign ministry or a discreet exchange between 
the US president and another head of state”.51 
 In case of failure or insufficient results, turning to 
public diplomacy and to public symbolic acts was another 
option considered by the Carter administration.52 
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51 Ibidem. 
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The theoretical outline was set, the principles to follow 
were very clear, the diplomatic tools to use were many, the 
legal framework was established and effective. A further 
action to take consisted in creating the institutions within 
the administration dealing specifically with human rights. 
It was time to support rhetoric with important concrete 
actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Patricia Derian and her staff. 
On March 5, 1977 President Carter announced the 
appointment of Patricia Derian as Coordinator for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the Department of 
State.53 Therefore, it was evident that Carter wanted to back 
the policy through a strengthened bureaucracy. The Office 
of Human Rights was transformed into a Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs headed by an Assistant 
                                                                                                                                     
Regime: Revisiting the Diplomatic Crisis of 1977, Draft of December 2005, pp. 
28 ff.) 
53 See Carter, Jimmy PPPUS, Nomination of Patricia M. Derian, March 5, 1977. 
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Secretary of State.54 The appointment of Patricia Derian 
came pretty unexpected, to herself as well. Although she 
had been a deputy director of the Carter-Mondale 
campaign and had worked on the Carter-Mondale 
transition team with the Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW) group, she did not expect to be under evaluation at 
the Department of State. Damico writes: “Vance and 
Christopher sought someone unconnected to the 
bureaucracy and with a single-minded, principled focus on 
human rights. Richard Moose, a member of the State 
transition team and who later would be appointed 
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, believed that a 
former leader in the civil rights movement would make an 
ideal appointment for the post […] Although Moose had 
only met her once or twice, Derian had come to his mind as 
a candidate for the post. After some research and brief 
conversation with her, he suggested her name to Vance and 
Christopher for the human rights post. Neither had ever 
heard of the former Mississippi housewife, but they agreed 
that she would be a good choice”.55  
Carter’s human rights-based foreign policy found in 
Derian the best person to implement its goals. Despite her 
inexperience in international affairs, there was a certain 
logic to her appointment, Muravchik admits. “It made 
sense to choose for the human rights field someone of 
                                                             
54 Salzberg, John P. The Carter Administration and Human Rights, in Newsom, 
David D. (ed.) cit., pp.61-65. 
55 Damico, John K. From Civil Rights to Human Rights – The Career of Patricia 
Derian, Ph.D. Thesis, Mississippi State University, December 1999, p.103.  
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stature in the American civil rights movement, and Derian 
was such a person”.56 Carter himself desired to jettison the 
policy of automatically supporting oppressive regimes 
because of their pro-United States foreign policies and to 
begin a program that took into account the human rights 
conditions in those countries as well.57 Such a deep change 
in the U.S. foreign policy would be certainly resisted by 
many bureaucrats in Foggy Bottom, and Derian started her 
new job with the idea of battling to influence the policy and 
attitudes of the State Department’s old bureaucracy. 
Damico notes: “Derian’s appointment, then, would 
guarantee an adversarial relationship between her office 
and the State Department bureaucracy, which Carter may 
have regarded as healthy”.58 Derian definitely seemed to be 
the best choice for the position. 
Throughout the four years, Derian was supported in 
her job by Mark Schneider, who was known as a liberal 
activist and became her principal deputy. Other important 
figures that played a pivotal role within the administration 
as far as the protection of human rights abroad was 
concerned were: Stephen Cohen who, together with 
Schneider, helped Derian since the very beginning of her 
appointment and toward the end of Carter years, John 
Salzberg, Roberta Cohen, and Stephen Palmer, who joined 
the human rights group of the State Department.  
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32 
 
But Derian was not the only social rights activist 
without foreign policy expertise placed by Carter in an 
important foreign policy post. An example was represented 
by Carter’s choice for ambassador to the United Nations, 
Andrew Young. A former associate of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. and mayor of Atlanta, Young was considered one of the 
most committed political figures that would fight for the 
new human rights issue. Muravchik says that “numerous 
observers have described Young’s role as that of a militant 
on human rights issues in the administration’s internal 
debates”.59  
Also within the National Security Council there was a 
human rights specialist, and she was Jessica Tuchman. 
From 1977 to 1979 she was the director of the Office of 
Global Issues, covering, besides human rights, nuclear 
proliferation, conventional arms sales policy, and chemical 
and biological warfare. Brzezinski decided to appoint “Dr. 
Tuchman [because she] combined technical expertise in 
nuclear proliferation, political savvy because of her 
background as a scientist […], and a genuine sense of 
compassion for the underprivileged”.60 
The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs played an active role in the production of the 
human rights reports: in fact, the Bureau set the guidelines 
(outlining content, format, and style) followed by the 
                                                             
59 Muravchik, Joshua cit., p.14. 
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embassies, whose human rights officers gathered 
information and prepared draft reports on their host 
countries. “With personnel in virtually every country, the 
Department could produce a document based on first-hand 
information and covering the full range of human rights. 
No other organization had a comparable capacity”61, De 
Neufville notes. Furthermore, she describes how important 
was the effort put by Derian and her coworkers in 
developing an increasingly standardized reporting format. 
“For each country the report was organized into several 
main topics dealing with 1) integrity of the person (torture, 
killing, etc.); 2) civil rights; 3) political rights; 4) economic 
and social rights or vital needs.  […] Embassies were told to 
discuss both the laws and the actual practices for each topic 
and were pressured to provide illustrative examples and, 
where possible, quantitative estimates of violations to 
incorporate into the text”.62 
Patricia Derian’s and her Bureau’s work resulted to be 
synergic and in continuity with the congressional efforts of 
the early 1970s. 
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34 
 
2.3 Presidential Review Memorandum 28 and 
Presidential Directive 30. 
During the Carter Administration, the National 
Security Council (NSC) created Presidential Review 
Memoranda (PRM) and Presidential Directives (PD) as part 
of the foreign policy development process. These 
documents, which represented stages in the decision-
making process, supplanted respectively the National 
Security Study Memorandum and the National Security 
Decision Memorandum. The names were changed, 
although the mechanics of NSC review remained similar to 
previous administrations. These studies could be 
conducted either under the purview of the Special 
Coordination Committee (SCC), that was chaired by the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or 
under the purview of the Policy Review Committee (PRC), 
and in this case the group was chaired by a member of the 
Cabinet Secretary. PRMs identified topics to be researched 
by the NSC, defined the problem to be analyzed, set a 
deadline for the completion of the study, and assigned 
responsibility for it to one of the two NSC committees. An 
attentive study was conducted and then drafted by people 
who had the expertise in the government needed to tackle 
the issues. When the committee believed that the study had 
incorporated meaningful options and supporting 
arguments, the study's conclusions would go to the 
President in a 2- or 3-page memorandum, which in turn 
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formed the basis for a Presidential Directive.63 It was the 
President who made the final decision, his decision became 
a Presidential Directive that was prepared, signed and sent 
out as a policy. “That was the process clearly […] for 
human rights, so that all of the agencies were involved, all 
the good ideas available were brought to bear both to 
structure the study and to carry it out, to decide what the 
issues were and how they ought to be set out for the 
President, and to decide on the recommendations that were 
made”.64 
On May 20, 1977 the NSC issued a Memorandum with 
the objective of reviewing the U.S. foreign policy with 
respect to human rights. A few months later, in July 1977, a 
revised draft of the first memorandum was ready and 
almost close to the final version of the Presidential Review 
Memorandum 28 entitled “Human Rights”. In the 
document it’s evident a strong and clear connection to what 
was stated by Vance in his April 30 speech, which set the 
guidelines for the administration’s policy. First, in this 
document human rights were described and divided into 
three different groups: the first group was defined as “the 
right to be free from governmental violations of the 
integrity of the person”; the second included the “economic 
and social rights”; and the third group was the one of the 
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“rights to enjoy civil and political liberties”. Which of the 
three groups should have been considered in the 
implementation of the human rights policy in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of the new administration’s 
actions? There were no doubt that the first group had to be 
included: torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, denial 
of fair and public trial as well as invasion of the home were 
“the most egregious and horrible of abuses of authority and 
thus deserve[d] [the administration’s] most urgent 
attention”.65 Moreover, since the rights of the first group 
were subject to “immediate curtailment”, it could be 
possible to achieve good results in the short run. Still, it 
was not possible to impose one and only paradigm of rights 
as to export an American-style democracy; on the contrary, 
the aim was enhancing basic human rights in diverse 
cultures not seeking “to change governments or remake 
societies”66. Throughout the pages of the PRM-28, an 
evaluation of the objectives and costs of the new human 
rights policy was made. Even though the promotion of 
human rights was undoubtedly a fundamental tenet of the 
U.S. foreign policy, the decision to raise it to a higher level 
of priority would imply certain costs. There were clearly 
other major objectives of U.S. foreign policy of equal –if not 
greater– importance, such as for example the fundamental 
                                                             
65 Memorandum from Warren Christopher to Jessica Tuchman et al. PRM on 
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66 Ibidem. 
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objective to protect and advance U.S. national security. 
“There will clearly be situations in which efforts to achieve 
our human rights goals will have to be modified, delayed 
or curtailed in deference to other important objectives. [...] 
Even when other objectives outweigh the human rights 
factor, our policies should, nevertheless, be implemented in 
a manner that promotes human rights to the extent 
possible.”67 The human rights issue pivotal in any case, 
then, except in case of threats to national security. Human 
rights had to be always promoted “to the extent possible”, 
but what to do with those countries consistently 
perpetrating gross violations of human rights with which 
the U.S. had relations? “Governments that have a 
consistent record of gross violations of human rights 
should be dealt with as special cases, and our policy should 
generally be to bring to bear international opinion and 
concerted action by the world community against such a 
regime. Obviously, this should be done only in flagrant 
cases after attempts to encourage evolutionary 
improvement have been spurned. Even in such cases, 
however, there is no necessary reason why formal relations 
should not be maintained”.68 Several considerations 
followed: the administration clearly intended to take a case-
by-case stance, since it was evident that the human rights 
policy could be implemented only on a country-by-country 
basis and it was not possible to create an all-purpose 
formula. Each country represented a special case and, in 
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order to implement a realistic and effective policy, the 
administration had to take into account all the differences 
in each case. Taken this into consideration, the 
administration intended to have a “stick and carrot” 
approach: “We can promote our objectives not simply by 
penalizing, or threatening to penalize, offensive conduct 
but also by rewarding, or offering to reward, positive 
human rights conduct”69. The document also highlighted 
the major possible actions to implement in order to 
integrate human rights considerations into U.S. foreign 
policy: “The Executive Branch has already taken some 
important steps to help assure implementation of this 
Administration’s focus on human rights, but needs to do 
more”.70 The steps taken in the first months of the new 
administration were: the establishment of the Interagency 
Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, pursuant 
to an NSC Memorandum dated April 1, 1977. The Group 
was chaired by the State Department, namely by the 
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, after whom the 
group was also named “Christopher Group”, and included 
representatives from the NSC, State, Treasury, DOD and 
AID. Its mandate consisted in coordinating the 
development and the implementation of U.S. human rights 
policy as it was related to bilateral and multilateral 
economic and security assistance programs. More 
specifically, with respect to security assistance, it was 
created an interagency Arms Export Control Board, made 
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up of representatives of the State Department’s Office of 
the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs, whose job was to take human rights factors into 
consideration in its deliberations. When unable to reach a 
consensus on particular policies, programs or transactions 
because of differences concerning the effect of human 
rights of the proposed actions, it was envisaged the 
possibility of referring the issue to the Interagency Group 
on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. This could 
ensure an over-all coordination of the U.S. human rights 
policy as it related to foreign assistance and would have 
made possible a consistent work of the U.S. administration 
in this respect. Some changes were made also within the 
State Department: the Office for the Coordinator of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was expanded 
(designation of full-time human rights officers in each of 
the Department’s regional bureaus and full or near full-
time human rights offices in each of the Department’s 
functional bureaus71), and a Human Rights Coordinating 
Group72 was established. All U.S. mission chiefs were 
instructed to give their personal attention to furthering 
observance of human rights in their host countries, 
                                                             
71 They were responsible for monitoring human rights concerns within their 
bureaus, coordinating with the Department’s Office of Human Rights and 
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72 Chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, this group 
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providing frequent reporting on human rights, and 
assuring full mission involvement in the implementation of 
human rights policy. The draft of the PRM-28 stated also 
the necessary future steps to implement and some could be: 
the “expansion of the mandate of the Interagency Group on 
Human Rights and Foreign Assistance to include all 
aspects of our human rights policy, not simply foreign 
assistance. That expanded purview would promote greater 
coordination of our human rights policy within the 
Executive Branch; [it was moreover desirable to set] 
reasonably regular high-level meetings to review 
implementation and development of our human rights 
policy –e.g., meetings between the President and relevant 
agency heads; between some or all of them and key-
members of Congress; between members of the Interagency 
Group and representatives of concerned non-governmental 
organizations”73. 
Even if since the very first months of 1977 the 
administration had started to work on its human rights 
policy, the Presidential Directive 30 entitled “Human 
Rights” was published on February 17, 197874, one year 
later than Carter entered into office. Nevertheless, it must 
be noted that the human rights policy was put into practice 
even before the PD was issued. The three-page presidential 
document managed to combine all the thoughts and the 
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of the Presidential Directive is available at: 
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strategies discussed in the PRM 28. It was decided to give 
primary attention to the “rights of the first group” (the 
right to be free from governmental violations of the 
integrity of the person), still not omitting the social and 
political liberties as well as economic and social rights 
(rights of the second and third group). 
The document stated: 
 “It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to 
promote the observance of human rights throughout the 
world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due 
consideration to the cultural, political and historical 
characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental 
U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question. 
Specifically: It shall be of the U.S. human rights policy to 
reduce worldwide governmental violations of the 
integrity of the person (e.g., torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; 
lengthy detention without trial, and assassination), and 
to enhance civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of 
speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the 
press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will 
also be a continuing U.S. objective to promote basic 
economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, 
education, shelter and health)”75.  
 
Could the use of these three verbs indicate different 
intensities of the effort that the administration intended to 
put in the international protection of the three categories of 
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human rights? Was there a sort of priority order to follow 
or not? Pretty controversial was the choice to include 
economic and social rights, transforming them into a salient 
feature of the Carter human rights policy. Didn’t that mean 
to have an unrealistic approach with regard to the effective 
condition of many countries of the developing world? The 
administration considered the human rights issue as a 
means of drawing the United States closer to the 
developing world. Still, as Muravchik notes: “given the 
records of most Third World governments on such central 
human rights matters as free expression, due process, or 
popular sovereignty, this issue should have been a source 
more of friction than of understanding with the U.S.”.76 On 
the other hand, freedom and political participation cannot 
be guaranteed where there is poverty and the 
administration completely shared this view. 
Certainly, the choice of including economic and social 
rights is worth to be noted, but then a question follows: 
what emphasis to give them? And what about the priority 
with respect to the other two categories listed by Vance in 
his Law Day speech and specified also by Carter in the PD-
30? Since it’s not possible of course to rank human rights 
and to choose which ones to emphasize, at the beginning of 
the administration the ideal aim was to make all these 
rights complementary and mutually reinforcing. The 
human rights diplomacy meant to protect all these rights as 
a whole. In the widespread variety of the real world, 
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though, this could be only an unattainable hope rather than 
a concrete political program. What really happened was 
that the administration put an extraordinary emphasis on 
the violations of the “integrity of the person”. The U.S. 
aimed first at stopping those episodes of governmental 
torture, undue imprisonment and unjust process 
perpetrated by the countries with which the United States 
had diplomatic relations.   
The opening line of the presidential directive 
“reiterated the Carter administration’s overriding foreign 
policy commitment to promote international justice” and in 
this way the human rights issue became “more 
institutionalized and took on heightened importance”77 
For Carter, human rights was both a moral and a 
practical policy. Rather than completely abandoning the 
realism of the Nixon/Kissinger years, he argued that he 
could combine idealism and realism.78 Carter made the 
connection between morality and power central to both 
foreign and domestic policy, but it was most apparent in 
foreign affairs.79 
Carter would later write: 
“To me, the demonstration of American idealism was a 
practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and 
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moral principles were the best foundation for the 
exertion of power and influence”80. 
“It is clear that Jimmy Carter intended to get human 
rights on the national agenda. It is not clear that many of 
the elements that helped him accomplish this goal – the 
lack of clarity about his definition of human rights, the 
inconsistencies in managing the policy, the availability of 
multiple meanings allowing for multiple choice outcomes 
under different administrations – were the products of 
intentional behavior on Carter’s part. In fact, it is much 
easier to think that these things were not strategic at all. 
Nonetheless, their presence points to what may be a viable 
presidential strategy”.81 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Jimmy Carter and Latin America. 
“We cannot look away when a government tortures 
people, or jails them for their beliefs or denies minorities 
fair treatment or the right to emigrate… we should begin 
by having it understood that if any nation… deprives its 
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own people of basic human rights, that fact will help 
shape our own people’s attitude towards that nation’s 
government”.82 
 
It was September 8, 1976 and this was candidate 
Carter’s first major speech emphasizing human rights and 
foreign policy during an appearance before the national 
convention of B’nai B’rith83. In earlier speeches, Mr. Carter 
emphasized the need to ‘restore the moral authority of this 
country in its conduct of foreign policy’ by discarding 
‘policies that strengthen dictators or create refugees, 
policies that prolong suffering or postpone racial justice. 
“The B’nai B’rith speech in September, then, was notable 
for its emphasis on human rights considerations, not for its 
uniqueness. Only after this speech did the media firmly 
identify the issue of human rights as a major feature of the 
Carter campaign. Thereafter, statements about human 
rights became a prominent feature of the Carter 
campaign”.84 As it has been widely acknowledged, and also 
Schmidli affirms, “Carter’s outspoken emphasis on human 
rights during the presidential campaign reflected the 
Georgian’s religious beliefs and moralism but was also a 
savvy recognition of the national mood in the post-
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Vietnam, post-Watergate era”.85 This explains why no one 
was surprised at all by the intention of having an absolute 
commitment toward human rights, stated in Carter’s 
inaugural address. With respect to the Nixon-Ford years, it 
was definitely given much more emphasis to human rights, 
even though when Secretary Vance spoke before the Senate 
on February 24, 1977 he seemed to tone down the ‘absolute 
commitment’ of the administration. How much of a 
commitment, then? Cyrus Vance announced the 
administration’s intention to cut aids to Argentina, 
Uruguay and Ethiopia because of their gross violations of 
human rights.86 He also stated that human rights would 
have been incorporated in the U.S. foreign policy on a 
country-by-country basis. But, in any case, the political 
concern for human rights would have been balanced by 
economic and security goals. Therefore, perhaps it is safe to 
say that the efforts made by the administration would be 
more ‘relative’ than ‘absolute’. “The general message that 
emerged was that human rights would have a significant 
place in nearly all foreign policy decisions but that the 
amount of significance would depend upon the nature of 
                                                             
85 Schmidli, William M. Institutionalizing Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: 
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other variables involved and, therefore, the countries 
involved.”87 The “other variables” which the historian Lars 
Schoultz was possibly referring to were the strategic and 
economic interests the U.S. had toward human-rights-
violator countries. These interests would have certainly 
prevailed on human rights considerations, had the 
administration been forced to make a choice between the 
two.  A further aspect to take into account is that many of 
the major human rights violators were outside the U.S. 
sphere of influence.88  
“Once the Carter administration recognized that a 
universal, absolute standard of human rights would 
conflict with other foreign policy values to an intolerable 
extent – once the administration adopted a case-by-case 
approach to human rights abuses – attention shifted to 
the nations of Latin America. By the end of 1977, it was 
clear that the United States’ efforts to protect human 
rights were to be concentrated upon Latin America’s 
repressive governments”.89  
The Latin American region, historically linked to the 
United States with deep and intimate relations and not a 
focal Cold War theatre at the time, became the ideal place 
where to put into practice the new diplomatic directives. 
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It was necessary to set the overall approach toward the 
Latin American region: should the U.S. move away from 
the traditional regional special relationship? Maybe it was 
the time to drop the rhetoric about a special relationship 
and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional, or 
global levels depending on the issues. Definitely, the first 
thing to do was to define the U.S. interests in the 
hemisphere and then to decide on the need for a special 
relationship. Military and economic assistance could 
provide a good opportunity to influence Latin American 
governments on human rights and other matters.90 
According to National Security Adviser Brzezinski,  
 
“The notion of a special policy is ahistorical. […] The 
Monroe Doctrine which underlines this approach is no 
longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy which 
has embittered our relationships. […] if [the] 
relationships are to become healthier, then we need to 
put them on a more normal footing”.91 
 
For Brzezinski, two parallel strategies had to be 
implemented: on the one hand, the U.S. had to stress the 
bilateral relations with Latin American countries and, in the 
other, the region’s problems needed to be seen in a wider 
global context. The new administration’s intention not to 
have a “blanket policy for all cases” emerged clearly, since 
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it was very well aware that “constructive relations demand 
greater specificity”. Of major importance was to decide 
how to deal with military regimes.92 Deputy Secretary of 
State Christopher suggested to adjust U.S. relations so as to 
differentiate according to the kind of regime: 
 
“Warm relations with civilian and democratic 
governments, normal relations with non-repressive 
military regimes, and cool but correct relations with 
repressive governments”.93 
 
On this, there was a general consensus within the 
administration. 
But in the case of human rights, there was common 
agreement on the importance of having a similar policy for 
the hemisphere as for the rest of the world, because it was 
important to pursue a single policy on human rights. A 
major aim was to explore ways to express the human rights 
policy in a more affirmative manner. 
 
“The Executive should seek greater discretionary 
authority from Congress so as to be able to make 
important definitional distinctions. For example, we 
should define gross violations of human rights as torture 
or degrading treatment instead of denial of due process. 
This would draw a line in which only seven-to-ten 
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countries would be in violation rather than 60-to-80. Our 
influence on trying to mitigate repressive policies abroad 
is likely to increase proportionately”.94 
 
These recommendations were all incorporated in the 
President’s speech before the Permanent Council of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) held on April 14, 
1977. Carter announced before the –then 26– OAS member 
States the new approach the U.S. administration meant to 
have toward the hemisphere: 
 
“[…] a single United States policy toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean makes little sense. What we 
need is a wider and a more flexible approach, worked 
out in close consultation with you. Together, we will 
develop policies more suited to each nation's variety 
and potential. […] Our own goal is to address problems 
in a way which will lead to productive solutions--
globally, regionally, and bilaterally”95. 
 
Carter also announced that the U.S. new 
approach would be based on three elements: 
 
“First of all is a high regard for the individuality and 
the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean 
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nation. We will not act abroad in ways that we would 
not tolerate at home in our own country.  
Second is our respect for human rights, a respect which 
is also so much a part of your own tradition. Our values 
and yours require us to combat abuses of individual 
freedom, including those caused by political, social, and 
economic injustice. Our own concern for these values 
will naturally influence our relations with the countries 
of this hemisphere and throughout the world. You will 
find this country, the United States of America, eager to 
stand beside those nations which respect human rights 
and which promote democratic ideals.  
Third is our desire to press forward on the great issues 
which affect the relations between the developed and 
the developing nations. Your economic problems are 
also global in character and cannot be dealt with solely 
on regional terms”.96  
 
These words expressed two main ideas: it was true that 
the U.S. intended to outline a new kind of relationship with 
Latin America, namely to favor bilateral relations instead of 
having a generic regional approach, but the U.S. would still 
pay attention to Latin American regimes’ internal affairs 
“even if they were pro-United States in their foreign 
policies”. Carter intended to use human rights as the tool 
through which pressure Latin American governments for 
reform. The denial of human rights could not be 
overlooked any longer. Was it effectively, as John K. 
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Damico97 says, “a return to an emphasis on Wilsonian 
idealism”? Or was it rather realism expressed through 
idealistic concepts? However, Carter’s tactics differed from 
Wilson’s. “While Wilson tried to impose United States-style 
democracy on other peoples through military force, Carter 
would not consider that option. Instead, he would pursue a 
combination of economic sanctions, public and private 
nagging and dissociation in an effort to force foreign 
regimes to comply with international human rights 
standards”.98 
Also according to Schmidli, the policy shift represented 
by the Carter administration’s, and especially Patricia 
Derian’s, “highly visible human rights advocacy reflected a 
major rupture with the previous three decades of U.S. Cold 
War foreign policy toward Latin America”.99 This rupture 
was also deeply unwanted and opposed by Washington’s 
policymaking élite and the business community.  
 
The centrality of the Latin American region in the new 
administration’s foreign policy was proved by the 
publication on January 26, 1977100 of the Presidential 
Review Memorandum/NSC 17 on Latin America, which 
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dealt with the future developments of the U.S. diplomatic 
action toward the region. The PRM 17 stated the necessity 
of a study, to be completed by March 1, 1977, analyzing the 
major issues of concern to the U.S. and Latin America. The 
policy review had to concentrate on six areas of interest, 
one of which, listed as issue number 3, was precisely 
human rights. According to the document:  
“What options are available for U.S. foreign policy to 
reflect a higher and more effective level of concern for 
fundamental human rights in all nations? Options 
should be developed for U.S. policy in: a) bilateral 
relationships (taking into consideration distinctions 
between degrees of human rights violations and types 
of governments); (b) multilateral organizations […]; and 
(c) signing and ratification of various conventions, 
including the American Convention on Human Rights. 
A discussion should also be included of ways to 
strengthen the internal capacity of the U.S. Government 
to assess reports and to make determinations on 
‘consistent patterns of gross violations of human 
rights’”.101 
Carter refused to continue the past practice of 
overlooking the human rights abuses of U.S. allies102, and 
intended to do that especially with those countries 
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traditionally very close (both geographic and diplomatic 
terms) to the U.S. As Schmidli has affirmed, “Carter aimed 
to dramatically shift U.S. policy from subtle support for the 
military’s ‘dirty war’ to public condemnation of human 
rights violations”. The turnabout needed to be dramatic, 
and had to show immediately how deep was the change of 
attitude of the new administration. The institutions and the 
diplomatic corps had to put immediately into practice  the 
new directives. Within the Department of State, the two 
bureaus responsible for the implementation of United 
States policy on human rights in Latin America were the 
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) and the Bureau of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (HA). The 
former, responsible for the day-to-day diplomatic 
interaction with Latin American countries, was pretty 
reluctant in raising publicly the issue of human rights 
abuses. Schoultz underlines that “under the Carter 
administration the Bureau occasionally accepted the risk of 
straining relations. […] Throughout the late 1970s, the 
Bureau maintained its reputation for renitency on the 
human rights issue. Much of this reputation was 
underserved, for the Carter ARA regularly used quiet 
diplomacy in defense of human rights. But because it was 
quiet, ARA’s diplomacy often went unnoticed”.103 On the 
other hand, the Bureau of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs played a central and visible role 
during the years of the Carter administration. “Most of 
HA’s considerable bureaucratic strength stemmed, of 
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course, from President Carter’s emphasis upon the 
international protection of human rights, an emphasis that 
was most evident in United States policy toward Latin 
America”.104 In the near future, the administration intended 
to use the United States’ vast political and economic 
influence to stop disappearances and the use of torture, and 
to reduce the number of political prisoners. In the longer 
run, the U.S. aimed to encourage “greater respect for 
judicial independence and trade union rights, a relaxation 
of controls on freedom of the press and assembly, and 
progress toward political re-democratization”.105 
Throughout the 1970s the U.S. Congress had already 
sketched the legal framework in order to put the U.S. 
influence in practice especially in the field of military 
assistance, relating human rights and U.S. assistance 
programs. “For military assistance provide[d] the most 
direct, symbolic, as well as practical, relationship between 
[U.S.] government and the repressive practices of other 
governments”.106 Indeed, most repressive governments 
were military governments and, consequently, military aid 
was the best tool to impose “aid sanction” in the case of 
repressive governments. Section 502(B) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, revised and strengthened in 1976, denied 
all forms of military assistance and sales to governments 
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engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights. It was precisely 
according to section 502B that the Department of State was 
required to submit annually to the Congress a report on the 
status of human rights in each country which was to 
receive either military or development assistance. 
“Ironically, the most significant relationship of military 
assistance and human rights [was] taken at the initiative of 
several recipient Latin American governments. In response 
to State Department’s Human Rights Country Reports 
issued in 1977, the countries of Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Argentina and Uruguay decided, on their own 
initiative, that they would not accept U.S. military 
assistance. They did this on the grounds that they felt such 
treatment was insulting to their national dignity”.107 As 
shown in Table 1, during the years of the Carter 
administration the U.S. military assistance towards these 
countries either was totally suspended or was considerably 
cut with respect to the Ford administration. 
“Recently the President of the IDB stated that the 
majority of Latin American nations view human rights as a 
political problem which should not interfere in the 
economic deliberations of development institutions”.108 
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Table 1: U.S.  Military Assistance, Constant 2011 $US 
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook], http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/ 
Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on February 5, 2013 
tq—In 1976 the U.S. Government changed the fiscal year from July-June to October-September. The Transition Quarter (TQ) reports       
the 3 month adjustment period of July, August and September in 1976. 
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2.5 The United States and Brazil in the late 
1970s. 
The years of the Carter presidency are considered by 
the literature as the low point in the history of the bilateral 
relations between the United States and Brazil. It has to be 
acknowledged that so far there has been a limited 
historiographical interest on U.S.-Brazilian diplomatic 
relations during the four years of the Carter administration; 
still, in these recent years, some historians have focused on 
the topic a bit more attentively. And it is commonly 
observed that the policy of President Jimmy Carter led 
swiftly to a major crisis in U.S.-Brazilian relations109, up to 
the point that it is possible to consider those years as years 
of estrangement between the two countries110. “Carter 
singled out Brazil to test some of his ideas on non-
proliferation and human rights promotion” and this led to 
“increased acrimony in a relationship that had little prior 
experience of overt conflict”.111 It is true that Washington 
was upset by the nuclear ambitions of Brasilia and the 
refusal to abandon its nuclear development program and to 
suspend the agreements signed with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, but it was especially because of the dramatic 
shift in the realm of human rights that  tensions began to 
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escalate and “there were serious implications for the 
quality of the bilateral relations”.112 Since 1977, tensions and 
disagreements represented a constant in the dialogue 
between Washington and Brasilia, but it is perhaps an 
overstatement  to affirm that “the two countries disagreed 
on essentially every issue”.113  
What is necessary to be kept in mind is that the 
bilateral relationship, even if tense to an unprecedented 
extent, never ran the risk of being broken. There were 
moments in which the tension became very high, especially 
during the first year of the Carter mandate, but diplomatic 
efforts were continuously made to keep the dialogue could 
remain open. The major conflicts emerged because Brasilia 
interpreted the pressures about human rights as an 
infringement of Brazil’s national sovereignty, and therefore 
“the bilateral relationship lost any semblance of amicability 
experienced during Nixon’s or Ford’s presidency”.114 
During the years of these two administrations, in fact, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger managed to forge close 
relationship with the highest echelons of the Brazilian 
military government, especially with the Foreign Minister 
Antonio Azeredo da Silveira. The two foreign ministers 
had a very frank dialogue, a strong mutual respect, and a 
personal friendship. It had been on initiative of Henry 
Kissinger that the two countries had come to the signing of 
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the Memorandum of Understanding in February 1976. 
Kissinger intended to set up a formal arrangement, through 
which he could be sure the United States would have a 
special relationship with Brazil. Brazil was considered the 
key hemispheric country and the reason why it “mattered 
so much to the U.S. was that it had sufficient influence to be 
able to penetrate certain regions of the world where 
Washington simply had no diplomatic entry of its own”.115 
The Memorandum “provided for regular bilateral 
consultative meetings on a wide range of levels”, hence 
creating a “mechanism to insure that vital questions could 
be discussed routinely, before misunderstandings could 
grow”.116 On the Brazilian side, Silveira wanted an 
agreement establishing “high level consultations, between 
autonomous parts dealing under equal conditions”.117 The 
Kissinger-Silveira deal led to a robust U.S.-Brazil 
engagement. The United States recognized the rising 
international role of Brazil, and through the Memorandum 
of Understanding decided to formalize the decision to 
embrace and integrate it into its foreign policy strategy. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, if the news of the election 
of Jimmy Carter aroused very mild reactions in Brasilia. 
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“Although followed with intense interest, the election of 
Jimmy Carter was received calmly in Brazil, 
notwithstanding the candidate’s earlier critical references 
to the country’s internal political situation. President 
Geisel […] affirmed that ‘Brazil and the United States 
have always been traditionally friendly countries, and 
consequently there is no concern whatever on the part of 
Brazil over the result of the contest”.118 
 
The election was generally viewed as unlikely to alter 
close relations and the Brazilian military leadership 
intended to strengthen even further the existing ties. 
Carter’s critical statements were interpreted as campaign 
rhetoric which did not necessarily indicate his attitude as 
President. On the other hand, representatives of the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democratico 
Brasilero – MDB), the official opposition party to the 
military regime, warmly welcomed the news of the new 
U.S. president. They expressed “the belief that Jimmy 
Carter’s emphasis on democracy and human rights might 
have a positive impact abroad: 
For the Brazilian opposition the popular decision in the 
United States has a special connotation, having also in 
view the importance that Carter gave in his campaign to 
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the exercise and practice of democracy in brother 
countries”.119 
Certainly in the Brazilian opposition movements 
against the military regime, such as student groups, 
representatives of the Christian Church, politicians and 
supporters of the MDB there was sympathy and 
appreciation for Carter’s stance on human rights.120 
However, the prevailing view was that Carter did not 
represent a basic change in the American political system 
and that, among other factors, the strategic importance of 
Brazil in the Western world would guarantee a continuance 
of cordial relations.121 According to a CIA estimate of 
January 1977: 
“The prospect of a Carter administration has generally 
been viewed favorably throughout Latin America. 
Brazilian officials, however, are concerned about the 
incoming administration’s  negative views of Brazil’s 
nuclear accord with West Germany  [...].  Foreign  
Minister  Silveira  [...]  said  that  the  period  of  better 
understanding  with  the  US  is  about  to  end.  
Although  President  Geisel  has expressed the hope that 
the traditionally close relationship with the U.S.  will be 
maintained and strengthened, he can be expected to 
register a sharp protest if the nuclear   contracts  with  the  
Germans  fall  through  or  if  implementation  is 
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postponed. Putting the  nuclear controversy aside, most 
Brazilians hope that U.S. leaders will continue to treat  
Brazil  as  an emerging power and will  work to 
strengthen bilateral economic ties”.122 
 
Nevertheless, as the following paragraphs will show, in 
the first months of the Carter mandate the dialogue 
between the two countries would reach very harsh tones. I 
will proceed chronologically, reviewing the main 
developments of the U.S.-Brazilian relationship, 
highlighting  three key turning points of the four years 
1977-1981. In March 1977, the State Department released 
the human rights report assessing the respect and the 
protection of fundamental human rights in Brazil: this was 
the moment in which the diplomatic crisis burned up. The 
following year, in March 1978, President Carter visited 
Brazil: in this occasion, there was a partial diplomatic 
rapprochement between the two countries. Finally, in 
March 1979 João Baptista Figueiredo became the new 
President of Brazil, the Brazilian military dictatorship 
entered a new phase and the diplomatic relations with the 
United States gradually improved. 1979 was a year that 
represented a turning moment in the Brazilian internal 
history, but it was also –and especially– a decisive year for 
the wider international context. The second oil shock, the 
Iran hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
                                                             
122 CIA Intelligence Memorandum Foreign perceptions of the incoming US 
administration, January 7, 1977, Top Secret, CIA Records Search Tool 
(Hereinafter CREST), NARA. 
 
64 
 
caused a dramatic shift of attention towards other issues 
rather than the human rights policy. The United States 
rushed down again in a Cold War climate, assertiveness 
and security had to became the new foreign policy 
guidelines. 
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3. CARTER SWORN INTO OFFICE: THE 
DIPLOMATIC CRISIS ARISES. 
 
3.1 The nuclear issue. 
The very first weeks after Jimmy Carter was sworn into 
office as the 39th President of the United States were 
immediately characterized, among the other things, by 
intense and constant contacts with the Brazilian military 
leadership. But it was not because of human rights that a 
rift emerge between the two countries, the issue of 
contention was nuclear technology. 
The Brazilian necessity to look for alternative energy 
sources was due to the fact that the country didn’t have 
fossil fuels and, moreover, since 1973 the price of oil had 
increased four times. Brazil wanted to acquire a nuclear 
capacity to meet its needs of developing country. The 
acquisition of nuclear technology was “as issue on which 
the U.S. had strong views”123, especially if it included the 
complete fuel cycle, that is to say the nuclear plant plus the 
uranium-enriching technology, because it could be used to 
produce also nuclear weapons. And, since the end of WWII 
and even more in the 1960s/1970s, the U.S. had campaigned 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. 
Given that the Soviets, the British and the French had 
become very rapidly self-sufficient in all phases of the 
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nuclear technology, the U.S. started to assume a very firm 
stance towards less powerful developing countries that 
wanted to develop atomic power. “In the short run such 
countries had little choice but to seek nuclear technology, 
which in Brazil’s case meant the U.S.”.124 In fact, in 1972 the 
U.S. company Westinghouse Electric signed a contract to 
build the first Brazilian nuclear power plant and to supply 
enriched fuel from its plant in Tennessee. In 1973, also due 
to the first oil shock which increased the oil prices to levels 
never reached before, the Brazilians started to press 
Westinghouse asking for a contract that would provide 
them with the entire fuel cycle. But the American company 
in response offered only more reactors, with the 
assumption that Brazil would have continued to depend on 
the U.S. for enriched fuel. In 1974 the Brazilian government 
decided that couldn’t bear any longer to depend on a 
foreign source for the crucial element in the nuclear fuel 
cycle, also because in the meantime India obtained the 
technology from the Canadians and exploded the bomb in 
May 1974. India was the first country of the Third World to 
get the bomb and this news deeply annoyed the Brazilian 
government. Finally, when the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission announced that the U.S. could no longer 
guarantee the supply of enriched uranium, Brazil realized 
that it was definitely time to seek out alternative nuclear 
powers.125 It was thus in record time and strict secrecy that 
Silveira worked out an agreement with West Germany that 
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would grant Brazil the entire nuclear-fuel cycle.126 West 
Germany seemed to be the best country to address: it had a 
very advanced nuclear technology and, on the other hand, 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was one of the 
poles around which Brazil wanted to build its new 
international geopolitics. The agreement between the two 
countries was signed in June 1975 and the news came on 
the international scenario as a bolt from the blue; the U.S. 
was also totally surprised and deeply concerned. The 
apprehension was justified by the prospects of a Brazilian 
nuclear weapon. After all, to use Spektor’s words, “this was 
an authoritarian military regime with growing 
international-power aspirations which had refused to sign 
the NPT”127 (Non Proliferation Treaty) in 1968. As soon as 
the U.S. knew about the deal, Washington started to put 
pressure on Bonn in order to increase controls. Neither the 
U.S. nor the FRG ever spoke to the Brazilians about their 
contacts. 
U.S. pressures were quite mild, also because the personal 
friendship between Kissinger and Silveira made possible a 
continuation of the dialogue also between their respective 
countries.  
With the election of Jimmy Carter the nuclear issue 
gained impetus, since the new President put a high priority 
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on preventing nuclear proliferation and had decided to 
make it one of the core themes of its foreign policy.  
 “Brazil’s approximation to becoming nuclear power 
certainly woke up Washington to the real potential of its 
historically pacific southern neighbor. The Carter 
administration’s concern with Brazil, coupled with the 
acknowledgment of its importance, led to a high degree of 
policy attention”.128 
 
Both the human rights and the nuclear non-
proliferation issues were raised in the weeks after 
November 5, 1976, when Jimmy Carter was elected, even 
before the inauguration of his presidency. Despite the 
lukewarm optimism expressed by the Brazilian 
government about the conservation of friendly relations 
with the U.S. as soon as Carter’s victory was announced, 
anxiety and defensiveness rapidly emerged. In the end of 
November 1976, the U.S. ambassador in Brasilia Crimmins 
wrote: 
“Anxiety has mounted since President-elect’s comments 
about Brazil’s military government in Playboy 
interview129, his continuing emphasis on human rights 
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and his recent comments about using diplomatic means 
to bring about reconsiderations of the transfer of 
sensitive nuclear technology such as the FGR-Brazil 
agreement”.130 
Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, seemed to be 
reconsidering the results and the consequences of the 
election of President-elect Carter. In Congress, both the 
government party (ARENA) and the opposition party 
(MDB) decided to discuss about the first statements of 
president-elect Carter about human rights and nuclear 
reprocessing. ARENA spokesmen voiced relatively mild 
criticism, trying to avoid frictions with the new U.S. 
administration, while MDB spokesmen welcomed Carter’s 
human rights remarks, but defended the Brazil-FRG 
nuclear agreement.131 
Once Carter entered into office on January 20, 1977, it 
was precisely the nuclear issue that was immediately 
tackled. Only a few days after the inauguration, vice 
President Mondale flew to Bonn to meet Chancellor 
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Helmut Schmidt and inform him about the absolute U.S. 
opposition to the Brazil-FRG nuclear deal. Brasilia was not 
informed at all about the U.S.-FRG conversations and, 
when the Brazilian government found the news132, its 
reaction was really bad. “It was troubling that the week-old 
Carter administration would take such swift and dramatic 
action against the nuclear accord—widely considered a 
great diplomatic victory by Brazilians and dear to 
nationalist sentiment in Brazil”.133 The U.S. behavior 
showed to be quite contrary to the agreements guaranteed 
by the 1976 Memorandum of Understanding, which stated 
that all matters of concern to both the United States and 
Brazil would be discussed directly between the two 
nations. In this case, this was not true and the American 
government bypassed the Brazilians. It was only on March 
1, 1977 that a U.S. delegation, led by Deputy Secretary of 
State Christopher, arrived in Brasilia to discuss directly 
with the Brazilian government about the German-Brazilian 
nuclear accord. Still, there are not U.S. records available but 
only a summary of the meeting written by chanceler 
Silveira134. Silveira’s description of the events is very precise 
and he attentively tells about the three meetings held on 
March 1, 1977: two in the morning and one in the 
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afternoon135. Christopher stressed many times that the U.S. 
did not intend to convince Brazil to abrogate the nuclear 
agreement with the Germans, but to offer some 
alternatives. More specifically, Warren Christopher said 
that president Carter’s major interest was to discuss 
bilaterally the Brazilian development of nuclear explosives 
capabilities and to express the American will to cooperate 
in order to solve the increasing Brazilian energy needs. The 
Brazilians, instead, seemed to be more interested in 
discussing multilaterally the global development of nuclear 
weapons and did not intend to suspend the nuclear 
program. No result was achieved during the three rounds 
of meeting and Warren Christopher and his entourage left 
Brazil the day after their arrival, earlier than scheduled. 
Then, the U.S. pressures resulted to be totally ineffectual. 
Nevertheless, on March 25, 1977 Jimmy Carter wrote a 
letter to the Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel referring to 
“the frank talks that Deputy Secretary Christopher and 
Foreign Minister Silveira had on March 1”, talks that Carter 
considered “another helpful step in our relationship”136. 
Furthermore, Carter explicitly referred to the non-
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proliferation issues on which the two countries had a 
different approach: 
 
“We recognize how important these questions are 
for Brazil. The proposals we have made to your 
Government represent our serious and sincere effort to 
take into account your need for expanded and secure 
energy resources. They also represent an attempt to 
help develop a new global framework that will preserve 
the distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful uses 
of the atom. I know that you share this goal, and I hope 
that our temporary differences will not prevent you 
from joining us to find mutually acceptable 
solutions”.137 
 
Despite the mildly optimistic tones expressed by 
President Carter, it actually happened that the unsuccessful 
Mondale and Christopher missions negatively affected the 
atmosphere of the U.S.-Brazil dialogue. Only three days 
after Christopher left Brasilia, in fact, the human rights 
issue made its explosive appearance on the bilateral 
agenda.  
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3.2 The human rights report. 
 
Was the human rights rhetoric the expression of a new 
political discourse in the international scenario, the tool 
through which let the détente be the paradigm of 
international relations? Or was it rather a way to assert the 
continuing primacy of the United States, precisely 
reaffirming the bipolar logic of the Cold War 
confrontation? A moral rhetoric with very pragmatic 
purposes: the respect of basic human rights became a new 
way to influence the behavior of allies and friends and to 
exert pressures, enough to condition a foreign 
government’s eligibility to United States military aid and 
arms sales on its human rights record. 
The amendments made in 1976 to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, namely through the introduction of the 
section 502(B), mandated the preparation of Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices about the countries receiving 
security assistance from the United States. In case the 
recipient countries resulted to be persistent violators of 
basic human rights, the military aid had to be suspended. It 
needs to be highlighted that the country report on Brazil 
was prepared and finalized by December 1976138, still 
during the Ford administration and under the supervision 
of the Department of State headed by Henry Kissinger. The 
reports were divided into four sections: political situation, 
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legal situation, observance of internationally recognized 
human rights, and other human rights reporting; in the 
final section the State Department compared its opinion 
with that of specialized human rights organizations, such 
as Amnesty International or Freedom House.  
 
The human rights report on Brazil did not express 
severe judgments and offered an accurate description of the 
respect of human rights within the Brazilian territory. The 
assessment about the internal political situation was rather 
positive, recognizing the Geisel administration’s 
commitment to “a gradual relaxation of the strict 
centralized controls over political and civil liberties”.139 The 
report acknowledged some improvements in recent months 
and stated: “Since January 1976, […] human rights 
advocates […] have stated in public reports and interviews 
that persons arrested in security cases are for the most part 
not being subjected to torture or harsh conditions of 
interrogation or confinement; very few charges of abuse 
have arisen in this time period involving political 
detention”.140 Nevertheless, even though the Brazilian 
government had started to put into practice 
countermeasures and investigations, “various kinds of 
police abuses not involving political detainees ha[d] 
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continued unabated […]. The ‘death squads’, believed to be 
clandestine associations of off-duty policemen, prey[d] 
mostly on common criminals and suspects; their victims 
show[ed] evidence of torture”. There were still undeniable 
negative aspects in the decade-long military dictatorship, 
but Geisel’s abertura was praised.141 It was noted, for 
example, that media censorship was at “its lowest level 
since the mid-sixties”. As required by law, the final part of 
the report cited recent investigations and analyses made by 
organizations such as Amnesty International, the Red 
Cross, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
and the International Commission of Jurists. Finally, the 
report quoted the Freedom House’s evaluation of the 
Brazilian political situation as “partially free”. According to 
the historian Timothy Power, “the March 1977 report was a 
reasonably accurate portrayal of the Brazilian situation at 
the time”.142 
It had been arranged that the reports had to be 
delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Assistance on March 4, 1977. The final draft of the 
report on Brazil was sent to the U.S. embassy in Brasilia in 
the afternoon of March 3, and the day after it would 
become an official and public document. The U.S. 
ambassador, John Crimmins, decided to release right away 
the file to Brazilian officials. Just a few hours later the 
Brazilians returned the report and their reaction was 
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incensed. “The Geisel government reacted with calculated 
fury. Foreign Minister Silveira denounced the intolerable 
interference in Brazil’s internal affairs. By pursuing the 
cause of human rights through bilateral aid, the U.S. 
Congress had aroused Brazilian nationalism”.143 
It was only among the ranks of the Catholic Church 
that the human rights report was greeted warmly and 
appreciated. Cardinal Arns, major opponent to the military 
regime and tireless defender of human rights, affirmed that 
the report “was one of the most significant recent 
developments in Brazil”144 and believed that its publication 
“stemmed a trend toward deterioration in human rights 
practices in Brazil”.145 Cardinal Arns stated it was necessary 
to publicize the text more in order to keep the human rights 
issue well in the foreground of government and public 
concerns. 
Still, the Brazilian government considered the 
assessment made by the U.S. human rights report as an 
intolerable interference in its own internal affairs. The 
Brazilian government, as a consequence, decided, first, to 
unilaterally denounce the U.S.-Brazilian Military 
Agreement signed in March 1952 and, then, to refuse in 
advance any military assistance for 1977. Actually, it was a 
symbolic action which slightly affected the Brazilian 
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military capabilities. The military aid refused by the 
Brazilian government totaled, in fact, just U.S. $50 million 
of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program of 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
Program for credits of arms purchasing (just the 2.5% of the 
Brazilian defense budget, as Spektor notes146) plus $100,000 
for training. Brazil was rapidly moving toward arms self-
sufficiency, provided for itself of 75% of its own military 
needs and was becoming one of the major exporters of 
military materials. The military accord with the U.S. had, 
therefore, a diplomatic significance rather than a concrete 
usefulness and the choice to denounce it represented a 
symbolic shift in the history of bilateral relations. Brasilia 
was sending the clear message to Washington that no one 
could dare to interfere in matters of national sovereignty, 
not even the historical hemispheric ally, whose help indeed 
Brazil could now do without. It signaled a strong 
deterioration of the relationship between the two countries. 
According to the Brazilian military, U.S. human rights 
policy had become “exceedingly interventionist”147 and 
Geisel’s decision was praised even by some MDB leaders, 
who “closed ranks publicly behind the government”.148  
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On March 11, 1977 the Government of Brazil officially 
announced its decision on the 1952 military agreement and 
declared:  
“As a consequence of the introduction of changes in U.S. 
law, which unacceptably changed the conditions in which 
the military cooperation between the two countries had 
been processing under the auspices of the Agreement 
signed in Rio de Janeiro on March 15, 1952, the Brazilian 
Government informed the Government of the United 
States of America […]of  its decision to terminate the 
Agreement. This attitude is the consequence, for the same 
reasons, of the refusal to accept any assistance in the 
military field that -directly or indirectly- depends on the 
examination by foreign government agencies in matters 
which, by their nature, are under the sole jurisdiction of 
the Brazilian Government”.149 
On that same day, a Weekly National Security Report 
stated: 
 
“The effects of a new US  policy on human rights 
continued  to  reverberate throughout  the  Southern  Cone  
countries  of Latin  America  [...]  Expressions  of national  
indignation  have   been   heard  from  these  countries  
individually  and collectively. Today Brazil cancelled its 
25  year old Mutual Defense Agreement with the United 
States. Internally, moderates – urging a  better policy on 
human rights – and hard liners – urging a tough response 
to US interference – are debating the kind of response 
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which these countries should take”. 150 
 
Such a tough reaction was quite unexpected in 
Washington, but after the tensions emerged because of the 
nuclear issue, the mood in the Brazilian military was 
already nervous and the human rights report was greeted 
with enmity. The U.S. had to think carefully on how to deal 
with the Brazilians in the coming weeks, since U.S. policy 
toward Brazil needed to consider the country’s size, 
importance, and growth potential.  
Immediately, the Department of State and the Pentagon 
started to analyze what implications the withdrawal from 
the 1952 military agreement could have and what 
developments might have the military cooperation between 
the two countries could ensue.151 But also the Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance considered it also appropriate to write a 
letter to the Brazilian chanceler Silveira to express his worry 
about the recent episodes. Vance wrote he had “watched 
with concern the direction in which [the U.S.-Brazil] 
relations ha[d] been moving in the past month”152 and 
                                                             
150 Weekly Report, Weekly National Security Report #4, March 11, 1977, 
“Weekly Reports (to the President), Box 41, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 
Jimmy Carter Library. 
151 Telegrama, Acordo Militar Brasil - Estados Unidos. Reunião para 
esclarecimentos Sugestão do Departamento de Estado, April 11, 1977, Secreto 
Exclusivo Urgente, AAS mre be 1974.03.15. 
152 Minuta de Telegrama, Corrispondência entre o Ministro de Estado e o 
Secretário de Estado Cyrus Vance, March 14, 1977, Secreto Exclusivo 
Urgentissimo, AAS mre be 1974.03.15. 
80 
 
stressed the mutually important interests of the two 
countries and the “need to pay attention to detail and 
understand each other’s style”. Vance moreover 
emphasized how important was for the U.S. administration 
to maintain friendly relations with Brazil. These 
conciliatory tones show that “the Americans were 
concerned with the downward spiral and made overtures 
to increase bilateral dialogue”.153  
Bitterness and resentment could not be the leading 
forces of the bilateral relationship. In PRM 17, Brazil had 
already been pointed out, together with Cuba, Mexico and 
Central America, as one of the “special countries” the U.S. 
had to deal with. In the NSC document it was asked:  
“What are U.S. interests, and in the light of those 
interests what should U.S. objectives be? What options 
and strategies are available to the U.S. to attain those 
objectives?”.154 
Since the very first days, it was clear that the new 
administration had to study attentively the new attitude to 
have toward some Latin American countries with which 
sensitive issues were at stake. No doubt that Brazil, with 
the two delicate topics of nuclear proliferation and human 
rights, represented a special country to the U.S. foreign 
policy in the hemisphere. “Brazil’s major power potential 
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pose[d] unique challenges for U.S. policy formulation”155 
and moreover the Carter administration perceived an 
increasing mistrust in the Brazilian government about the 
U.S. willingness to support its aspirations. The core point 
was to decide how close the bilateral ties had to be. The 
U.S. wished to: protect its trade and investment interests; 
maintain access to Brazil’s strategic minerals; preserve 
Brazil as a constructive participant in inter-American affairs 
and as a  contributor to hemispheric security; and, finally, 
encourage Brazil to keep its role in the North-South 
dialogue. It was strategically important to keep bilateral 
channels open, in order to enhance the U.S. possibilities for 
influencing Brazil on its upward course. The most 
widespread belief was that “the closer the consultative 
relationship, the more it [could] be expected to attenuate 
bilateral problems and encourage Brazilian cooperation on 
many international issues”.156 
This is the reason why the First Lady Rosalynn Carter 
could not omit to go to Brazil in her trip to Latin America 
planned for June 1977, in order to reaffirm her husband’s 
commitment to the international respect of human rights 
but to try to keep open at the same time a dialogue with 
the Latin American most powerful nation. 
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4. THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC VISITS AND 
THEIR SIGNIFICANCE. 
 
 
4.1 June 1977: Rosalynn Carter’s trip to Brasilia and 
Recife. 
 
After the unfortunate (and very quick) visit of Warren 
Christopher at the beginning of March 1977, the trip 
Rosalynn Carter made to Brazil in June 1977 was the first 
important diplomatic mission of representatives of the new 
administration to Brazil. It is worth to note that in less than 
one year two other important official trips were made to 
Brazil: the one of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 
November 1977 and the one of President Carter himself in 
March 1978. They were proof of the serious effort the 
Carter administration put in repairing the breach occurred 
in the relationship after the publication of the human rights 
report.  
On May 3, 1977 President Carter announced that the 
following month his wife Rosalynn would make a trip to 
seven Latin American countries; he took advantage of a 
meeting held in Washington with the ambassadors of the 
Latin American countries producing and exporting 
sugar.157 Rosalynn Carter would go to Jamaica, Costa Rica, 
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Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Jimmy 
Carter writes in his White House diary: 
 
“My hope and expectation are that her conversations will 
both convince the people of these countries of our 
interest and friendship and also provide the leaders with 
an avenue directly to me for their problems, 
opportunities, and requests from our own 
government”.158 
 
Rosalynn Carter visited Brazil on June 6-8, 1977 and 
four were the main points that she was planning to discuss: 
 
“During her visit, Mrs. Carter would hope: A. To review 
with leading Brazilian officials the basic thrust and 
purposes of the Carter Administration’s global foreign 
policy in relation to patterns of international change [...]; 
B. To elicit the views of Brazilian   leaders   on   how   
cooperation   between   the   two   countries   can   be 
strengthened and to review informally the overall  
framework of relations; C. To exchange ideas on major 
issues in bilateral relations, as well as  on multilateral 
cooperation on human rights and arms restraints; D. To 
elaborate some of the new directions contained in the 
President’s OAS speech of April 14159, discussing ways in 
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which the U.S. and Brazil can cooperate most effectively 
in advancing them”.160 
 
Rosalynn Carter studied a lot and for several weeks 
before her trip to Latin America. Also the day before her 
departure, Jimmy Carter took note in his diary that “he 
spent several hours answering questions that she had listed 
from her twenty-five or thirty hours of briefings by the 
National Security Council and the State Department”.161 
The administration was very well aware that the fact of 
sending the wife of the President could be interpreted as 
provocative, as if the U.S. didn’t take seriously the hosting 
countries. Rosalynn Carter studied in depth the political 
situation of the countries she was going to visit and knew 
well the topics she had to deal with.  
Rosalynn Carter was accompanied by Terence Todman 
and Robert Pastor, the former served at the time as 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and 
the latter was the National Security Advisor on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. At her arrival in Brasilia on 
June 6, 1977, Mrs. Carter was coldly greeted with a one-
sentence welcome by Foreign Minister Silveira but 
nevertheless the tones throughout the meeting held soon 
after were frank and cordial. 
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Rosalynn Carter and Silveira met at the Itamaraty 
building in the afternoon of that same day. All the points 
considered sensitive to the bilateral relationship were 
examined: the Brazilian nuclear ambitions, the diplomatic 
relations between Brazil and its neighbor countries, the 
Brazilian view on the South African apartheid and the 
presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and of course 
conversations focused especially on the possible future 
development of U.S.-Brazil dialogue and on the way the 
human rights issue could affect it.162 
Remembering the words of the First Lady, Silveira wrote in 
a personal note: 
 
 
“The current President [Carter] would consider important 
to further expand these relations and give attention to all 
the people, their ideas, their problems. Latin America, and 
Brazil in particular, would be very important in this 
context. Mrs. Carter stated that Brazil is a leading country 
in the developing world, and that the current 
administration shares this view and for this reason her trip 
is so important. She affirmed that the U.S. government 
would like to work with us, to know our opinion and point 
of view on how international relations can develop”.163 
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Mrs. Carter recognized the growing importance of the 
role of the developing countries in the international 
scenario and affirmed the intention of president Carter to 
give support to a widening North-South dialogue, 
considering also the simultaneous relaxation of the tensions  
between  East and West. Equally important point brought 
up immediately after was the necessity to  recognize and 
respect  internationally human rights. “While Mrs. Carter 
was careful not to criticize her  hosts, neither did she retreat 
from previous U.S. rhetoric in favor of human rights”164 and 
this was a hard task considered the difficulties the bilateral 
relations were experiencing. But Rosalynn Carter actually 
managed to have frank and calm conversations both with 
Silveira and Geisel, not losing the opportunity at the same 
time of meeting Brazilian human rights activists and 
dissidents. 
During his meeting with the First Lady, Silveira 
affirmed that also Brazil considered essential the respect of 
human rights and that, therefore, his country wanted to 
participate actively  in the international  discussion about  
guidelines and recommendations on the topic. And in fact 
he said: 
 
 
“Brazil's opinion on [human rights] has been well 
understood by most of the international community, as 
proved by the fact that Brazil has been elected, as the 
fourth most voted country, by the members of the 
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Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to 
integrate the Human Rights Commission of the UN. In that 
vote, I want to remark, the United States obtained just one 
vote more than Brazil”.165 
 
The following morning, June 7, 1977 Mrs. Carter met 
for a bit more than one hour the Brazilian President Ernesto 
Geisel.166 The conversation first tackled the non-
proliferation issue. Mrs. Carter noted that her husband 
wished to achieve disarmament and to stop nuclear 
proliferation and that, in the first four months in office, the 
new administration had already started to work in this 
sense. She moreover stated that in the hemisphere 
President Carter considered fundamental the protection of 
human rights and acknowledged the importance of the 
respect of the sovereignty of each country. Jimmy Carter 
was sending through her wife a message of friendship and 
collaboration: he wished to develop an intense dialogue, 
both in bilateral and multilateral contexts, with those 
countries that were proving to have a growing importance 
in the international scenario, such as Indonesia, Iran, 
Venezuela and Brazil. It was very important for the U.S. to 
have frequent and frank consultations with these countries.  
President Geisel deeply appreciated the friendly 
message expressed by Mrs. Carter’s words and started 
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replying about the human rights issue. Geisel stated that 
his country shared completely the relevance of the respect 
of human rights but emphasized that, to assure a high life 
standard to its citizens, a country must achieve a high 
economic development. It was not the case of Brazil yet. 
Brazil was still a developing country that in the last years 
had put serious efforts in the fields of housing, food, 
education, and health. “It was not possible, therefore, to 
ignore the necessity of fighting intrinsic difficulties faced 
by every underdeveloped country”.167 The conversation 
ended with the plea of Mrs. Carter for the Brazilian 
signature and ratification of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.168 When Rosalynn called her husband that 
night, she expressed her concern “about her conversations 
with the foreign minister of Brazil, Silveira. She felt they 
wanted to be friendly but were trying to prove that Brazil 
is equal with us and will not be dominated”. Furthermore, 
Rosalynn Carter reported that the Brazilians seemed to be 
upset about the U.S. SALT negotiations with the Soviets 
and that they strongly opposed the Convention on Human 
Rights.169 
The bilateral conversations continued that night 
during a dinner offered by President Geisel at the official 
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residence of the President of Brazil (Palácio da Alvorada). 
The talk focused mainly on the nuclear issue, that was left 
out during the morning because of the short time 
available. Mrs. Carter declared that her husband was not 
contrary at all to the use of nuclear energy as energy 
source and that he totally understood the Brazilian 
stance.170 Mrs. Carter moreover expressed the U.S. 
preoccupation for the Brazilian decision not to sign the 
NPT. Giving elusive answers about this, President Geisel 
just affirmed that Brazil did not intend anymore to depend 
on other countries for the supply of raw materials. He 
acknowledged he had a more realistic approach to the 
international relations than Jimmy Carter and stated that 
disarmament, even if an enticing and ambitious target, 
required such a deep change of mentality that could be 
achieved only in a long term.171 
The intense consultations Mrs. Carter had with the 
representatives of the Brazilian government didn’t have 
any concrete effect but they certainly did have some 
diplomatic consequences. First, they were the proof that, 
despite the confrontational attitude assumed by the 
Brazilians after the publication of the human rights report, 
both sides wanted to preserve a dialogue. On the one 
hand, Silveira and Geisel  wanted  to  prove  that  their  
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country  was  respected  and  supported  by  the 
international community and that, probably, the U.S. was 
too severe in criticizing its human rights practices. On the 
other hand, despite the major frictions emerged in the last 
months, Washington would make all the necessary efforts 
to avoid diplomatic estrangement with Brazil, that was a 
key-country strategically important to the U.S., but at the 
same time would continue to push on both the human 
rights and nuclear fronts.  This determination was 
confirmed by the fact that, despite the harsh critiques 
moved to Kissinger’s attitudes toward Brazil and the 
signature of the 1976 Memorandum of Understanding, the 
document was considered still in forc. About this, in a 
letter wrote on June 22, 1977 from Vance to Silveira it was 
possible to read: 
 
“I am happy to confirm in this letter that the United States 
considers that the Memorandum   of   Understanding   of   
February   21,   1976   between   our   two governments 
remains in effect. Consistent with our discussion, my staff 
will begin to plan a visit to Brazil for a formal consultative 
session with you in the last two weeks of October”.172 
 
Rosalynn Carter left Brazil on June 8, 1977 but, before 
going back to Washington D.C., she decided to travel to 
Recife to meet personal friends and “in a dramatic move 
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[…] agreed to meet with Lawrence Rosebaugh and Thomas 
Capuano”173, both U.S. citizens who resided and worked in 
Brazil as missionaries of the Catholic and Mennonite 
Churches respectively. In May the two men had been 
arrested and detained by the Recife police for three days 
without being charged of any crime. The U.S. Embassy had 
written to the Brazilian Foreign Minister on June 1, 1977 to 
have some clarifications about the events.  
 
“The Embassy of the United States can only note with 
deep concern the poor treatment accorded to Messrs. 
Rosebaugh and Capuano by local authorities at the 
moment of their arrest and during their subsequent 
detention. […] The detention of the two men […] was 
arbitrary in that no charges were placed against them and 
they had no opportunity to secure consular, legal or other 
advice or assistance, or to bring the matter of their 
detention before the judiciary. […] The Government of the 
United States notes […] the violations of the human rights 
of the American detainees through the inhuman and 
degrading treatment they suffered while in the hands of 
the local authorities”.174 
 
When Mrs. Carter made her trip to Brazil, therefore, the 
episode had recently happened and she decided to meet 
the two missionaries with a twofold purpose: first, she 
intended to give them all the support of the U.S. 
government and, second, she meant to symbolize the 
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serious U.S. commitment to human rights. The U.S. did not 
tolerate human rights abuses, especially in the case they 
interested American citizens abroad. According to Robert 
Pastor, Rosalynn Carter “succeeded in walking a very fine 
line between offending the government and encouraging 
the opposition” and had managed to keep human rights on 
the bilateral agenda, “but in a far more positive way than in 
the days of March”.175 
A few days after Mrs. Carter’s return to Washington, 
Ernesto Geisel wrote a letter to Jimmy Carter giving his 
impressions and comments about the recent visit. 
Frankness and availability to talk about any issue 
considered important by Mrs. Carter were the principal 
Brazilian attitudes, Geisel stated. The Brazilian President 
recalled the main points of the conversations held about 
human rights, nuclear proliferation and disarmament. 
Furthermore, he wanted to state once more that, 
according to his opinion, the United States and Brazil had 
common objectives in both the human rights and nuclear 
issues, but there were radically different points of view 
about the way to achieve them.176 
President Carter was “greatly pleased with the 
success of [Rosalynn’s] visit to Brazil”177 and, he 
continued, “from our side we believe that this direct 
exchange was invaluable in giving us a better perception 
of the Brazilian view of world problems, and of Brazil’s 
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national goals and aspirations. We hope that it also 
contributed to increased Brazilian understanding of some 
of the major directions and objectives of United States 
policies”.178 Jimmy Carter saw his wife’s visit to Brazil as 
an important element for the two countries’ ongoing 
dialogue and was confident of the importance of 
continuing a personal correspondence with Geisel on 
matters which required their attention.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The aftermath of Rosalynn Carter’s trip. 
 
The press gave wide coverage to the visit of the First 
Lady to Brazil. The two pivots of Carter’s foreign policy 
caused both serious frictions and misunderstandings with 
the Brazilian government: it was probably for this reason 
that the press decided to make aware the public opinion 
on the diplomatic actions implemented by Rosalynn 
Carter. The Brazilian stop was considered the biggest 
challenge in her Latin American trip, and certainly Mrs. 
Carter’s diplomatic skills would have been tested if she 
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was to repair the “needlessly strained relations between 
the two countries”.179 “While the dispute over the nuclear 
reprocessing plant was the major cause of the chilling of 
relations between the two large Western Hemisphere 
nations, human rights ha[d] been another thorny issue”, 
the Washington Post stated.180 Rosalynn Carter had 
indeed a very delicate task: she had to deal with a deeply 
resentful Brazilian leadership, that did not expect at all to 
discuss such sensitive topics (as nuclear non-proliferation 
and human rights) with a woman, even though this 
woman was the wife of the U.S. president. Indeed, she 
received a low-key reception “in contrast with the 
elaborate welcomes she ha[d] received in other countries 
that she ha[d] visited in her two-week, seven nation tour 
of Latin America”.181 Foreign minister Silveira greeted 
Rosalynn Carter just with one sentence expressing “the 
pleasure and satisfaction the Government ha[d] in 
receiving Mrs. Carter”.182 On the contrary, Mrs. Carter’s 
arrival statement greeted warmly the Brazilian people 
and stated that she was looking for meeting the Brazilian 
leaders and discussing with them issues that concerned 
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both countries, the region and the world.183 In this, she 
had to make any possible effort to initiate a U.S.-Brazil 
rapprochement and, at the same time, she had to stress 
the U.S. deep commitment to human rights. The First 
Lady needed to find the way to balance public and quiet 
diplomacy. And she actually managed to do this. As we 
know from the Brazilian records, during her private 
conversations with the Brazilian leaders Rosalynn made 
clear to them Jimmy Carter’s position on human rights, 
never avoiding the question. On the other hand, she 
significantly exposed herself to the criticism of the 
Brazilian government as well as of the public opinion 
when she decided to visit the two American missionaries 
in Recife. And the U.S. press emphasized the bad 
conditions the U.S. missionaries had to suffer during their 
unjustified imprisonment. Capuano told reporters he felt 
himself being turned into an animal; “you could hear 
cries, groans of people getting beaten. He said he and 
Rosebaugh were in a cell 10 feet wide and 25 feet long 
that contained 34 men, all naked. […] There were wall to 
wall bodies. When it came time to lie down, there was no 
room to lie down”.184 This was the most effective way to 
raise the human rights issue in the country and to inform 
the public opinion, especially outside Brazil. Indeed, 
ambassador Crimmins wrote to inform Foggy Bottom 
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that in those days a heavy press coverage was given 
precisely to the Brazilian reactions to Mrs. Carter’s 
meeting with the missionaries in the U.S. consulate in 
Recife. Citing some popular Brazilian newspapers, 
Crimmins wrote: 
 
“Front page teaser in June 10 Correio Brasiliense 
claimed that Mrs. Carter’s act of posing for photographs 
at the U.S. consulate in Recife […] ‘offended Brazilian 
diplomatic sectors’, particularly when it became known 
that President Carter had previously approved her 
meeting with them. Report in O Estado de São Paulo 
stated 60 million Americans had witnessed on their TV 
screens the two missionaries talking to Mrs. Carter and 
discussing their mistreatment at the hands of Brazilian 
police. This heavy impact on U.S. public opinion, article 
notes, was further reinforced by reports of Mrs. Carter’s 
meeting with missionaries carried in the New York 
Times and The Washington Post”.185 
 
Even though the Brazilian government was 
profoundly irritated by the prominence that the news 
received, it was highly unlikely that this incident would 
aggravate the dispute between Washington and Brasilia. 
And Crimmins continued: 
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“According to Correio [Brasiliense] columnist, […] 
incidents in Recife can be used as basis for new 
pressures against Brazil-FRG nuclear accord, providing 
the basis to argue that country that cannot control its 
police is not a fit recipient of sensitive nuclear 
technology”.186  
 
Once again the nuclear and human rights issues were 
intertwined and were put together on the table of the 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. According 
to a Brazilian interpretation, then, the U.S. government 
was putting pressure on the Brazilian leadership about the 
respect of internationally recognized human rights with 
the aim of discrediting tout court the international role of 
Brazil: was it a reasonable doubt? Sure it was, even 
though the Carter administration in many occasions stated 
that the human rights and the nuclear issues were not 
interdependent. 
But besides the narrow focus on the U.S.-Brazil relations 
and the effects of Rosalynn Carter’s visit on them, it is 
really interesting to point out one more aspect: the Unites 
States and Brazil were dealing with the human rights issue 
in a very different way. The Brazilians considered it to be 
part of state sovereignty over its territory and its citizens, 
a subject strictly pertaining only to the State and on which 
any external interference was inappropriate and 
unacceptable. The Americans, instead, were highlighting 
the new international dimension of human rights policies 
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and practices, that were gradually modifying the concept 
of State sovereign authority. This transformation was 
significant and would be irreversible. As we know, today 
fundamental human rights are considered as inderogable 
by the will (and law) of states, and even more human 
rights are considered the most blatant example of 
peremptory norm (or jus cogens).187 A peremptory norm is 
“a fundamental principle of international law that is 
accepted by the international community of states as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted”; therefore 
peremptory norms cannot be violated by any state, cannot 
be modified by any treaty, and are absolutely non 
derogable. Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties sanctions the jus cogens as being part 
of general international law, even though not specifying 
what rights could be considered of jus cogens. “As regards 
human rights, it has been contended that their coming into 
being as general rules of international law would not occur 
through the medium of customary law-making and its 
reliance on state practice but rather by general 
principles”188: the general acceptance and recognition of 
these rights would not be based on state practice, but rather 
on the moral consensualist conception that human rights 
are fundamental and binding by their own nature. The 
1970s were the years in which international law scholarship 
and jurisprudence were starting to give a precise content to 
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the concept of jus cogens and grassroots movements as well 
as international organizations were playing a decisive role 
in remarking that basic human rights were above the logic 
of state-centered sovereignty. Using Kathryn Sikkink’s 
words: “the human rights issue is an important case study 
of how understandings of sovereignty currently are being 
reshaped in the world and of the important role of 
transnational actors in that process. The doctrine of 
internationally protected human rights offers one of the 
most powerful critiques of sovereignty as currently 
constituted, and the practices of human rights law and 
human rights foreign policies provide concrete examples 
of shifting understandings of the scope of sovereignty. 
[…] The human rights issue does not presage an 
alternative to sovereignty, but it suggests a future model 
in which understandings of sovereignty are modified in 
relation of specific issues that are deemed of sufficient 
importance to the international community to limit the 
scope of sovereign authority”.  189  
The Carter administration’s commitment to human 
rights contained the acknowledgment of the new 
international dimension of these rights. Rosalynn Carter 
was able to demonstrate in a sober but very resolute way 
how deep was the U.S. concern on the respect of human 
rights and how important was to mobilize the whole 
international community on the issue. 
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4.3 The Memorandum of Understanding in force: 
Cyrus Vance’s trip to Brasilia.  
In the first months of 1977 also a pretty intense 
exchange of letters between Cyrus Vance and Antonio 
Azeredo da Silveira started. The two foreign Ministers, as 
well as the Presidents, used this tool to discuss topics of 
primary importance to their respective governments. 
The Vance-Silveira correspondence began a few days 
after the Secretary of State took office. Vance acknowledged 
all the deep differences between the U.S. and Brazil and 
was committed to review each and every issue through 
frank consultations with his Brazilian counterpart.190 Both 
sides were required to make an effort to familiarize with 
the respective views and to have a better comprehension of 
them. Silveira agreed on the necessity to maintain friendly 
relations between the two countries and considered 
essential a close working relationship and a constant 
mutual dialogue. The exchange of letters between the two 
Ministers intensified, however, in March 1977 after Brazil 
decided to reject U.S. economic assistance and to denounce 
the 1952 Military Agreement. Vance expressed his concern 
about the direction of the relations between the two 
countries and stated that it would be necessary to meet 
personally and to talk about the two issues that were 
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causing frictions and misunderstandings.191 Vance and 
Silveira finally met personally in Paris at the end of May 
1977 at the Conference on International Economic 
Development and, in that occasion, they had a 45 minute 
private meeting. At the end of this meeting, Silveira sent a 
telegram to President Geisel and it is today the only 
document available to know the content of the dialogue 
between the two ministers.192 According to the telegram, 
the tone of the conversation was cordial and friendly and 
one of the first points raised by Vance was about the 1976 
Memorandum of Understanding. He had been informed of 
the doubts, often raised by the Brazilian press, of the 
validity of the Memorandum. Vance wanted immediately 
clarify that the U.S. government considered the agreement 
as effective and, indeed, he intended to schedule in the 
short term a new meeting of the trade sub-group.193 Vance’s 
words pleased Silveira, who in turn stated that the 
Brazilian government considered the Memorandum a 
useful tool of reciprocal consultation and information. The 
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two ministers exchanged opinions on several issues: about 
the conference that had just ended, the Brazilian role as 
regional and international power and, also, the German-
Brazilian nuclear agreement. They discussed also the 
forthcoming OAS General Assembly Meeting, that would 
take place in Grenada in mid-June, during which human 
rights would be one of the themes certainly tackled. On this 
point Silveira was very clear: the Brazilian government 
accepted to discuss the issue in international fora but could 
not tolerate any interference in its own internal affairs. 
Silveira pointed out that Brazil was perfectly aware of the 
intent of the U.S. policy in this field: emphasizing some 
important democratic principles was a shield against the 
growing influence and infiltration of the Soviet Union.194 
The Brazilian government totally understood this strategy, 
though did not agree with it. Silveira, moreover, suggested 
that the United States would be better to moderate its tones 
on the human rights issue, also with some small countries 
of the OAS, such as Paraguay or Uruguay, whose major 
interest was to understand and support U.S. policies. 
The Brazilians gave clearly the impression of being 
regional leaders, able to understand and express the 
sentiments and the political aspirations of their neighbors. 
The cordiality and the frankness with which every topic 
was discussed proved that it was important to keep a 
constant dialogue. And the Memorandum of 
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Understanding was the best tool to do that. According to 
Spektor, it was only natural “that the two sides should 
have chosen to further revitalize the Memorandum. Slowly 
but surely they found the instrument to be a refuge against 
overt conflict and a cover under which they could pursue 
their respective agendas”.195 
Vance and Silveira had the opportunity to meet again 
after two weeks in St. George’s, Grenada, for the VII OAS 
General Assembly held on June 14-16, 1977. The two 
ministers had lunch together on June 15196 and it was the 
occasion to exchange views on the meeting in progress and, 
more specifically, on the evolution of human rights in the 
hemisphere. The U.S. government was planning to increase 
its contribution for the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) in order to enhance its activity. 
But, according to Silveira, the U.S. attitude was marginal 
(minoritaria) since all the other OAS members seemed to 
consider that any alteration of the human rights issue in the 
inter-American context would require further study and 
careful consideration.197 Moreover, Silveira considered very 
difficult for the Organization to survive after a unilateral 
action of its biggest and most powerful member state.  
Despite the perceptions on the role of the IACHR 
remained divergent, the discussion helped a bit more to 
increase the understanding on both sides. Back to 
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Washington, Vance wrote to Silveira to express 
appreciation on the useful exchange of views.198 Therefore, 
consistent with the provisions of the Memorandum of 
Understanding, Vance and his staff were planning a visit to 
Brazil for a formal consultative session in the last two 
weeks of October. In his answer, Silveira spoke of the 
importance of maintaining open channels of 
communication to “clear misunderstandings” and 
“enhance cooperation”.199 Once more Silveira pointed out 
clearly what was the Brazilian government’s position on 
the role of the IACHR: Brazil, he claimed, as the United 
States, had as main objectives the support and the 
promotion of human rights. A divergence could be found 
in the priorities and the methods of reaching those 
objectives. According to its level of social, economic and 
political development, each State had specific priorities, 
which had to be respected because conditioned upon its 
peculiar characteristics. As for the methods, Silveira added, 
the main objective had to be “to achieve efficiently those 
conditions in which every individual could fulfill and enjoy 
his rights” through forms of “positive and voluntary 
cooperation”. “Forced investigative actions were opposed”, 
because the Brazilians thought it was not “possible to 
acknowledge the right of any State to try another”.200 
Hence, the Brazilian government recognized the 
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importance of the international protection of human rights, 
but it evaluated even more important and unassailable the 
autonomy of action of a State within its borders and the 
non-interference of other States (or international bodies) in 
its internal affairs. In the case of the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission, the Brazilian government would never 
allow an inspection and an assessment of the human rights 
situation in Brazil. A few months after the human rights 
report published by the U.S. State Department, Brasilia re-
affirmed the same principle with the same determination.  
Referring precisely to a form of ‘positive and voluntary 
cooperation’ Vance wrote again to chanceler Silveira in mid-
July to ask Brazil’s support and cooperation. Vance hoped 
Silveira could convince Paraguay to accept a visit by an 
inspection group of the IACHR and wrote in a very explicit 
way: 
 
“We are concerned over recent indications of a delay in 
the earlier Paraguayan decision. Noting the particularly 
close and frank relationship between Brazil and 
Paraguay, I believe that Brazil is in an excellent position 
to encourage Paraguayan cooperation with the 
Commission. This would be a positive follow-up to our 
conversations in Grenada, in which you indicated 
support for the present form and function of the 
Commission”.201 
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Undoubtedly Vance was making a request the 
Brazilians would hardly fulfill. One of the cardinal points 
of Brazil’s foreign policy was non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other States and therefore Silveira stated: 
 
“Brazil, which enjoys the experience of living together 
with ten neighboring, friendly countries, has in the 
unrestricted respect for the internal and external affairs 
of each one of them the touchstone of its good relations 
on the continent. […] Thus I feel I am not in a position to 
comply with your request and, furthermore, this is in 
keeping with the stance I have publicly expressed on the 
matter […] in Grenada”.202 
 
This proved that the tones of cordiality did not entail 
the restore either of the ancient unwritten alliance or the 
unconditional Brazilian support to any U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives.  
 
In the meantime, Foggy Bottom was not only working 
on re-establishing a constant diplomatic dialogue with 
Brasilia but was also discussing about U.S. strategy with 
regard to linking multilateral loans to human rights in 
Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Romania, Benin and 
Ethiopia.203 The assessment of human rights was becoming 
a determining factor also for the U.S. loans within 
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International Financial Institutions (IFIs). A May 1977 
memorandum, drafted by the Christopher group, stated 
that: 
 
“Violations of human rights continue in Brazil. Despite 
significant moves taken by President Geisel to curb 
abuses against political prisoners, other serious long-term 
problems remain […]. President Geisel’s recent move to 
further limit the powers of the Congress and hamstring 
the opposition party in future elections were a significant 
reversal of his previous cautious efforts toward 
liberalizing Brazil’s political system. […] it is possible 
that direct and public pressure on Brazil to improve 
human rights performance could actually weaken 
President Geisel’s hand against the repressive elements 
within the Brazilian security forces. Such efforts could 
effect a range of other U.S. interests: - reaching agreement 
with Brazil on nuclear proliferation issues; - protecting 
our significant trade and investment; - encouraging a 
continued Brazilian moderating role in multilateral 
affairs. […] In sum, linking human rights to IFI loans for 
Brazil at this time may lead to a confrontation before we 
have fully considered the alternatives and 
consequences”.204 
 
What strategy to adopt then with regard to linking 
multilateral loans to human rights violations in recipient 
countries? In the case of Brazil, the United States preferred 
adopt the strategy of waiting and seeing how things would 
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change. “The immediate situation in Brazil [was] not as bad 
as that in Argentina”205 and, considered that in the first 
months of 1977 relations between Washington and Brasilia 
were very strained, any negative action taken in that 
moment could affect both the non-proliferation and the 
human rights issues. At the beginning of 1977 it was 
decided that it was not a good time to make the linkage 
‘human rights-IFI loans’ and it was agreed, however, that 
the U.S. would consider at an appropriate future time 
informing the Brazilians on the human rights policy as it 
related to international financial institutions. Using the IFIs 
in this way might tend to politicize them, and this choice 
could be detrimental to the U.S. interests in the long term; 
furthermore, IFI loans “could not be an effective pressure 
point except in certain specific instances when the U.S. 
government wished to dramatize a point or obtain 
satisfaction on a particular and clearly definable human 
rights issue”.206 Actually, with the Brazilians in that 
moment there was not a specific problem at stake or any 
point to dramatize and the U.S. was rather observing a 
gradual improvement in the respect of human rights. For 
the moment it was advisable to hold the issue in reserve 
and do not raise IFI loans, also in view of the several trips 
planned in the coming months. There were many official 
visits in Brazil scheduled for 1977: besides Mrs. Carter’s 
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voyage to Brasilia and Recife in June, the administration 
had in mind to organize a bilateral meeting between Vance 
and Silveira in October 1977 and to plan a stop in Brazil for 
the presidential tour in Latin America and Africa planned 
for November 1977. The presidential trip would be 
postponed to the beginning of 1978, while the Vance-
Silveira summit would be deferred to November 1977.  
Ahead of the Vance-Silveira consultations, two-day 
planning talks were held on October 6-7, 1977 in Brasilia. It 
was the occasion for Warren Christopher to go back to 
Brazil after the unsuccessful meeting in March 1977 about 
the non-proliferation issue.  
During the meeting the atmosphere was quite cordial, 
even if the Brazilian attacked the U.S. nuclear non-
proliferation and ‘discriminatory’ trade policies, while 
minimized other major bilateral issues, such as human 
rights. The Brazilians were annoyed by the ambiguity as to 
their status, demanding on the one hand the special 
concessions granted to least developed countries (LDCs), 
and on the other asked to be accorded the attention worthy 
of an incipient global power. According to a U.S. briefing 
memorandum on the planning talks: 
 
“Brazilian aspirations for ‘grandeza’ center on rapid 
economic growth, which is linked to export expansion. 
The Brazilians repeated the charge that our trade policies 
discriminate against newly arriving countries, who are 
considered less important politically and for whom we 
feel less cultural affinity, than our Western European 
friends. […] Certain tariff barriers inhibit entry of more 
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labor-intensive and/or more highly processed products. 
The higher-income LDCs argue that such a trading 
system frustrates their drive to enter the club of 
industrial states. […] They sought to distinguish Brazil 
from the poorer LDCs – but when we asked how the 
upper-tier LDCs might be incorporated into the decision-
making process on global issues, the Brazilians offered 
no suggestions”.207 
 
The U.S. delegation was pleasantly surprised at the 
Brazilian stance on human rights. Indeed, the Brazilians 
avoided attacking the U.S. forcibly stated position on 
human rights, except to argue that the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission should be normative, not 
judgmental. In the same memorandum there was the 
comment: 
 
“This more relaxed view on human rights may reflect the 
whispers of liberalizing winds within Brazil, as well as 
their desire to disassociate themselves from the Southern 
Cone hardliners”.208 
 
In late 1977, human rights seemed not to be such a 
harsh source of conflict: the approaches of the two 
countries on the topic continued to be different, but the 
Brazilian confrontational attitude had been moderated. But 
the Americans pointed out other difficulties that could 
emerge in the future: the gradual integration of Brazil into 
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the world system and the need to convince Brazil to 
balance its narrowly conceived pragmatism with a concern 
for global welfare  could provoke strains and 
disagreements. Furthermore, as the Brazilians would 
become more important and more competitive in the 
international scenario, the U.S. needed to be more aware of 
the Brazilian policies and maintain close communication 
channels.  
 
This  is the  framework  in which  should  be  inserted  
the 24-hour Vance’s  visit  to Brasilia  on  November  22-23,  
1977.  The  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  travelled  to  Brazil  to 
implement the high level bilateral consultations between 
State officials, as provided by the 1976 Memorandum  of  
Understanding.  On  that  day,  Vance  and  the  U.S.  
ambassador  John Crimmins had a meeting with the 
Brazilian president  Ernesto Geisel and the Brazilian 
foreign minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira. Records of 
the talks are available in the Brazilian archives, where there 
are both memorandums of the conversations and 
evaluations on the status of the bilateral relations. The first 
meeting to take place was the one with President Geisel at 
the Palácio do Planalto in the afternoon of November 1977 
and lasted a bit more than one hour. Vance was 
accompanied by the U.S. ambassador to Brazil Crimmins, 
and Geisel was assisted by chanceler Silveira.209 The main 
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purpose of the high-level bilateral meeting was to discuss 
the Brazilian nuclear program, which represented certainly 
the most sensitive issue to deal with. Before getting to 
Brasilia, the American delegation, made up of six persons 
plus the Secretary of State210, had made also a stop in 
Buenos Aires to talk about the Argentinean nuclear 
program. Vance considered the nuclear issue a regional 
problem to address on several fronts at the same time.  As 
Spektor tell us, “Vance had managed to get the Argentines’ 
agreement to consider the possibility of putting a 
moratorium or deferring commercial reprocessing in 
exchange for American provision of nuclear fuel. But as 
conversations with the Argentines progressed, Buenos 
Aires said that a precondition for their commitment was 
that there was what they called ‘a regional equilibrium’. In 
other words, they would suspend their own enrichment 
program only if Brazil did the same”.211  
Vance decided not to tackle any other topic during the 
meeting with Geisel, and deferred the human rights issue 
to a 40 minute private conversation he would have later 
that afternoon with Minister Silveira.212 The Secretary of 
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State asserted once again in this occasion how important 
the Carter administration considered the international 
respect of human rights. The U.S. policy didn’t have any 
ideological connotation and was addressed without 
exception to any country with which the United States had 
diplomatic relations. Silveira responded stating again the 
usual Brazilian attitude: the Brazilian government could 
perfectly understand the motivation and the scope of the 
U.S. human rights policy, but did not agree on the way it 
was implemented. Each government had the duty of 
guaranteeing the full respect of human rights in its country 
and no external interference of any kind could be tolerated. 
Moreover, Silveira continued, the U.S. foreign policy 
inspired by the human rights issue seemed to be incoherent 
and inconsistent: the USSR and other countries strategically 
relevant to the U.S. interests were approached in a much 
more benevolent way than other countries with better 
records on the respect of human rights, but strategically 
less important. Hence, according to the Brazilian point of 
view, the decision of politicizing human rights and making 
them a foreign policy tool could not be supported. But this 
didn’t mean not recognizing and supporting the intrinsic 
value human rights had. Silveira concluded with a very 
strong and direct affirmation: he could not tolerate any 
more to start a dialogue on the human rights issue with the 
assumption that the U.S. and Brazil had something to talk 
about, because it was not the case and he hoped the topic 
would never emerge again in the future.213 Vance 
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apparently interrupted his speech and did not reply to this 
provocation. Such a tough assertiveness on the Brazilian 
side might seem unexpected, excessive, and risky but can 
find an explanation in a diplomatic gaffe made by Cyrus 
Vance a few hours before his private meeting with Silveira. 
Indeed, after meeting President Geisel, Vance 
unintentionally left a copy of his instructions and talking 
points for the summit with Silveira.214 This had 
undoubtedly been a pedestrian mistake, because the 
Brazilians could see (and read, leaving no room for 
misinterpretation) what the U.S. line and strategy were.  
The talking points on human rights highlighted some 
aspects of particular concern for the U.S. administration. 
Vance was supposed to raise the topic of recent allegations 
of torture, happened both in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
which deeply “disturbed” the Americans.215 Fifteen political 
prisoners had recently written a letter (widely reported in 
Brazil and abroad) in which they stated of being 
systematically tortured with very sophisticated devices by 
the Army policemen of the Department of Domestic 
Operations and Internal Defense Operations Center (DOI-
CODI): this episode, together with other charges of tortures 
and deaths of prisoners, could cause tensions between the 
U.S. and Brazil at a time when it was of great interest to 
both sides to work in harmony. Vance  intended to express  
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the  U.S.  preoccupation  about  the  possibility  to  find  
Brazil  working actively  to  make  ineffective  the  
important  work  of  non-governmental organizations, 
especially of Amnesty International. Instead, as the 
Brazilian records tell us, there was no occasion at all to 
discuss any of these points or to talk about episodes 
happened recently in Brazil. But, besides this, two were the 
reasons Silveira was very upset by the document Vance 
forgot at the Palácio do Planalto: first, there was neither any 
reference to the U.S. intention to improve the bilateral 
relations with Brazil nor the acknowledgment of Brazil as a 
valuable interlocutor; second, the document referred to the 
Memorandum of Understanding in a very perfunctory 
way.216  In occasion of Vance’s visit, also Patricia Derian, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, was present in the U.S. delegation 
but she did not have any conversation with Brazilian 
representatives because, as it is possible to read in a 
Brazilian document, there was no Brazilian group 
interested in talking about the human rights topic.217 
Nevertheless, as the historian Timothy Power remembers, 
she expressed her hope that the changes to come in Brazil’s 
human rights situation would not result from conversation 
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with U.S. officials, but rather from the natural evolution of 
the Brazilian system. 
The mainstream historiography has generally 
interpreted Vance’s visit a “departure from earlier 
experiences, in that the United States was now giving 
Brazil more positive encouragement for improvements in 
the Brazilian human rights record”.218 Still, the newly 
available diplomatic documents from the Brazilian archives 
induce a different interpretation of the events. As we have 
seen, an original narrative emerges. Even though the 
bilateral high-level meetings were scheduled to give the 
Memorandum of Understanding a new lease of life, 
because both the U.S. and the Brazilian governments had 
an interest to keep it in force, the two countries interpreted 
the agreement in different ways: Washington wanted the 
memorandum to be the place where any sort of 
misunderstanding and disagreement could be managed 
and discussed; Brasilia, instead, wanted it to be the 
evidence that the United States recognized and accepted 
the international growing importance of Brazil, with which 
sensitive issues needed to be discussed.  
But the significance of Vance’s visit to Brasilia in 
November 1977 deserves an even more attentive analysis. 
A few weeks before Cyrus Vance’s trip to Latin 
America, the U.S. government assessed the Southern Cone 
political situation and analyzed the possible future policy 
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toward the area, and Brazil in particular.219 According to 
the U.S. evaluation, the military in the Southern Cone 
countries would remain friendly to the United States, but 
the pervasive bonds of the past would presumably 
diminish. Focusing more specifically on Brazil, the U.S. 
government hypothesized, over the following years, a 
steady increase of the Brazilian power and influence, so as 
to become a counterweight to the United States throughout 
South America. The relationship with the United States was 
expected to become more balanced and this would entail 
more frequent problems of conflicting interests. The 
Brazilian role in the international scenario would become 
increasingly relevant. The overall result of these 
developments on the U.S. position in the region was one of 
“increasing popularity and decreasing influence”220, and 
the relation with Brazil would evolve in terms of shared 
interests and mutual accommodation rather than 
asymmetric dependence. In the short term, the U.S. 
objectives in the region centered on nuclear non-
proliferation and human rights, for which the 
administration was developing elaborated strategies and 
policy mechanisms. In the medium term, the U.S. aimed at 
establishing a revised broader relationship with all the 
Southern Cone countries, but especially with Brazil and 
this “not only because of Brazil’s size and economic 
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influence in the area, but because of the precedent impact 
of U.S. actions toward Brazil and the political interaction 
among the existing military governments”.221 
Hence, Brazil resulted strategically important for the 
whole hemispheric policy. The central U.S. objective was to 
bring Brazil gradually into the community of industrial 
democracies and, to achieve this goal, the U.S. government 
intended to strengthen bilateral partnerships through 
informal country groups related to functional issues. 
It was probably this spirit to convince the Carter 
administration to revive the Memorandum of 
Understanding and to use it to re-establish a stable 
dialogue after the bad start at the beginning of the year. 
The United States was well-aware of the necessity to create 
a growing structure of functional relationships, since there 
were many areas in which a strict cooperation intended to 
be pursued such as: energy, not only for nuclear 
cooperation but in various other forms like oil, hydro-
power, coal technology, solar, gasohol, and geothermal; 
economy, with the aim of getting Brazil more focused on 
the broader responsibilities of a major participant in the 
world trade and payments system; international finance, 
area where Brazil was more reluctant to cooperate and 
tended to minimize any IMF role in Brazilian affairs; 
technical assistance to poorer countries, for which Brazil’s 
links with South America and Portuguese-speaking black 
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Africa could complement U.S. technology and financial 
resources.222  
It is therefore in this framework that Vance’s trip to 
Brasilia has to be inserted and it was easily predictable that 
the U.S. delegation would look for a constructive dialogue 
with the outlook of restoring a good relationship and a 
strict collaboration. What was definitely unexpected was 
the attitude Silveira assumed on the human rights topic 
during the private bilateral conversations. Brazil proved 
also in this way that had a strong self-confidence and knew 
well that the relationship with the United States was 
becoming equal. 
Unfortunately there are not American records available 
on the bilateral November meeting and we don’t know 
precisely what the reactions were in Foggy Bottom when 
Vance reported that Silveira refused to discuss again the 
human rights issue. It probably appeared fundamental to 
organize in the best possible way the presidential visit 
planned in March 1978.  
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5. 1978 : THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AFTER 
THE FIRST YEAR OF PRESIDENCY. 
 
After the first year of the Carter presidency and the 
foundation of the human rights policy, it was time to assess 
the implementation of the new foreign policy.  
In the first twelve months four fundamental actions 
had been promoted to institutionalize the policy: the 
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was 
established; a separate Inter-Agency Committee ( namely 
the Christopher group) was created, with the aim of 
examining human rights factors as they were related to 
bilateral assistance; part of the National Security Council 
staff was attached specific human rights responsibilities; 
ambassadors were given personal duty of implementing 
the policy and assuring fully adequate information 
gathering.223 From January 1978, the Carter administration 
started to work out the most effective way of implementing 
a policy of securing greater international respect for human 
rights: the intention was to discuss both with other 
developed countries and developing countries how to 
establish a viable international standard to protect human 
rights, to obtain a consensus that the international financial 
institutions had a role to play in that area, and to achieve an 
agreement on how to cooperate with respect to policy in 
                                                             
223 Telegram from SecState Washington DC to AmEmbassy 
London/Stockholm/Copenhagen/Bonn/Paris/Ottawa/Brussels Human Rights 
and IFIs, January 31, 1978, Unclassified Records of Deputy Secretary Warren 
Christopher, NARA. 
121 
 
the IFIs. The aim was not “insisting on an American 
approach but trying to shape an international approach 
which achieve[d] broadly-shared human rights 
objectives”.224  
The United States meant to consolidate the human 
rights policy, hoping to make it become decisive also 
within existing multilateral frameworks and not only in 
bilateral relations. The administration acknowledged that 
the human rights policy had had a pretty good start, but 
that problems nevertheless remained. “Human rights 
advocacy ha[d] become” throughout its first months “a 
standard, visible and important feature” of the U.S. 
diplomacy.225 The human rights policy had had until that 
moment a greater and more visible impact on the U.S. role 
in the International Financial Institutions, especially on 
loans for industrial development which often met the ‘basic 
human needs’ criteria. Since the Carter administration took 
office, the United States had abstained from voting on 
eleven loans and had voted ‘no’ in other seven cases on 
human rights grounds.226 Then, it was within the IFIs that 
the U.S. action could have a greater resonance, and could 
find new supporters. Of course, the United States 
recognized that effective channeling of IFI resources to 
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reflect human rights considerations would require the 
support and cooperation of other IFI members and this was 
the reason why the United States was interested in 
consulting together with other member countries who 
shared the same concerns and might have similar 
objectives.227 Therefore, efforts would be made to 
channeling loans to countries with good human rights 
records; consulting with other donors about standards for 
meeting basic human needs and promoting human rights; 
and devising with them mechanisms for acting together.228 
Of course, multilateralizing the human rights policy, that is 
to say if other countries would start applying human rights 
criteria to their votes, could cause a politicization of the 
IFIs.  
While the discussion was open on how to further 
implement the policy, it was the moment to assess the 
results achieved as well as the limits and deficiencies that 
had emerged. 
The first and glaring problem observed was the 
inconsistency of the human rights policy. The 
administration admitted that there were “times when 
security considerations, or broader political factors” led 
them to be “softer on some countries’ human rights 
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performance rather than others”.229 Indeed a memorandum 
written by the Director of Policy Planning, Anthony Lake, 
said: 
 
“We sometimes […] approve a loan in recognition of a 
positive trend – even though the overall situation in the 
country remains as bad or worse than that in countries 
whose loans we oppose. One of the most difficult 
questions in the human rights business is what actions on 
our part are most likely to encourage a government to 
believe that further progress is worthwhile, without 
leading it to think we believe its human rights problem is 
solved. This can only be solved on a case-by-case basis, 
and some of our decisions will turn out to have been 
wrong”.230 
 
The inconsistency actually appeared in several aspects: 
first, the U.S. government seldom continued bilateral aid 
programs to countries whose IFIs it opposed; second, 
human rights criteria were applied in a far more rigorous 
way to economic assistance, designed to help poor people, 
than to military assistance, perceived as a tool to support 
repressive regimes231: this was undoubtedly inconsistent 
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with the spirit of human rights promotion, which easily 
became secondary with respect to security interests232; 
third, the country-by-country approach led sometimes to 
punish countries which didn’t matter very much to the U.S. 
security or economic interests (such as Paraguay, Uruguay, 
the Central African Empire, Benin, Guinea) and to gloss 
over the human rights records of others who did (like Iran, 
Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the People’s Republic of 
China); fourth, U.S. foreign policy actions appeared to be 
read as focusing on Latin America as the best theatre for 
human rights activity, since it was a region where other 
U.S. interests were not at risk and U.S. leverage was 
greater.233  
Indeed the administration admitted: 
 
“In assessing human rights conditions we look to all 
three groups of rights. Moreover, we are especially 
sensitive to trends. We think a positive trend is very 
important. A country may have serious human rights 
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the Carter administration seemed not to be affected by human rights in the 
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undermined by the realities of power politics” (p.192).  
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problems, but if it is making a genuine effort to rectify 
them, even though the process may take time, we would 
not generally oppose IFI lending to that country. While 
there is a good deal of unavoidable subjectivity in the 
implementation of our human rights policy, we think this 
fact should not be overdrawn. […] With respect to 
consistency, we do not claim that there is a worldwide 
consistency in the techniques we use. Our foreign policy 
interests overall and with respect to particular countries 
are simply too diverse to permit this. This is not to say, 
however, that our concern for human rights differs from 
country to country. Our concern remains constant. It is 
methods and techniques of pursuing those concerns 
which may differ from country to country, in light of 
different circumstances and interests”.234  
 
Despite the various drawbacks that was possible to 
find, the United States was sure that its post-Vietnam, post-
Watergate image had been greatly improved. According to 
the general perception within the administration, this 
boosted the American standing in Europe and helped in the 
relations with several least developed countries (LDCs), 
because the new policy resulted to be appealing and 
encouraging to many people living under repressive 
regimes.235 Patriotic tones emphasized even more how 
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important the positive effects of the policy were: 
 
“This underscores what many of us frequently forget – 
the U.S. is a model for many countries; our influence 
transcends our political, economic, and military power 
and is strikingly important in ethical, cultural, and value 
areas; other governments find themselves unable entirely 
to ignore the impact of U.S. policy and actions – 
particularly when we join action to rhetoric. Our 
championship of human rights is encouraging others to 
do likewise. […] The important thing is that we are 
contributing to an international consciousness-raising 
and a climate conducive to human rights 
improvements”.236 
 
This was the way the U.S. administration perceived its 
own action abroad, but how was it perceived outside the 
American borders? The Brazilians made an attentive 
analysis of the new administration’s foreign policy, 
especially on the ideological roots of the human rights 
diplomacy.  
According to an analysis by the Brazilian foreign 
ministry237, the key of Carter's proposal was reversing the 
negative attitude that seemed to characterize U.S. foreign 
policy, becoming offensive and inducing their opponents to 
adopt defensive postures. How, though, to support this 
new orientation of the external action? Certainly, the new 
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administration wanted it to be very clear the distinction 
with the foreign policy of the previous presidency. 
The guidance of Kissinger, conditioned by a national 
will weakened by the Southeast Asia crisis, and not least, 
by the institutional crisis caused by the Watergate scandal, 
consisted in “disengagement and in maintainability of 
positions”.238 On the contrary, Carter proposed to reshape 
this direction, reorganizing the national will around a new 
ideal of freedom, fundamental principle of the U.S. ethical 
traditions. Carter intended to replace the defensive concept 
of freedom, represented by anti-communism, with the 
offensive concept of the worldwide promotion of global 
human rights. 
It should be noted that the main addressee of the new 
American doctrine was always the Soviet Union. The policy 
was reoriented, but the goal remained actually the same. 
Changes would be in the method and the tactic, but the 
political substance would remain unchanged, centered on 
the Soviet-U.S. rivalry. And this for the simplest of reasons, 
namely because the Soviet Union was the only veritable 
rival, the only real threat to the security of the United States 
of America.239 Therefore, the Brazilian military interestingly 
interpreted the human rights policy through the prism of 
the cold war and, more specifically, assumed that the spirit 
of détente had not softened the U.S.-Soviet rivalry at all. 
According to this analysis, the new U.S. foreign policy 
appeared not to be as innovative as the Carter 
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administration asserted it was.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Preparing President Carter’s visit to Brazil. 
The first weeks of 1978 were all centered on the 
organization of the presidential tour of Latin America and 
Africa240: originally scheduled for November 1977, Carter 
had to postpone his trip in late March-early April 1978 
because of “urgent business in connection with the 
Congressional consideration of [his] administration’s 
energy program”.241 
Carter and Geisel had maintained an intense 
correspondence through 1977, and both had always been 
very frank in expressing their points of view on the most 
sensitive issues of the U.S.-Brazilian relations. After 
Rosalynn’s trip to Brasilia, Jimmy Carter acknowledged 
how the direct exchange was “invaluable” in giving him 
and his staff “a better perception of the Brazilian view of 
world problems, and of Brazil’s national goals and 
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aspirations”.242 Carter had a strong commitment in making 
the relations between the two countries cooperative and 
constructive, and in many occasions he wrote to Ernesto 
Geisel how the cementing of close ties between their two 
countries was of the highest priority to him.243 On February 
24, 1978 Brzezinski announced in a press conference the 
specific schedule of the presidential trip: President Carter 
would arrive in Brasilia on Wednesday March 29, stay 
there for one day and then fly to Rio de Janeiro on March 
30, from where he would leave for Lagos on March 31. 
Brzezinski briefly announced also the agenda of the 
conversations between Carter and Geisel: 
“Our agenda here will include, of course, such matters as 
the energy issue and also the related problem of 
nonproliferation in the world and the Western 
Hemisphere. We will talk about global and bilateral 
economic issue […]. We will discuss our perspectives on 
human rights and we will also discuss political 
developments in the hemisphere and in the world, given 
Brazil’s increasingly significant role in international 
affairs”.244  
 
The Carter administration had a very clear awareness 
of the international role of Brazil in those years. The 
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Brazilian diplomacy sat at several negotiating tables and 
was able to deal with different international interlocutors: 
Brazil was a key-actor in the North-South dialogue, had 
intense exchanges with the Portuguese-speaking African 
countries, and was an important partner of the major 
economies of the Western world.  
An anonymous document written by an outsider 
circulated the White House during preparations for 
Carter’s trip245, arguing for encouraging Brazil to “become a 
responsible Western country”: according to this unsigned 
memorandum, the short-term objective of the presidential 
trip consisted in encouraging “Brazil to adopt the stance of 
a responsible member of the Western community and to 
recognize that Brazil ha[d] arrived as an international 
power”.246 Despite the fact that the author of the document 
was unknown, Bob Pastor considered it to be certainly “a 
person who clearly [knew] Brazil well”.247 And effectively 
the memorandum offered an attentive analysis of the 
current Brazilian internal situation as well as an accurate 
study of the possible future developments of both its 
economy and politics. According to this memorandum, one 
of the most urgent issues to solve for the Brazilian 
government was energy supply: 
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“Still lacking adequate fossil fuels, Brazil hopes to find 
enough oil offshore to become self-sufficient by the turn 
of the century at the latest. Brazil is, however, actively 
developing its enormous hydroelectric potential and is 
advanced in the production and use of alcohol from 
sugarcane […]. An independent technological and 
research base is still lacking, but the university 
population has grown ten-fold since 1960 […]. Brazil 
intends to push nuclear power projects […]. The absence 
of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the military’s 
concept of Brazil’s destiny”.248 
 
Aside from the lack of nuclear weapons and of a steady 
technological base, the memo considered the small size of 
armed forces the only factor still keeping Brazil aside from 
being considered a major world power. Brazil indeed 
preferred to devote its investments and resources to 
economic expansion.  
Despite their long-term ambitions, Brazilian leaders 
were considered “ambivalent in terms of current policy”: 
 
“They want to be taken seriously as an international 
power and are sensitive to slights. They want all the 
advantages of being or posing as an underdeveloped 
nation. [But] per capita GNP already exceeds $1,000 in 
Brazil and is steadily growing with population growth at 
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about 2.9% per annum and GNP growing at an average 
of over 7%  for the last two decades, in real terms.”249 
 
Contradiction, ambiguity, ambivalence: being a 
country on the edge between developed and developing 
world seemed to be a major characteristic of Brazil, a clear 
strategic choice in order to try to take advantage from both 
conditions. 
The decision to denounce the bilateral military agreement 
signed with the United States in 1952 meant that Brazil was 
looking for a new relationship, and a new status in the 
international scenario as well. According to the memo, in 
the longer term the U.S. might think to support the 
Brazilian accession to the network of Western institutions. 
The memorandum raised the possibility of Brazil becoming 
a member of the Atlantic Alliance, while Pastor, in his 
comments to this document, suggested also the idea of 
increasing the Brazilian representation in the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or in the international banks.250 At 
any rate, Brazil would not be satisfied just with the OAS 
membership for the years to come, because it was very 
unlikely that Brazil saw itself exclusively in that context.251 
Nevertheless, Brazil’s “authoritarian system of government 
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and its undistinguished record of human rights” were the 
“main stumbling blocks” for its inclusion in the key 
Western institutions: how could the United States lure 
Brazil into the club of industrialized nations? The issue was 
relevant for the development of hemispheric as well as 
international relations. In the near future, but with this 
long-term target in mind, Carter would have to put an 
effort first to obtain a normalization of the relations 
between the two countries. President Carter definitely 
managed to achieve this goal, and the 1978 presidential 
visit to Brazil was considered the major event in the U.S.-
Brazilian relationship since Carter took office. Two 
concurrent trends in late 1977 had been conducive to this 
change of attitude, Timothy Power recalls: that is to say “a 
growing recognition that the human rights issue could be 
handled maturely as a simple issue of contention between 
the United States and Brazil, coupled with the improving 
Brazilian human rights record”.252 Indeed, in the few weeks 
before Carter’s trip the Department of State dealt with two 
delicate decisions: whether to sell to Brazil items on the 
U.S. munitions list and whether to export computer 
systems for Brazilian Criminal Investigation Agency, and 
more specifically three computerized fingerprints 
identification systems. In both cases, the human rights 
situation in Brazil could affect negatively the decision: in 
the case of the munitions list items because they would be 
sold to the Brazilian Navy, Air Force and other government 
agencies not engaged in civil law enforcement or internal 
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security functions253; in the case of fingerprint computers 
there were doubts on their possible secondary applications 
to political monitoring, repression or human rights 
abuses.254 For both these resolutions it was necessary to 
assess the human rights situation in Brazil, one year after 
the publication of the State Department’s report. And it 
appeared that a relevant improvement had taken place: 
 
“Brazil’s domestic human rights performance over the 
last several months has been marked by slow, hopeful 
progress, though there are still problems which affect 
both civil and political liberties. Internationally, the 
Brazilian Government continues to assert that the 
protection of human rights is an internal matter only, and 
Brazil is probably the most effective Latin American 
opponent of an active role for the IAHRC and its UN 
counterpart”.255 
 
Despite the continuing Brazilian reluctance to accept an 
international handling of the human rights issue, it was 
nevertheless clear that: 
 
                                                             
253 Action Memorandum from Gelb to the Deputy Secretary Commercial Sales 
to Brazil of Items on the U.S. Munitions List, March 7, 1978, Secret, Records of 
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, NARA.  
254 Telegram from AmEmbassy Brasilia to SecState Washington DC Human 
Rights and GOB Purchase of US Computers, June (17?), 1978, Secret, Records 
of Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, NARA. 
255Attachment to the Action Memorandum from Todman to Benson Human 
Rights, no date, Secret, Records of Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 
NARA. 
135 
 
“Brazil is a human rights problem country, but it is not a 
serious human rights problem country. […] The trend is 
up in Brazil, something PD 30 mandates to we take into 
account. […] Brazil [is] on an upward trend and [is] 
arguably better than a number of other important 
countries, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iran”.256 
 
In view of the upcoming presidential trip, the Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau (HA) together 
with the American Republic Affairs Bureau (ARA) wrote a 
human rights paper presenting a picture of Brazil with a 
remarkable improvement of the human rights situation: 
 
“President Geisel’s repeated orders against torture seem 
to have seeped down to the working level of the security 
forces. Mistreatment of political prisoners seems to have 
virtually stopped, though this is not so of common 
criminals and marginal socio-economic groups. Recently 
the President of the Supreme Military Tribunal strongly 
condemned mistreatments of prisoners. This prompted 
in Air Force court in Rio de Janeiro to grant provisional 
liberty to several defendants who claimed they had been 
tortured after their arrest”.257 
 
Therefore, within the administration prevailed the idea 
that in Brazil there was not a consistent pattern of gross 
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violations of human rights any more. But this view was not 
widely shared. In July 1978 two journalists of the Los 
Angeles Times raised the major contradictions of the Carter 
administration’s human rights policy toward Brazil. The 
frequent statements about the clearly improved human 
rights situation: 
“[…] appear nearsighted in light of what is actually 
happening in Brazil. As recently as April, 1977 Brazilian 
President Ernesto Geisel arbitrarily suspended Congress 
when that body pressed for judicial reform, especially the 
reestablishment of the habeas corpus in political cases. 
Nowadays, government decrees and broader 
‘institutional acts’ allow government authorities to 
override constitutional guarantees of due process and to 
hold, without trial, anyone considered a threat to 
‘national security’. […] Amnesty [International] also 
noted in its most recent annual report that, ‘although 
brutal and violent arrests of political prisoners have 
diminished, Amnesty International is concerned at 
increasing reports of the torture and ill-treatment of 
people […] suspected of ordinary crimes”.258 
An in-depth study of the political and economic 
Brazilian scenes was also prepared. It highlighted that since 
1974, year in which President Ernesto Geisel took office, 
political opening and relaxation (abertura e distensão) had 
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been gradually put into effect. The approach taken entailed 
allowing a greater role for Congress in the political process 
and a greater opportunity for political critique in the 
country.259 The opposition party (Movimento Democratico 
Brasileiro – MDB) had obtained significant gains in the 
elections, “including a majority in five state legislatures, 
about 44 per cent of the seats in the Federal Chamber of 
Deputies and one-third of the Senate seats”.260 The 
President had important exceptional powers and Geisel 
used them also in 1977. In fact, in March 1977 the Congress 
rejected a constitutional amendment to reform the judiciary 
proposed by the executive branch. As a consequence, 
Geisel responded by closing Congress for two weeks (from 
April 1 through April 16), using precisely the extraordinary 
powers granted to the President by the Institutional Act 
number 5 (Ato Institucional Número Cinco – AI-5)261. “In the 
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further exercise of these powers, President Geisel decreed 
the judicial reform and instituted a number of other 
changes including the indirect election of State governors 
and part of the Senate, alteration of electoral schedule, and 
lowering from two-thirds to one-half of the congressional 
majority needed to pass a constitutional amendment. These 
measures produced a strongly negative reaction in broad 
sectors of public opinion”.262 Hence, also during the first 
months of the Carter presidency, the Brazilian political 
scene had experienced moments of serious repression by 
the military. 
Economically speaking, Brazil was facing a quite 
difficult period. The balance of payment deficit, together 
with an inflation rate that reached 46% in 1976, represented 
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the harshest problems to solve for Brazil’s economic 
managers. The balance of payment deficit was reduced 
through 1977 “by the windfall from high coffee and 
soybean prices, two of Brazil’s most important agricultural 
exports. After showing large deficits for the previous three 
years, the trade account (exports and imports) was in rough 
balance”. The account in 1977 was in deficit by about $4 
billion.263  
The long-standing U.S.-Brazil relationship had become 
more complex and intense since WWII, particularly in the 
economic area. Brazil was the hemisphere’s major 
beneficiary of USAID and had also been a major recipient 
of American Peace Corps volunteers. Moreover, also the 
bilateral trade exchange was very important: the U.S. was 
Brazil’s largest trading partner, while Brazil was the eighth 
largest trading partner of the United States.264 And also 
one-third of Brazil’s public and private debt (which totaled 
about $31 billions) was owed to private U.S. banks.  
The two countries were strictly intertwined and, in the 
name of both the historical tradition of their relations and 
the future developments of hemispheric equilibriums, it 
was necessary that president Carter made any possible 
effort to re-establish the U.S.-Brazilian engagement.  
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5.2 Jimmy Carter in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro: March 
29-31, 1978. 
The Air Force One landed at the Brasilia military 
airport, arriving from Caracas, in the afternoon of March 
29, 1978. President Geisel was there to greet the U.S. 
delegation. Jimmy Carter was the first U.S. President to 
visit Brazil in eighteen years since President Eisenhower’s 
visit to Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in February 
1960.265  
As described in the paragraph above, Brazil was too 
strategically significant for the United States and this is 
why Brasilia was a sensitive stop-over for Carter and his 
staff.  A  memo from Cyrus Vance to the president prior his 
trip urged Carter to try to convince the Geisel 
administration that the United States welcomed “Brazil’s 
increasingly important role in the world and [was] 
prepared to consult seriously on major issues”.266 Despite 
not omitting human rights and nuclear proliferation from 
his talks with Geisel, Carter had the difficult task to regain 
Brazil’s will to be a trustworthy partner and interlocutor of 
the United States. Probably for this reason the schedule of 
the bilateral meetings was pretty intense and Carter and 
Geisel met three times in one day and a half. 
The first round of bilateral talks started one hour after 
Carter’s arrival in Brasilia at the Palácio do Planalto and 
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lasted for one hour.267 The meeting participants were, for 
the American side, President Carter, Secretary of State 
Vance and National Security Advisor Brzezinski; the 
Brazilian delegation was made up of President Geisel and 
chanceler Silveira. This first meeting dealt principally with 
two topics, that is to say the political scenarios in Africa 
and the Middle East268 and it was chosen not to tackle 
immediately the themes considered controversial by both 
parts. In hindsight, it seems this was an ‘exploratory 
moment’, to test the waters. 
The traditional long friendship linking Brazil and the 
United States was recalled in Geisel’s words at the end of 
the meeting. Also Carter declared how relevant the United 
States considered the relations with Brazil, and he 
expressed his concern that recent misunderstandings 
would keep growing rather than revive the old friendship. 
The Brazilian President replied conciliatorily asserting that 
Brazil had been and would always be a loyal friend, and 
that the points of convergence were definitely more than 
those of divergence. Geisel also expressed the belief that the 
talks would be rewarding and would renew trust in the 
relations between the two countries.269  
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The second meeting took place in the evening of that 
same day, during the dinner offered at the Palácio da 
Alvorada. At the beginning of the evening, Carter 
expressed his wish that Geisel would go to visit the United 
States before his successor Figueiredo would take office in 
March 1979. But Geisel turned the proposal down saying 
that he “had scruples in accepting invites during the last 
year of his mandate”270: was it, as Spektor affirms, that 
“Geisel now saw commitments with Washington as too 
dangerous and unstable an entanglement”271? Geisel 
politely declined the invite, showing that he didn’t want 
Brazil to be subject to an excessive involvement with the 
United States, nevertheless Carter didn’t give up and 
continued pushing on crucial issues for the U.S.-Brazil 
bilateral relations. Carter asked Geisel’s opinion on the 
possibility of establishing a sub-group on agriculture, 
within the framework of the Memorandum of 
Understanding, which would work on American 
investments in Brazilian market. Even in this case Geisel 
proved to have a pretty severe stance: in fact, he replied 
addressing the issue of human rights, stressing the 
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Brazilian position according to which the basic rights of the 
person to receive food, medical care, education and 
housing had to prevail on anything else.272  
Jimmy Carter then dropped the subject, probably to 
avoid any controversy, and switched to another “sensitive 
question”: he affirmed that the United States was “anxious” 
to restore military relations with Brazil, and that would do 
it “discreetly”, “without embarrassing” the Brazilians. In 
this case Geisel was far more conciliatory: he stated that 
Brazil would accept with pleasure the restoration of 
military relations but could not tolerate any criticism by 
U.S. Senate to the Brazilian political system. Carter 
committed himself to talk about the issue with “influent 
U.S. senators” as soon as he would be back to Washington 
DC. No further problems would emerge in the future and 
the restoration of military relations would be successful, 
Carter guaranteed.273 
On March 29, 1978 late at night there was also a 
meeting between Vance and Silveira274. The topics covered 
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in the summit between the two Foreign Ministers 
replicated those tackled in the morning by the two 
Presidents: that is to say, the African political situation, the 
way Western powers could deal with the African Marxist 
governments, the relations between Israel and Egypt, and 
the Middle East peace process. According to the Brazilian 
records, frankness and cordiality characterized also this 
round of conversations but this did not suffice to find a 
common ground on the issues raised. Besides this, the talks 
did not focus on any specific bilateral issue, least of all on 
human rights. 
On the following day March 30, the two presidents met 
again in late morning for a third round of one-hour 
bilateral talks.275 As the Brazilian records tell us, the 
participants were the same as in the first meeting which 
took place the morning before. Not the same, of course, 
were the topics. Above all, the two delegations talked about 
the U.S.-USSR relations and the nuclear issue in Brazil: 
Carter offered thorium for the Brazilian nuclear plants, 
thereby trying once again to drift Brazil apart from the 
nuclear agreement with West Germany. But Geisel 
dropped the argument without continuing the conversation 
on the subject.  
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According to the scheduled agenda a further meeting 
was planned for later that day, but Geisel said that, in his 
opinion, it was definitely unnecessary, given that the 
results achieved thus far had been very positive.276  
Was it true? Could the results achieved be considered 
successful? The sensitive issues had been left on the edge: 
the nuclear issue was discussed but didn’t give any new 
outcome; and what about human rights? They de facto 
disappeared from the bilateral agenda. Nevertheless, Carter 
addressed the human rights issue in less private and less 
reserved circumstances. 
Indeed, in early morning of March 30, 1978, a couple of 
hours before meeting President Geisel for the third round 
of conversations, Jimmy Carter delivered a speech before 
the Brazilian Congress. The words pronounced left no 
doubt: the worldwide guarantee of the respect of basic 
human rights continued to be a primary goal for the 
American presidency. But Jimmy Carter took advantage of 
being before the Congress in Brasilia to highlight other 
crucial issues: despite the undeniable differences between 
the United States and Brazil, the two countries shared an 
old tradition of friendship and alliance; both countries were 
pivotal actors of the Western hemisphere and, as such, 
partook both responsibilities and objectives in the 
international arena. In fact, Carter said: 
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“I recognize that in your country and in mine there is a 
great diversity of interest, differences among people, and 
a constant, unceasing, most often successful struggle to 
bring harmony among differences and to carve out 
common commitments that will add the strength of all 
those different people together to reach a destiny even 
more inspirational than the past history has already 
given to us.  
We share a common religion among many of our people, 
a common hope for peace. We share a feeling that our 
nations are bound together with unbreakable chains. We 
share a realization that while friendship is strong enough 
to sustain transient differences of opinion, that we can 
exchange ideas freely and without constraint and, in the 
process, learn about one another and perhaps improve 
the attitudes of people in the United States and also in 
Brazil.  
We are learning together in the Western Hemisphere, 
which still has the vigor of newness, how we can exert 
our leadership throughout the rest of the world in 
dealing with hunger and despair, in dealing with the 
struggle for basic human rights.  
We understand the broad definition of these two 
important words—the right to freedom, the right to 
criticize a government, the right of people to contain 
within themselves, collectively, the ultimate authority, 
the right to an education, the right to good health, a place 
to live, food, the right to share more equitably the riches 
with which God has blessed us, the right to express 
opinions, the right to enhance our own individuality, the 
right to seek collective solutions to private and public 
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problems, the right to expose the greatness of our own 
nations which we love”.277 
Maybe the speech was read as provocative by the 
Brazilian military leadership: the U.S. President decided to 
talk about “the right to freedom, and the right to criticize a 
government” before the same Congress that Ernesto Geisel, 
enacting the AI-5, had closed for two weeks in 1977; 
moreover, Carter raised the human rights issue publicly 
and not during the bilateral summits, certainly in order to 
give the issue a major impact.  
Not by chance, on March 30, 1978 the New York Times 
emphasized that Carter in Brasilia raised “rights and 
nuclear issues”278: 
 
“Mr. Carter spoke of both human rights and non-
proliferation – the two issues that have exacerbated 
relations with Brazil and brought them to what one 
American official described as ‘a 30-year low’. On human 
rights, President Carter said that it would be necessary 
for the United States and Brazil to speak to ‘each other 
frankly and with understanding’ if progress wants to be 
made in advancing ‘the cause of human freedom and the 
rule of law’. […] Briefing reporters this evening, Jody 
Powell, the White House press secretary, said that 
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despite the well-known and publicly expressed’ 
differences between the two countries on these issues, 
neither was discussed in the initial talks between Mr. 
Carter and General Geisel this evening. He said he was 
confident that both points would be raised when the 
talks were resumed tomorrow because ‘none of us is 
making any pretense about the differences that exist’”.279  
 
The U.S. press gave a quite positive balance of the 
presidential stop in Brasilia.  Two were the major results 
achieved: first, there was “an apparent reduction of the 
tensions” between the U.S. and Brazilian governments, 
even though there was not a narrowing of the differences 
on human rights and nuclear policy280; second, President 
Carter was able in going a long way toward convincing the 
Latin American leaders he met that “they could deal with 
the United States as equals”.281 The Latin American trip 
could be considered a turning point in Carter’s regional 
foreign policy: 
 
“For Carter, while he early expressed an interest in a new 
relationship with Latin America, positive policy has 
taken a back seat to highly publicized criticism of human 
rights abuses. […] The Latin American trip was Carter’s 
first chance to put some teeth in his expressed good 
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intentions for a new Latin American policy based on 
equality and mutual respect”.282 
 
Were the tensions between Washington and Brasilia 
eased? According to the joint communiqué issued after the 
bilateral talks, they definitely were. 
At first, the two governments announced that “the 
conversations between the two Presidents took place in an 
atmosphere of frankness, cordiality and mutual respect”. 
Moreover, the two Presidents expressed “their great 
personal satisfaction that their conversations, conducted in 
an atmosphere of friendship […], had resulted in a very 
useful, comprehensive and mutually beneficial exchange of 
views on a wide range of multilateral and bilateral 
issues”.283  
President Carter enthusiastically declared at the end of 
his trip to Latin America and Africa: 
“In Brazil, one of our close allies over the years, we 
reestablished the understanding of the long-term, 
common interests and friendship between our people. 
And we stressed, perhaps in different ways, our mutual 
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concern about nuclear nonproliferation and human 
rights”.284 
Furthermore, he wrote down in his diary: 
“We […] had a good visit to Brazil. Foreign Minister 
Silveira was amazed at the number of people who came 
out to the highway to greet us, at the friendliness of their 
reaction. I personally liked President Geisel very much. 
He’s an older gentleman, military, frank, honest, blunt, 
cool at first in his welcoming remarks, particularly. I 
rejected Zbig’s suggestion that we be cool also, and made 
a very warm statement. The two major issues are our 
insistence on human rights, which are abridged in Brazil 
but on which progress in being made, and the concern 
we have about Brazil putting in a  nuclear reprocessing 
plant which we don’t think they need. In both instances 
Brazil has considered this position of the United States an 
unwarranted intrusion into their affairs”.285 
From the reading of these memories, it is clear that 
Carter intended to melt the coldness of the Brazilian 
military, making a warm statement and behaving friendly. 
Certainly, Carter was helped by the positive impression he 
received of President Geisel. 
Drawing on their deep common heritage of respect for 
the Rule of Law and their determination to improve the 
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conditions of life of their peoples, both Presidents 
reaffirmed and agreed that the progress of mankind will be 
measured in large part by advances made in guaranteeing 
and assuring the political, economic and social rights of all 
peoples.  
“President Carter emphasized the fundamental 
commitment of his country to the promotion of human 
rights and democratic freedoms as basic to the process of 
building a more just world, and stated that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the OAS Charter 
provide a framework for international concern in this 
area. In this regard President Geisel recalled that 
international cooperation for the affirmation of human 
rights, in all their aspects, is one of the noblest tasks of 
the United Nations. He stressed the preoccupation of the 
Brazilian Government with the observance of human 
rights and noted the essential role of economic, social and 
political development in attaining progress in this 
area”.286 
President Carter reviewed the global scope of the U.S. 
non-proliferation policy: he emphasized that the United 
States aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but 
at the same time encouraged international cooperation in 
the development of the peaceful use of atomic energy. 
President Geisel noted Brazil's equal concern for non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and stressed that Brazil 
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strongly supported international efforts towards 
disarmament; he moreover emphasized that, in fact, 
Brazil's nuclear program had strictly peaceful objectives, in 
order to meet the country’s energy needs. 
In this connection, asked about the U.S. attempts to 
persuade Brazil to give up reprocessing and enrichment 
technology acquired from Germany, President Carter 
affirmed that the United States strongly favored the right of 
any country to have part of its energy supplies come from 
nuclear power and that would never prevent that trend 
continuing, both in Brazil and in any other countries in the 
world. And on the Brazil-West Germany agreement stated: 
“Our own nuclear nonproliferation policy, however, tries 
to draw a distinction between the right and the meeting 
of need of countries to produce energy from atomic 
power on the one hand, and the right of the country to 
evolve weapons-grade nuclear materials through either 
enrichment processes or through reprocessing.  
We have no authority over either West Germany nor 
Brazil, nor do we want any. But as a friend of both 
countries, we reserve the right to express our opinion to 
them, that it would be very good to have, and possible to 
have, a complete nuclear fuel system throughout a 
country without having the ability to reprocess spent fuel 
from the power reactors”.287 
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The U.S. government wanted it to be clear that neither 
any pressure nor interference would be put in place toward 
Brazil and the FRG: Carter was very clear when he said that 
the U.S. not only didn’t have any authority over them, but 
did not want any. This statement revealed that Washington 
had a definitely less aggressive attitude than the year 
before. 
The two Presidents released a joint press communiqué 
precisely to prove that the bilateral dialogue was 
successfully renewed and accord was re-established.  They 
led the press know that during their meetings they 
“reviewed the conditions and prospects of the world 
economy” and “strongly endorsed the key role of 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank”. Moreover,  
Carter and Geisel “agreed on the importance of frequent 
consultations and close cooperation between the two 
Governments. They agreed that the mechanisms and 
procedures of consultation established under the 
Memorandum of Understanding of February 21, 1976, 
should continue to be used and instructed their Foreign 
Ministers accordingly. The two Presidents expressed their 
intention to continue in close personal communication so as 
to permit their direct and prompt address to matters of 
special interest to their two countries”288. For this reason, it 
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was decided that the Fifth Session of the Brazil-US Sub-
Group on Trade would take place in Brasilia in May. 
With respect to the first months of 1977 the tones had 
radically changed, and the joint communiqué was evidence 
of this. Not surprisingly, during the press conference before 
Carter’s departure to Rio de Janeiro a couple of provocative 
questions (from Brazilian journalists) were addressed to the 
U.S. President. It is interesting to quote entirely both the 
questions and the answers given: 
“Q: Mr. President, at the beginning of your 
administration there was a clear tendency to isolate and 
treat Brazil coldly in favor of democratically elected 
governments, elected by the people.  
Yesterday at the airport you stressed the need for 
cooperation between Brazil and the United States as 
equal partners. Who has changed, Brazil or you?  
A: There has not ever been any inclination on my part or 
the part of my administration to underestimate the 
extreme importance of Brazil as a major world power, 
nor to underestimate the extreme importance of very 
close and harmonious relationships between the United 
States and Brazil.  
There are some differences of opinion between ourselves 
and Brazil which have been very highly publicized. But 
on the long scale of things, both in the past history and in 
the future, the major factors which bind us in harmony 
with Brazil far transcend, are much more important than 
the differences that have been published between our 
approach to human rights, for instance, and the subject of 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
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Q: What comes in the first place for you: the private 
enterprise and the private system or the human rights 
policy? 
A:Well, they're both important to us. And I don't see any 
incompatibility between a belief in a free enterprise 
system, where government does not dominate the banks 
or the production of agricultural products or commercial 
products on the one hand, and a deep and consistent and 
permanent and strong belief in enhancing human rights 
around the world”.289 
 
After one year in office, then, the public opinion was 
probably wondering what the real order of priorities of the 
U.S. administration was. Was the human rights idealism 
giving in to the logic of economic and political interests? 
Once again, the risk of inconsistency and incoherence was 
high. Indeed, the U.S. administration wanted the 
commercial and financial issues to be clearly detached from 
the human rights policy. Carter himself considered 
unconceivable any act of the Congress that would try to 
restrict the lending of money by American private banks to 
Brazil under any circumstances.  
 In the early afternoon of March 30, 1978 Jimmy Carter 
and the whole U.S. delegation went to Rio de Janeiro “for a 
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day and night of recreation”290. Actually, while in Rio in the 
morning of March 31, “President Carter met Cardinal Paulo 
Evaristo Arns, who since 1975 established a ‘truly 
organized human rights movement in Brazil’ after 
sympathizing for several years for torture victims during 
the years of the military regime”.291 But President Carter 
met also other five people that morning, each of them 
representing a rather broad spectrum and a number of 
facets of the Brazilian society. What mattered most was that 
they were all opponents to the military regime and their 
names were: Cardinal Arns of Sao Paulo, Cardinal Sales of 
Rio de Janeiro, both tireless opponents to the use of torture 
by the military, Mr. Faoro, President of the Brazilian Bar 
Association, Mr. Mesquita Neto, publisher of the Estado de 
São Paulo and known as a ‘champion of press freedom’, 
Mr. Vianna, head of the national bank for the economic 
development, and Mr. Mindlin, a businessman who 
resigned from the Sao Paulo government in protest against 
the death in police custody of a newspaperman.292 
Asked about the purpose of the meeting, Carter replied: 
 “I don't have any agenda prepared for my visit with 
Cardinal Arns and the others. In a diverse society like 
you have here in Brazil, it's important for me to visit with 
different persons who represent different views. […] I 
want to meet with as many other people as I can. I have, 
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by the way, met and talked to Cardinal Arns previously 
in the United States. […] And as a leader of a nation, I 
reserve the right to meet with whom I please. And I think 
this is a constructive thing, which will give me a much 
better overall understanding of what exists in Brazil. And 
I think the right of people to speak to me as a foreign 
visitor is one that's important to Brazil to preserve and to 
cherish. And I am thankful that I have that right when I 
visit your country”.293  
Actually there isn’t any record of the meeting available 
and, therefore, there is no precise knowledge of the content 
of the discussion. What is very well known and that 
immediately aroused the public attention was Carter’s 
decision to invite Cardinal Arns to have a private 
conversation, on the way to the airport before going to 
Lagos. Writing in his diary about the private meeting with 
Cardinal Arns, Carter reported: 
 
“He’s extremely courageous. Because of him the 
newspapers in São Paulo are under tight constraints, 
which is rare now in Brazil. Some of his students have 
been arrested. He said the political prisoners in Brazil 
have dropped about 90 percent, to around two or three 
hundred, but there are still ten thousand political exiles 
who have been forced out of Brazil. He published a book 
the day before I arrived in Brasilia on human rights. […] 
My guess is that our paying attention to him will not 
help with Geisel, but I think it’s important in Brazil and 
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worldwide for me not to back down on this subject that 
arouses intense interest in other countries”.294 
 
Jimmy Carter had already had the chance to exchange 
his views with Cardinal Arns in the past: they first met at 
the University of Notre Dame in May 1977, when they both 
received honorary degrees and President Carter made the 
first key speech on his administration’s foreign policy. 
Furthermore, in October 1977 Arns wrote to Carter to 
sensitize him about the issue of disappeared political 
prisoners in Brazil and, enclosed to the letter, there was a 
list naming 23 Brazilians who had disappeared after being 
arrested by police and security forces.295 
 
All in all, the importance of Carter’s act was in its 
symbolic meaning: the U.S. President sympathized with 
one of the strongest and most charismatic leader of the 
opposition to the military regime, who was a strong 
defender of the human rights cause as well.  
Interviewed by Larry Rother of the Washington Post, 
an opponent to the regime said: 
 
“Many of us have been wondering whether Carter still 
cares about human rights, and there is no better way for 
him to show human rights still matter than to meet with 
the man the Brazilian people recognize as our leader in 
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this field”.296  
 
Jimmy Carter decided to depart from Rio de Janeiro in 
the afternoon of March 31 leaving the tacit message that 
human rights, freedom of speech, and a democratic 
political system were of primary importance to him. Jimmy 
Carter had just put into practice what he had declared the 
day before in Brasilia: 
 
“We believe this is an international problem, that the 
focusing of world attention and world pressure on us 
and other countries is a very beneficial factor, that high 
publicity should be given to any proven violation of 
human rights. It’s a commitment that our nation has that 
I want not to abandon but to enhance and strengthen”.297 
 
It was true that the tones between Washington and 
Brasilia definitely calmed down, but human rights had not 
disappeared from the agenda: human rights were an issue 
to deal with openly and frankly. The difference of opinion 
between the two governments on how the human rights 
issue had to be addressed and what actions could be taken 
to correct any defects that existed still persisted. What had 
really changed was the fact of talking about the issue. 
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As Carter said: 
 
“One of the best things about the development on human 
rights in the last year or so has been the worldwide 
attention to it. It was kind of a dormant issue for too 
long, and now I doubt that there's a world leader who 
exists that doesn't constantly feel the pressure of 
considering the human rights questions-to analyze one's 
own administration, one's own country, what the rest of 
the world thinks about us, and how we could correct any 
defects and prevent allegations in the future, either true 
or false”.298 
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5.3 The aftermath of President Carter’s visit. 
 
A few days after Carter left Brazil, the American 
embassy in Brasilia reported that the President had 
managed to restore a tone of cordiality and cooperativeness 
to U.S.-Brazil relations. According to the diplomatic corps 
“the major achievement of the visit was a considerable 
improvement in the atmosphere of [bilateral] relations 
flowing from the establishment of an amicable and useful 
relationship between the two presidents”.299 There was an 
optimistic attitude toward the future developments as well: 
if the non-confrontational tone set by Carter persisted, the 
new relationship he had been able to establish with Ernesto 
Geisel would permit a continuing personal dialogue on 
issues of mutual interests and would certainly facilitate 
efforts to seek maximum areas of convergence. The 
American analysts were aware of the probability that 
Geisel would continue to remain on his guard, as well as he 
did generally during the visit on matters of substance, such 
as nuclear power, human rights and trade issues.300  
Also a CIA National Intelligence Cable distributed in 
April 1978 expressed positive remarks on Carter’s visit to 
Brazil and emphasized the positive comments of the 
Brazilian media: 
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“Reaction in Brazil to President Carter’s recent visit 
has been largely favorable. Officials appreciated the 
President’s tact in addressing sensitive topics, and the 
Brazilian public appears pleased by his acknowledgment 
of their country’s growing world importance. Although 
Brazilians do not believe that differences with the U.S. 
are less serious or complicated than before, they may 
well think the visit will promote a more constructive 
dialogue in the future. […]  
The Brazilian press highlighted the President’s 
friendly manner and his statements that Brazil is a major 
actor in world affairs as setting the tone for the visit and 
putting apprehensive Brazilian officials at ease. The press 
also expressed admiration that the President, albeit in a 
low-key way, made clear his intention to stick to his 
human rights and non-proliferation positions”.301 
 
Even the most critical Brazilian officials of U.S. policies 
on human rights and non-proliferation had been probably 
convinced of the sincerity of Carter’s views and his 
determination to continue a dialogue on such topics. 
Jimmy Carter’s behavior had received the support and 
the endorsement not only of the press, the public opinion, 
and the military leadership but also of some important 
opponents to the military regime. On April 26, 1978 the 
NSC expert on Latin American, Bob Pastor, had a dinner 
conversation with Leonel Brizola, former Governor of the 
State of Rio Grande do Sul and leading exile politician.302 
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Brizola praised the way Jimmy Carter acted during his stay 
in Brazil and said he had done a “masterful job”. In a 
memorandum written to summarize the conversation held 
with Brizola, Bob Pastor said: 
 
“To him, the most significant events of the trip in 
Brazil were clearly the President’s decision to ask Arns to 
accompany him to the airport (a decision which he 
thought reflected the President’s desire to leave Brazil 
after an extremely balanced trip, with a slight emphasis 
on human rights, as opposed to just better relations with 
the Brazilian government) and the President’s statement 
before the Brazilian Congress”.303 
 
The undeniable success of the presidential visit, 
however, did not entail at all a change of the Brazilian 
position in the international scenario: Brazil, indeed, would 
continue to actively seek an expansion of its ties and 
influence outside the hemisphere, “into Western Europe, 
Africa and the Middle East”, regions where “commercial 
ties as well as diversified political relations” could be 
                                                                                                                                     
Brizola was forced to live in exile in Uruguay first and then in the United 
States, where he obtained asylum since late 1977. During the years of the 
military regime, Leonel Brizola was a political exile, could not receive his 
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successfully established.304 Indeed in Washington it was 
well known that, as Silveira used to say,  
 
“Brazil ha[d] neither permanent friends nor permanent 
enemies, only permanent interests”.305  
 
Besides seeking new markets and expanding existing 
ones for Brazilian exports, the Brazilian leadership was 
determined to achieve and demonstrate its independence 
from the United States in foreign affairs. Actually, “this 
[was] not a new attitude, although resentment of U.S. 
human rights and non-proliferation policies ha[d] recently 
heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic 
reactions”.306 Of course it was very well known that the 
regime was particularly concerned over the U.S. position 
on human rights but, first and foremost, over the effects 
that tackling such a topic could have on the Brazilian public 
opinion. A 1978 CIA report stated: 
 
“This truculence masks a very real fear that the 
United States, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian 
dissent and quicken the pace of demands for basic 
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changes”.307  
 
Likely, the harsh reactions to the U.S. intrusion into 
Brazilian internal affairs could be also due to the fear of the 
possible reactions of the opposition forces and grassroots 
movements.  
The Brazilian estrangement from the United States was 
part of a wider re-definition of the Brazilian foreign policy 
in the Seventies. The desire to ‘go it alone’ was certainly a 
prevailing sentiment in the Brazilian leadership. Spektor 
highlights that, on the one hand, Brazil thought of itself as 
if it “could not surrender sovereignty because, being 
relatively weak and traditionally dependent on the major 
powers, it was still trying to reassert it”.308 On the other 
hand, Brasilia perceived American pressures on nuclear 
issues and internationalization of human rights norms as a 
form of “neo-colonial intervention”.309 Did Geisel (and 
chanceler Silveira) seriously think that the United States was 
committed to contain Brazil and keep it a third-rate 
country? Or rather, the decision to emphasize the Carter 
administration’s pressures to contain Brazil’s diplomatic 
expansion was a way to maintain support at home.  As 
professor Roett310, eminent expert on Latin American 
studies, states, Brazil was reshaping its role in world affairs 
and “a movement away from –but not against– the United 
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States” was inevitable and “required new intellectual tools 
and/or principles with which to guide Brazil’s international 
behavior”.311 The estrangement from the United States was 
blatantly showed through the decision not to sign the 
Tlatelolco Treaty312 and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, respectively in 1967 and 1968. 
According to this interpretation of the Brazilian diplomatic 
strategy, the gradual approximation between Brasilia and 
Third World countries was also inevitable: first the 
Brazilian diplomacy worked to close ties with newly 
independent African countries (the recognition of the 
Marxist government of Angola in 1975 for example), and 
then with Latin American and Asian countries. 
Since the late Sixties, two things were simultaneously 
happening: not only middle-range powers, like Brazil, were 
trying to redefine their own roles and ties but also the U.S. 
international influence was experiencing a decline. “New 
options were available, both politically as well as 
economically/financially. A revitalized Western Europe, 
and a set of emerging Third World actors, offered new 
opportunities”.313 This interpretation is also shared by 
David Skidmore314, who holds that Carter’s foreign policy 
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(generally depicted as expression of the Presidential 
personal moralism) enacted, instead, a “pragmatic strategy 
of adjustment [precisely] to declining U.S. global power”.315 
Those were years of ongoing changes in the international 
structure of power: new actors were emerging on the 
international scenario, the developing countries were 
increasingly affirming their position, and the North-South 
approach was strenuously opposing the East-West détente. 
The time had come for the United States to adapt its 
policies and adjust to this new global structure. Carter’s 
initial policies might have appeared incoherent and 
inconsistent as a result of its “failure to develop a central 
world view”316, and the President’s personal inexperience 
together with the contrasts between Vance’s and 
Brzezinski’s views on strategic priorities didn’t help. Most 
of the literature agrees on the fact that Carter’s foreign 
policy changed over time, “although disagreement exist 
over the degree and nature of this shift”.317 According to 
David Skidmore, “those who affirm that the administration 
lacked a coherent world view fail to distinguish between 
coherence and complexity”.318 Carter and his staff were 
perfectly aware that the world order was becoming too 
complex to fit into the bipolar logic and interdependence 
was gradually replacing superpowers’ hegemony. The 
spirit of détente did not mean only a relaxation of the 
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competition between the U.S. and the USSR, but implied a 
wider, choral view of the international scenario. “The 
diffusion of international power and the growth of 
interdependence both created the need for a more subtle 
and differentiated approach to U.S. foreign policy”.319 The 
decision of the Carter administration to deal with this 
complexity with a case-by-case approach rather than a rigid 
paradigm has often been interpreted as an example of  
confusion and incoherence. The personal lack of leadership 
skills can explain why Carter didn’t manage to make clear 
the direction he was giving to his policy change and to 
obtain the necessary domestic support.  
Even if it is true that the Carter administration used an 
“idealistic wrap”320 to make more appealing a pragmatic 
foreign policy, David Skidmore notes that Carter’s idealism 
is probably overemphasized. 
The primary aim of the 1970s foreign policies was 
“adjusting [U.S. foreign policy] to account for declining 
American power”321 and “addressing what Samuel 
Huntington has called the Lippmann Gap”322, that is to say 
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the imbalance between (decreasing) capabilities and 
(constant) commitments. “Rival states gradually narrowed 
the enormous military and economic lead enjoyed by the 
U.S. in the early post-WWII era”323 and the 1970s can 
therefore be considered as years of American relative 
decline: was it possible to reverse or at least to narrow the 
Lippmann gap? If so, how? Skidmore states that it could be 
done “either reducing commitments or finding less costly 
and risky ways” of managing them.324 The presidencies of 
the 1970s had to implement a policy of adjustment of U.S. 
                                                                                                                                     
after WWII, this combination provided what Lippmann would call a 
‘comfortable surplus of power’ abroad and a general consensus on policy at 
home” (p.454). Things started to change by the end of the 1960s when U.S. 
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administration were largely diplomatic, heavily focused on reducing threats to 
U.S. interests and on increasing the role of allied powers in protecting 
American interests (pp.456-457). More specifically, the Carter administration 
put emphasis on the importance of regional influential (this for example 
explains the opening to China), tendency that however, Huntington notes, ran 
counter to the administration’s concerns with human rights and nuclear 
proliferation (p.458). The Carter administration ended in an atmosphere of 
malaise, and probably for this reason the Reagan administration greatly 
accelerated the defense buildup modestly initiated in the previous 
administration (p.459) and opted for military and strategic responses (rather 
than purely diplomatic) to the Lippmann gap problem. Huntington, Samuel 
Coping with the Lippmann Gap, Foreign Affairs, vol.66 n.3 America and the 
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interests. Kenneth Oye325 argues that Carter, as Nixon and 
Ford before him, narrowed the definition of American 
interests and shifted some of the burdens of containment to 
China, Western Europe and the Third World: this 
interpretation shows that it was the U.S. itself to make the 
number of international actors grow and that it was part of 
the American strategy to make the power gradually and 
widely shared. But once the leadership is shared, a 
reduction of commitment follows; and in the U.S. case, 
there was a reduction of commitment in the peripheral 
areas326, a shift of the burdens to friends and allies, and an 
accommodation with rivals. According to David Skidmore, 
the cut of U.S. arms sales and of military aid abroad was 
one of the major points of the strategy aiming at reducing 
commitments.  
Hence, some reflections are in order: was the human 
rights policy then strictly connected to the policy responses 
to U.S. declining power? Was the human rights policy all 
but idealistic? Looking at Carter’s foreign policy through 
the prism of the ‘adjustment strategy’, the human rights 
rhetoric appears the idealistic envelope of very pragmatic 
objectives to achieve. The human rights issue can be 
interpreted as a very useful tool to gain internal support for 
external policy actions deeply different from past policies. 
What does this mean exactly? During the presidential 
campaign in 1976, Carter had the opportunity to see that 
human rights were capable of unifying the different 
                                                             
325 Skidmore, David cit., p.704. 
326 Skidmore, David cit., p.705. 
171 
 
factions of the Democratic party, a topic through which any 
ideological opposition could be overcome and that raised 
wide consensus. Human rights actually resulted to be an 
appealing theme also in the wider public opinion. At the 
beginning of Carter’s term, it was a new political discourse 
that proved how the Cold War bipolar logic was definitely 
old-fashioned and inappropriate in the new world order. 
On the other hand, it was a political discourse that still 
showed that the United States was willing (and able) to 
play a leading global role, also in a more complex 
international scenario where bipolarism appeared obsolete, 
using  the tools of principles and negotiation rather than 
arms and military strength. 
   
David Skidmore shares the same opinion: 
 
“Carter's moralistic embrace of human rights was 
motivated not only by his own intense moral convictions 
but also by the belief that these sorts of appeals would 
bolster his own political fortunes and win support for his 
foreign policy reforms. An overemphasis on the Carter 
administration's idealism is, therefore, misplaced. It is 
equally misleading to suggest that Carter ignored the 
role of power in world politics. Carter believed that 
American power was not as predominant as it once had 
been and that the relative efficacy of various instruments 
of power had shifted over time. Economic power, for 
instance, was considered relatively more effective while 
military power had declined in utility. These changes 
required a greater appreciation for the limits of American 
power and a rethinking of some of the means by which 
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influence could best be wielded.327 
 
This was the program, but did Carter manage to 
institutionalize reform and adjustment in U.S. foreign 
policy? Not really, because he “began to retreat from his 
reformist aspirations as early as 1978; by 1980, his foreign 
policy was geared more toward resisting the implications 
of decline than adjusting to them”.328 But how can we 
explain Carter’s inability to complete his policy change? 
Probably, the explanation lies in the search for U.S. public 
opinion’s approval and it appeared to be too hazardous to 
implement policies that were not receiving the domestic 
support the administration hoped for. The decision to 
abandon the adjustment strategy was definitely due to 
increasing concern about domestic legitimacy: “The process 
by which policies were sold at home, in other words, 
influenced the substance of the policies themselves”329 and 
foreign policy became more responsive to domestic 
legitimation rather than to international change. No 
surprise, then, if divergence and incoherence emerged 
within the administration: behaving in this way, Jimmy 
Carter didn’t manage to deal with the “Lippmann Gap” 
and, to use Huntington’s words, “if commitments exceed 
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power insolvency results which generates deep political 
dissension”.330 
 Another possible explanation of the failure of the 
change in foreign policy attitude might be found in the fact 
that at the beginning of his term “Jimmy Carter was much 
more concerned with doing what he believed to be right 
than with what might be best for him politically”.331 Was 
there the idea (or hope) that the two things might overlap 
in a near future? How likely was that the ‘right thing’ was 
also the best political choice? The administration was 
inspired by principles of justice and fairness also in 
international relations, and that meant to leave behind all 
the disappointment that the Vietnam war and the 
Watergate scandal caused and offer (to both the public 
opinion and the Congress) a new foreign policy. The new 
approach consisted also in considering bipolarism 
outdated: “No longer would an ‘inordinate fear of 
communism’ drive the United States to ‘embrace any 
dictator who joined us in that fear’”.332 Human rights were 
chosen to be the new cornerstone of a new American 
foreign policy discourse. What are the possible explanation 
to the failure in achieving the goal of domestic 
legitimation? Were the inspiring principles too weak? Or 
rather, may incoherence be the answer? The rhetoric of the 
human rights policy wasn’t targeted to all foreign countries 
                                                             
330 Huntington, Samuel cit., p.453. 
331 Slavicek, Louise Chipley Great American Presidents – Jimmy Carter, Chelsea 
House Publishers, Philadelphia, 2004, pp.57-58. 
332 Slavicek, Louise Chipley cit. pp.59-60. 
174 
 
indiscriminately, there were glaring exceptions: just to cite 
a couple, let’s recall that for strategic reasons Jimmy Carter 
never contested nor even sanctioned the violations of basic 
human rights in Iran or in the People’s Republic of China. 
One of the major critiques moved to the Carter 
administration was exactly the selective choice of the 
target-countries of the human rights diplomacy, which 
rendered this policy less persuasive and rather inconsistent.  
Whatever the interpretation, the evidence is that during 
the third year of the mandate, 1979, there was a dramatic 
shift in the foreign policy orientation or, to be more precise, 
the administration backpedaled towards an orthodox Cold 
War mentality. Sure this did not happen accidentally: the 
two international crises provoked by the Iranian revolution 
and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underlined the 
necessity of a “wrenching shift in tone and policy”333 and 
strongly brought Cold War back on the international scene. 
Despite the initial hope about how convincing the human 
rights policy could be, at midterm the Carter 
administration had abandoned any adjustment strategy, 
détente was gone and containment was back.334 Why were 
all the new reforms abandoned? Skidmore states that this 
was because of the lack of “domestic legitimacy of his new 
policies in competition with the institutional and 
intellectual legacies” of the past.335 
Carter’s liberal internationalist attitude, with its 
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Wilsonian inspiration, bumped into the wall of changing 
times. The administration had to deal with international 
difficulties that kept pace with serious domestic troubles, 
public discontent and worries about the U.S. internal 
situation. Several months before the Iran hostage crisis and 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the abrupt arising of the 
second oil shock destabilized the U.S. economy, already 
severely strained by high inflation and unemployment. The 
nation was tired, dismayed and bewildered even before 
that the U.S. stance in the international scenario started to 
appear weakened. And the President’s words were neither 
reassuring nor encouraging. In October 1978, Jimmy Carter 
delivered a speech to the nation about his administration’s 
anti-inflation program.336 In this speech the President 
appeared concerned and unclear about what the best 
solution for the country could be. Moreover, the President 
offered of himself the image of an admittedly unsuccessful 
leader.  
 
“I want to have a frank talk with you tonight about 
our most serious domestic problem. That problem is 
inflation. Inflation can threaten all the economic gains 
we've made […]This has been a long-time threat. For the 
last 10 years, the annual inflation rate in the United States 
has averaged 6 and half percent. And during the 3 years 
before my Inauguration, it had increased to an average of 
8 percent. Inflation has, therefore, been a serious problem 
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for me ever since I became President. We've tried to 
control it, but we have not been successful.”337  
 
It was true that the administration had not been able 
yet to overcome the inflation issue, but several measures 
had already been adopted and the first results were good. 
Government spending was one of the causes of inflation, 
and therefore Government had to take the lead in fiscal 
restraint. Jimmy Carter was very well aware that American 
people were sick and tired of wasteful Federal spending 
and the inflation it brought with it.  
After one year and a half, the administration had 
already had some success: they had brought the deficit 
down by one-third since 1977—from more than $66 billion 
in fiscal year 1976 to about $40 billion in fiscal year 1979—, 
which meant a reduction of more than $25 billion in the 
Federal deficit in just 3 years.  
It was a frank speech in which the President was asking 
the nation to cooperate and make a common effort to 
improve the economic situation, and to share 
responsibilities, everyone had to do his own part to deal 
with the declining economy. However, telling the harsh 
truth in such a sincere way was risky: the administration 
looked too ineffective and the President seemed not to offer 
a solution, rather to put a burden on the nation’s shoulders. 
A few months later, in mid-July 1979, Jimmy Carter 
tackled once again a deep discontent that rapidly spread 
throughout the entire nation. When he delivered the 
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“malaise speech” on July 15, 1979 Americans were 
suffering from a general “crisis of confidence”. Patrick 
Caddell, Carter’s pollster, suggested to address this 
fundamental problem, inspire the country to overcome it, 
and try to turn the presidency around. The country was in 
the midst of the second oil shock, with gasoline prices 
skyrocketing and the resulting oil shortages, anxiety was 
the prevailing feeling among the population. Carter’s 
approval rating had dropped dramatically within a few 
weeks’ time: from the 41% approval rating in mid-April 
1979338, on June 10, 1979 the New York Times reported that 
the public approval rating had fallen to 30%, the lowest 
level since Carter took office.339 Most people blamed the 
President for the poor state of the economy and only 28% 
believed Carter could restore trust in government, a key 
campaign pledge in 1976.340 
The President perfectly perceived the mood of his 
people and understood that what people were asking for 
was a leader of the nation, not just a manager of the 
Government.341 The nation required a President able to see 
his people’s needs again, a President with a clear will to 
lead his country out of both the economic and spiritual 
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crises that it was experiencing. It was first of all a crisis of 
confidence: 
“We were sure that ours was a nation of the ballot, 
not the bullet, until the murders of John Kennedy and 
Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. We were 
taught that our armies were always invincible and our 
causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of 
Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of 
honor until the shock of Watergate. We remember 
when the phrase "sound as a dollar" was an expression 
of absolute dependability, until 10 years of inflation 
began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We 
believed that our Nation's resources were limitless until 
1973, when we had to face a growing dependence on 
foreign oil”.342  
But Jimmy Carter didn’t want to emphasize just the 
difficulties that the Americans had been forced to face in 
the last two decades, on the contrary he meant to point out 
how strong and inventive they were: 
“We ourselves are the same Americans who just 10 
years ago put a man on the Moon. We are the 
generation that dedicated our society to the pursuit of 
human rights and equality. And we are the generation 
that will win the war on the energy problem and in that 
process rebuild the unity and confidence of America”.343 
 
And the President tried to give a boost to the 
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Americans, recalling the many resources (both natural and 
spiritual) the country had, and said: 
“The solution of our energy crisis can also help us 
to conquer the crisis of the spirit in our country. […] 
You know we can do it. We have the natural resources. 
We have more oil in our shale alone than several Saudi 
Arabia. We have more coal than any nation on Earth. 
We have the world's highest level of technology. We 
have the most skilled work force, with innovative 
genius, and I firmly believe that we have the national 
will to win this war. I do not promise you that this 
struggle for freedom will be easy. I do not promise a 
quick way out of our Nation's problems, when the truth 
is that the only way out is an all-out effort. What I do 
promise you is that I will lead our fight, and I will 
enforce fairness in our struggle, and I will ensure 
honesty. And above all, I will act”.344  
Jimmy Carter promised action and people appreciated 
that. Still, a Gallup Poll published on the August 12, 1979 
New York Times found that 80% of those surveyed viewed 
President Carter as 'man of high moral principles,' 72% 
expressed trust in him personally, but only 27% felt he had 
'strong leadership qualities' and 20% said he had done an 
excellent or good job.345 Perhaps the astonishing frankness 
was appreciated, but the speech had a boomerang effect 
because it didn’t manage to gather the expected consensus. 
The speech wasn’t hailed enthusiastically even by the 
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press, and the weekly news magazine Newsweek defined it 
a “sermonette to the nation”.346 Hence, not everyone agreed 
on Caddell’s opinion that Americans were “trading their 
longstanding faith in progress, democracy and hard work 
for pessimism, privatism and self-indulgence.”347  
Sure, it is worth to reflect on how effective the impact 
of public opinion is on the conduct of foreign policy. 
Political scientist and international relations’ theorist Ole 
Holsti recalls that after WWII the relationship between 
public opinion and foreign policy could be summarized by 
three propositions: first, public opinion is highly volatile 
and therefore represents a dubious foundation for a sound 
foreign policy; second, public opinion lacks structure and 
coherence; and third, public opinion has limited impact on 
foreign policy.348 Holsti referred above all to Almond’s 
concept of the ‘instability of mass moods’, that is to say the 
sudden shifts of interest and preferences. Still, Holsti 
recalls, during the years of the Vietnam War that there was 
a radical change of this attitude. In fact, according to 
research projects and studies conducted in the 1980s349, 
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public opinion is less volatile than commonly thought, 
public attitudes don’t lack structure and coherence and are 
therefore not that impotent. Referring to a study by Page 
and Shapiro, Holsti affirms that “mass opinion in the 
aggregate is in fact characterized by a good deal of stability, 
and this is no less true of foreign policy than on domestic 
issues”350; moreover, a considerable convergence of 
findings can be observed on two points relating to belief 
structures: first, even if poorly informed, general public’s 
attitudes about foreign affairs “are in fact structured in at 
least moderately coherent ways”; second, “a single 
isolationist-to-internationalist dimension inadequately 
describes the main dimensions of public opinion on 
international affairs”.351 People organize their political 
world in richer and more diverse ways than indicated by 
the post-WWII scholarship, as Conover and Feldman stated 
in 1984352, and Holsti adds that, even in the absence of 
much factual knowledge, mass public “employ 
superordinate beliefs to guide their thinking on a broad 
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range of issues”.353 Despite the fact that it is possible to 
affirm that public opinion is more structured than it was 
believed in the past, it is not an easy issue to state clearly 
what the opinion-policy relation is. As Powlick showed in 
the post-Vietnam War period bureaucrats have started to 
be more “sanguine about the public than were [those] two 
decades earlier”, and they were therefore “more inclined to 
accept the legitimacy of a public contribution to the policy 
process”.354  
The Carter administration definitely seemed to confirm 
this general trend described by the literature: Patrick 
Caddell constantly evaluated what the public mood was 
and suggested to President Carter the political directions to 
follow consequently. But this was not enough to obtain the 
public support necessary for Jimmy Carter to be re-elected 
and  remain in the White House for four more years. 
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5.4 The remainder of 1978. 
 
The presidential trip in March 1978 proved how 
strategically significant Latin America was for the U.S. At 
the beginning of 1978 the Director of Policy Planning, 
Anthony Lake, had prepared a document on the six Latin 
American countries deserving a special U.S. attention over 
that year.355 Considering the extent of U.S. interests, the 
pace of change and the country’s regional weight, Brazil 
had been listed as a country to give top priority in 1978. 
The core issues of the U.S. foreign policy toward Brazil in 
1977, human rights, non-proliferation and international 
economic issues, remained fundamental and Washington 
was waiting to understand General Figueiredo’s (Geisel’s 
chosen successor) stance on the issues. According to the 
document, “Geisel’s choice, and therefore the almost 
certain winner, General Figueiredo, [was] a relative 
unknown”.356 The United States intended to encourage the 
moderates in the military in order to guarantee a 
continuation of the liberalizing path begun by Geisel and 
the reassertion of democratic traditions. Only in this way, 
Brazil could “rise to greatness, and entry into the ‘club’ of 
industrial nations. A democratic Brazil could be a 
counterweight to the hardline Southern Cone regimes, at a 
time when [the U.S.] leverage in the region appear[ed] to be 
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on the decline”.357 It is possible to affirm, then, that starting 
from 1978 the American attitude toward Brazil significantly 
changed: as soon as human rights violations decreased, 
Washington started to deal with democracy promotion.358  
The Carter administration evaluated in a very positive 
way the goals achieved in its policy toward Latin America 
after the first year in office. “By placing concern for 
humane values at the center of both multilateral and 
bilateral agendas, the U.S. has regained a positive, forward-
looking image in the hemisphere”.359 The fundamental 
inspiring principles of the administration through 1977 and 
the beginning  of 1978 had been three: first, a restoration of 
the moral content of U.S. leadership; second, non-
intervention in countries’ internal affairs; third, willingness 
to live with governments of different political 
predispositions. Since Jimmy Carter’s election, his 
administration had tried to give a different look to the 
foreign policy toward Latin America. The major goals were 
two: a genuine reduction of paternalism (and the 
dependence that inevitably followed); and the recognition 
of the tremendous diversity among the nations of the 
hemisphere, reason for which the relations had to be 
fashioned taking into account each country’s specific 
concerns. The idea of looking for simple, uniform solutions 
                                                             
357 Idem. 
358 This was also the opinion expressed by Robert Pastor during an interview 
held on April 11, 2011 in Washington DC. 
359 Memorandum from Feinberg to all S/P members Paper on U.S. Policy 
Goals and Achievements in Latin America, June 15, 1978, Unclassified, 
Records of Anthony Lake 1977-1981, NARA. 
185 
 
to hemispheric problems was outdated. Furthermore, the 
projection of Latin American nations onto the world stage 
as independent actors was welcomed. The growing 
international role of many Latin nations made it imperative 
that the economic issues affecting the region were placed in 
a broader, global context. Trade, commodities, capital 
flows, development assistance were all issues that each 
country had to address in presence of Europe, Japan, and 
the developing countries of Asia and Africa.360 
As for the human rights issues, since the first days the 
Carter administration had been working to develop a 
climate of greater respect for basic rights. In accordance 
with the human rights legislation, it was chosen to oppose 
assistance loans or other actions in order to dissociate the 
United States from repressive regimes. In the Brazilian case, 
as recalled in the paragraphs above, it was Brasilia to 
renounce U.S. foreign military assistance for 1978 since the 
military government didn’t tolerate unwarranted 
interference in its internal affairs. But this gave importance 
to the human rights issue and made it a central topic also in 
the bilateral presidential talks.  
But Washington decided not to request foreign military 
sales for Brazil also for the fiscal year 1979; moreover, as 
reported in a November 1978 synopsis on IFI-related 
human rights actions, “the approval of some export licenses 
for both commercial arms and munitions list items had 
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been delayed or denied”361 (unfortunately, it is not available 
a specific list of the licenses at issue). 
Nevertheless, the decision not to activate any security 
assistance program both for 1978 and 1979 did not affect 
the intense bilateral trade. As it is possible to see from a 
study conducted by Feenstra et al.362 on world trade flows 
between 1962 and 2000, there was a wide variety of 
commercial sectors in which high volumes of commodities 
were exchanged: agricultural products and food, minerals, 
coal oil and gas, chemicals, tobacco, electronic as well as 
leather products. But the categories in which bilateral flows 
were particularly dense were: ‘agricultural production 
crops’, and ‘food and kindred products’ as Brazilian 
products imported by the United States, and ‘chemicals 
and allied products’, and ‘industrial machinery and 
equipment’ as American products exported to Brazil.363  
The presidential visit at the beginning of 1978 initiated 
a thaw in the relations between Washington and Brasilia 
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that facilitated commercial relations as well as diplomatic 
exchanges. On November 8-9, 1978 a round of planning 
talks took place. As provided by the Memorandum of 
Understanding, diplomatic representatives of the two 
countries met to discuss topics of mutual interest. 
Unfortunately, primary sources do not provide a detailed 
report of the meeting, and only a memorandum with a 
summary of the talks is available in the U.S. archives.364 
Anthony Lake wrote to Secretary Vance: 
 
“While not hesitating to criticize aspects of our 
global policies, the Brazilians seemed generally to 
appreciate our basic thrusts on East-West, African and 
hemispheric issues. On North-South issues, they 
continued to display the ambiguous position of wanting 
increased participation in international decision-making 
as befits an emerging power while not wanting to be 
excluded from any benefits extended to LDCs. The 
sensitive bilateral issues of nuclear non-proliferation and 
military cooperation were omitted from the talks. We 
raised human rights in a global and Soviet context, and it 
was interesting to note how little the Brazilians disagreed 
with our position. The talks ended with a friendly 
meeting with Foreign Minister Silveira”.365 
 
The American delegation devoted a day to meet non-
governmental leaders in Sao Paulo, something that, in 
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Lake’s words, “exposed [them] to the exhilarating process 
of political liberation […] underway”. On October 15, 1978 
General Figueiredo was chosen as the president-elect of 
Brazil366 and in those weeks concern existed as to whether 
he would be able to guide the liberalization process, 
although it was pretty unlikely that the process could be 
capped.367 Figueiredo, on the other hand, presented himself 
as a person with an “amiable personality”, that could prove 
“an asset in the more open political system that was 
emerging”.368 The CIA also considered that there were very 
likely prospects for the establishment of democratic 
governments in Latin America. 
 
“A growing sentiment throughout the hemisphere 
favors civilian rule, or at least broader civilian 
participation in the governing process. Leaders in the 
area know that the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, 
governments in Western Europe are uncomfortable 
dealing with military regimes. But developmental 
problems and national security concerns, some real and 
some imagined, will remain a serious roadblock to 
constitutional, democratically-elected government.”369 
                                                             
366 João Batista Figueiredo, Geisel’s choice since December 1977 and ARENA 
candidate, was elected by the Colégio Eleitoral with 355 votes. His opponent, 
Euler Bentes Monteiro, candidate of the MDB party, received instead 266 
votes. 
367 Briefing Memorandum from Anthony Lake to the Secretary Brazilian 
Planning Talks November 8-9, 1978, November 21, 1978, Confidential, Subject 
Files of Edmund Muskie, NARA. 
368 Skidmore, Thomas E. cit., p.210. 
369 Prospects for democratic government in Latin America, Secret, 1978, 
CREST, NARA. 
189 
 
 
According to the CIA analysis, because of Brazil’s pre-
eminence in South America, the speed and extent to which 
the high command there would allow democratization to 
proceed –and the ultimate success or failure of the process- 
would have an important impact on its neighbors. The 
Brazilian ‘model’ had been followed in other Latin 
American countries, like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 
after the 1964 military coup; it would therefore be beneficial 
to the whole region if the same happened with the start of a 
democratization process. After 14 years of rule, “the 
Brazilian armed forces appear[ed] to have embarked on a 
course of extricating themselves from the active exercise of 
power. The process [would] be gradual however, and there 
probably [would] be setbacks”, and even in the case of a 
military return to the barracks, the CIA expected the 
generals to “retain a political role as overseer of the 
political process”.370 The plan to move back toward a 
civilian-based government was largely supported by the 
bulk of the armed forces, and reflected a number of factors. 
The military had become wary of the responsibility for the 
full range of economic and political problems of Brazil and, 
to a large degree, the military saw their main task, the 
establishment of sustained economic growth, as 
accomplished. Nonetheless, the outlook for a transition to a 
democratic regime was considered likely to be difficult and 
could be threatened if Figueiredo proved to be unwilling 
(or unable) to deal with the complexities and nuances of a 
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period of change. Still, according to the CIA, even if 
liberalization fared well, the government would not 
become as open as that of the U.S. or other Western nations: 
 
“In Brazil, governments, whether civilian or military, 
have tended to concentrate a preponderance of power in 
the hands of the executive and, even among civilians, 
authoritarian and paternalistic institutions are strong. In 
addition, the armed forces have traditionally acted as the 
moderators of governments, and even out of power will 
retain the overseer role”.371 
 
President-elect Figueiredo372, despite being a military 
himself, was considered the ideal successor of the 
liberalization process begun by President Geisel. 
 
“We expect the government of João Baptista 
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Figueiredo to continue the effort begun by President 
Geisel to open the political system to greater civilian 
participation. […] This liberalization process, though, 
will be subject to setbacks, and its ultimate success is by 
no means guaranteed. […] We expect the new 
government to continue the policy of export-led 
economic growth that has characterized recent years, and 
there could be new emphasis on developing Brazil’s 
agricultural sector. The Brazilians will remain highly 
dependent on and receptive to foreign investments. We 
also expect the new administration to scale down – but 
by no means abandon -  Brazil’s massive nuclear 
development program […]. Finally, we believe 
Figueiredo has an open mind with regard to relations 
with the U.S. and clearly hopes that recent tensions 
between the countries over nuclear non-proliferation and 
human rights can be overcome. Nonetheless, the new 
governing team will be very wary of U.S. intensions in 
these areas, which will continue to be seen in Brasilia as 
potential stumbling blocks”.373   
 
The opinion on Figueiredo as an open-minded, 
liberalizing leader was not shared by all and it is worth 
here to recall an interesting article written at the beginning 
of 1979 and published on the magazine ‘CounterSpy’374 for 
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its April-May issue. The author wrote: 
 
“As for Brazil's new president, João Baptista 
Figueiredo, and what lies in store for the Brazilian 
people, a few words must be said. For the unsuspecting, 
last month's appointment of Figueiredo as president 
appeared to usher in a new era of liberalization for that 
country's political situation. Pledging to continue the 
reforms (which included the closing of Congress for four 
months in 1977) initiated by his predecessor, Ernesto 
Geisel, Figueiredo declared that it would be his 
"unswerving purpose" to make Brazil a democracy. He 
guaranteed freedom of expression for the "many 
segments of Brazilian public opinion."90 But for those 
who have even the slightest familiarity with the man 
who is Brazil's fifth military head of state since the armed 
forces carried out a CIA-backed coup in 1964, João 
Baptista Figueiredo is to be watched closely.  
His background speaks to the intimate role the CIA 
has played in making Brazil one of the most repressive 
and, not surprisingly, one of the "safest" investment 
climates in Latin America. After the '64 coup, the CIA 
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helped Brazil set up its first national intelligence service, 
the SNI. Figueiredo became the director of its Rio office. 
Later he was named head of the military police in Sao 
Paulo, after which he became then-President Emilio 
Medici's chief of staff. Before coming to Brasilia in 1974 to 
direct the SNI, Figueiredo commanded the Third Army 
in Porto Alegre. Given the documented penetration and 
usurpation of the SNI and the police forces by the CIA, 
can there remain any doubt that with Figueiredo's 
ascendancy to the executive office, Langley truly has 
their ‘man in Brazil’?  
In an effort to dress up the seamy history of their 
new president, the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA 
ndr), the Government party, hired the largest advertising 
agency in Brazil to change Figueiredo's public image. The 
agency, Al Cantro Machado, which works closely with 
the huge New York ad agency, Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, 
replaced Figueiredo's dark glasses with clear, metal-
framed ones, got him to tone down on insults such as 
"For me the smell of horses is better than the smell of 
people," and, finally, succeeded in projecting him as 
almost a populist, anti-establishment figure”.375  
 
According to this interpretation of the events and of the 
political career of Figueiredo, it seemed that the new 
Brazilian president had removed democratization from the 
realm of political possibilities. “Under the new president”, 
it was also possible to read, “the future of Brazil's 116 
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million people bodes ill”.376 
Even if no one within the administration shared this 
opinion, a kind of incongruity of Figueiredo’s stance was 
noticed.  
 
“President-designate Figueiredo has expressed 
strikingly contrasting views on a number of issues closely 
related to the eventual liberalization of the political 
system. Because of his ambivalence, many Brazilians 
must now be wondering what Figueiredo’s true opinions 
on this all-important subject really are and how deep, in 
fact, is his expressed commitment to a political 
‘opening’”.377 
 
In a short time lapse, instead, the political figure and 
the personality of Figueiredo became reassuring to 
Washington, or at least to the National Security Adviser: 
Brzezinski wrote to Carter that with the new president 
relations were destined to “improve significantly”.378  
 
History has shown that an easing of the relations 
between Washington and Brasilia in the years of the 
Figueiredo’s administration actually happened. Several 
factors contributed to this result, but two are the major 
reasons to note: first, during 1979 “the superpower 
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management characteristic of détente was melting fast”379, 
and at the same time the cold war paradigm started again 
to regulate the international scenario, with the United 
States becoming increasingly involved in an escalation of 
tensions with the Soviet Union (which culminated in the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979); second, 
human rights stopped to be an issue in the bilateral 
political discourse, on the one hand because the United 
States had to change its priorities in the international 
agenda, and on the other because Brazil was experiencing a 
gradual improvement in the internal human rights 
situation. 
Already in June 1978, Cardinal Arns affirmed that in 
Brazil there was a moderate enhancement in the respect of 
human rights: 
 
“During Ambassador Sayre’s380 courtesy call, 
Cardinal Arns stated that the human rights situation in 
Brazil has improved. He thought that international 
pressure was, by and large, no longer necessary; that the 
situation had evolved to the point where interest parties 
had enough legal recourse and force of public opinion; 
and that international pressure, particularly through a 
press network involving London, Paris, the U.S., and 
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Canada, had proved very effective through publicizing 
cases”.381  
 
Almost in the same weeks, also the CIA documented 
some decisive decisions taken by Geisel: 
 
“President Geisel has approved a measure re-
establishing the right of habeas corpus for those accused 
of violations of the national security law. Restoration of 
this legal guarantee has been a persistent and 
fundamental demand of critics of the regime, which until 
recently had not seriously considered reinstating it. […] 
The move is clearly significant and fit[s] in with Geisel’s 
announced intention to introduce a number of 
normalizing measures before the end of his term”.382  
 
 To make the subject of human rights an internationally 
relevant discourse, then, apparently improved the human 
rights respect in Brazil, one of the first countries to 
experience the human rights diplomacy of the Carter 
administration. The administration saw the first two years 
of the human rights policy as a rewarding success: 
 
“There had been an increase in awareness of human 
rights issues throughout the world, which helped to curb 
existing abuses and acts as an important deterrent to new 
violations. There had been releases of many political 
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prisoners in over a dozen countries and movement 
toward restoration of democratic rule by a number of 
military regimes. The administration did not take credit 
for particular improvements but believed it had helped 
to create an atmosphere in which human rights progress 
was more likely to occur”.383   
 
Narrowing the analysis to the impact of the human 
rights policy in Latin America, Bob Pastor wrote: 
 
“While the human rights policy may be a good 
instrument of ideological diplomacy in other areas, I 
don’t think that ought to be done one of our purposes in 
this hemisphere. I was working under the impression 
that the goals of our human rights policy include: to 
contribute to a climate in which human rights are 
increasingly respected and the costs of repression have 
increased as well; to identify the United States with a 
universal cause, […]; and to project the U.S. as an 
idealistic, moral nation actively working toward a better 
world”.384 
 
It is evident that rhetoric and idealism were still 
perpetuated as U.S. foreign policy discourse, but 
nevertheless diplomatic actions needed to be re-evaluated: 
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“If our overall human rights policy is to be effective 
and credible, one aspect needs to be that we have warmer 
and closer relationships with those governments which 
share our ideals and cooler and more distant 
relationships with those governments that don’t. This 
necessarily means that our relations with the military 
governments in the Southern Cone should range from 
being cordial and correct –as in the case of Brazil, where 
we have a wide range of consultative mechanisms- to 
being distant, as in the case of Chile”.385 
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6. 1979: A TURNING POINT FOR THE BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP. 
 
In her brilliant contribution to the Cambridge History 
of the Cold War, Nancy Mitchell analyzes the years of the 
Jimmy Carter presidency through the lens of the Cold War, 
and writes: “Although the struggle between the 
superpowers had begun in Europe, it had soon moved to 
safer terrain. Fourteen years before Carter took office, John 
F. Kennedy had declared, ‘Berlin is secure, and Europe as a 
whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is 
the rest of the world’”.386 The author points out an essential 
aspect of the Cold War in the late Seventies, that is to say 
that in those years it was “the rest of the world” the main 
stage on which the U.S.-USSR competition was performed, 
namely it was the case of the Third World countries. 
Intervention in the Horn of Africa, normalization of 
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, 
the Middle East peace process and the Camp David accords 
are just some examples of how multi-directional the U.S. 
foreign policy had become.  
But Nancy Mitchell underlines that, instead, nothing 
fundamental had changed in the approach to the foreign 
policy during those years of deterrence:  
 
“The Cold War remained the paradigm and, for the 
United States, containment remained the strategy. 
Détente, however, did introduce an element of confusion: 
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it made it difficult to maintain a sharp focus on the 
conflict. Was the Soviet Union a mortal enemy, as the 
U.S. defense budget continued to indicate, or was it, as 
the rhetoric of détente claimed, a partner in creating a 
‘stable structure of peace’? […] Intensifying the confusion 
was the increasing salience of human rights, signaled not 
only by the Helsinki Accords but also by the 1974 
Jackson–Vanik amendment that tied U.S. trade 
liberalization with the USSR to Moscow’s treatment of its 
Jewish citizens. If détente meant that the United States 
accepted Moscow as a status quo power, the assault on 
Soviet abuses on human rights implied the opposite: that 
the West did not accept the legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime”.387 
 
Détente was a new feature of the Cold War, but 
Washington and Moscow in fact never stopped to compete. 
Human rights emerged as a new topic on which the United 
States could confront the Soviet Union, and the United 
States then used it as a foreign policy tool tout court, also in 
the “rest of the world” where the Cold War was fought, 
and especially in its own hemisphere.  
In this regard, Nancy Mitchell highlights:  
 
“Carter did not initiate the discussion of human 
rights; he rode a wave that had been growing since the 
end of World War II and that had gained momentum in 
1975 when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the 
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countries of Europe, East and West, signed the Helsinki 
Accords”.388 
 
Jimmy Carter’s choice, therefore, was an 
implementation of the spirit of his times, meant to be 
applied world-wide. In June 1979, just a few days before 
Carter departed to Vienna to meet the Soviet leader 
Brezhnev and to take part to the summit for the signature 
of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
(SALT II) and the Protocol, Patricia Derian wrote to 
Secretary Vance: 
 
“U.S. human rights policy is based on our 
commitment to international standards, including the 
joint pledges our two countries [the U.S. and the USSR 
ndr] have made in the Helsinki Final Act. […] We do not 
seek unilateral advantage from our human rights policy. 
There is great domestic U.S. interest in human rights in 
the Soviet Union, but this is based on real concern and 
our belief that, to be lasting, détente must involve 
improvements in the lives of ordinary people in the spirit 
of the Helsinki Final Act. Human rights strengthens 
détente”.389 
 
It is a very interesting idea, the one expressed by 
Patricia Derian in her message to Vance: the human rights 
policy was precisely a result of the deterrence between the 
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two superpowers and at the same time a tool to keep alive 
the spirit of détente.  
Traditionally considered of American hemispheric 
pertinence, Latin America, and Brazil in particular, was not 
a geographic area where the competition between the U.S. 
and the USSR could take place. Nevertheless, it was a 
region where the human rights diplomacy was constantly 
put into practice.  
 
1979 was a decisive year for the improvement of the 
relationship between Washington and Brasilia, on the one 
hand because the new presidency in Brazil could represent 
a new start for the bilateral dialogue, and on the other 
because, at the end of that year, “as Christmas 1979 
dawned in the West, détente faded”390. Inevitably, Carter’s 
attitude immediately changed and other (old?) foreign 
policy issues became of primary importance. Moreover, in 
1979 only eighteen months were still to go before the first 
Carter’s mandate came to an end and the President had to 
run again for elections.  
In August 1979, Warren Christopher wrote to Cyrus 
Vance: 
 
“Priority for domestic issues will preclude the 
President’s personal involvement in foreign policy 
initiatives requiring a major commitment of his time. 
Existing commitments (e.g., Middle East negotiations), 
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the ‘day-to-day’ flow of foreign ‘crises’, and unavoidable 
state visits will continue to occupy an important place on 
the President’s calendar, but he will not be able to make 
substantial time for new initiatives. And probably he 
shouldn’t. […] Our goals will be constricted by election 
year politics. This does not mean that we should step 
back from projects which are in the national interest, but 
we must recognize that our ability to initiate and 
accomplish must reckon with political factors”.391 
 
One of the ten major goals392 to achieve for the last 18 
months of the Carter administration was the improvement 
of relations with Latin America. The Deputy Secretary 
wrote: 
 
“An unusual opening for progress in Latin American 
relations is provided by the Panama Canal Treaties, our 
role in the removal of Somoza, and our human rights 
policy”.393 
 
And devoting a specific attention to the diplomatic 
exchanges with Brazil, Christopher added: 
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“The new Figueiredo regime affords an opportunity 
to put our relations on a sound and friendly footing. We 
started off on the wrong foot with Brazil but they have 
recently shown signs that they are ready for a closer 
relationship. We should begin to consult with them not 
primarily on bilateral matters, but on regional and global 
issues, treating them as the equals that they may 
someday be. Sometimes during this period, I would like 
to consider making a trip to Brazil, which, if it went well, 
might be seen in contrast to the trip I made at the very 
beginning of the administration, carrying the rather 
heavy non-proliferation message”.394 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 João Baptista Figueiredo: new priorities and new 
challenges. 
 
On March 15, 1979 the presidency of João Baptista 
Figueiredo was inaugurated. He was the fifth in the line of 
generals who had led Brazil since 1964, and was expected 
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to continue the political liberalization begun by outgoing 
President Geisel, possibly even giving way to an elected 
civilian at the end of his own term in 1985. Figueiredo’s 
new government395 “resembled Geisel’s in several 
respects”396, but especially for three aspects: first, no 
member had significant independent political appeal; 
second, the cabinet had a mildly reformist bent, 
presumably part of a strategy to combine political 
liberalization with small doses of socio-economic reform; 
third, the cabinet included few military. “The question was 
whether their relative absence in the cabinet would mean 
less military influence in government”.397 
 
Greater cordiality in Brazil’s relations with the United 
States was expected and this seemed even more likely after 
the decision to appoint Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro398 as new 
Foreign Minister. In a CIA cable it was affirmed: 
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“He [Figueiredo ndr] is replacing a testy, 
nationalistic foreign minister with a career diplomat 
known for his even-handed views and low-keyed 
manner. The new President and his advisers do, 
however, share the concern of their predecessors over 
U.S. policies in the areas of trade, nuclear non-
proliferation and human rights. They will be watching 
for signs of renewed pressure in these areas”.399 
 
Important efforts were required to President 
Figueiredo, especially in domestic policies, not only for the 
continuation of the liberalization process begun in the years 
of Geisel’s abertura lenta e gradual, but also because of 
mounting economic problems. 
 
“Liberalization to date has resulted in the virtual end 
of press censorship, a dramatic reduction in security 
excesses, and major steps to curb the regime’s 
authoritarian powers. There is now a generalized 
expectation that the role of civilians in national decision-
making will increase substantially and that the armed 
forces dominance will correspondingly recede. 
Figueiredo promises, though with few specifics, that he 
will ‘make Brazil a democracy’. It will be the new 
government that defines the nature -and limits- of 
liberation as it goes along. The process is certain to be 
complicated because both civilians and military men will 
continually be groping for ways to relate to each other in 
a changed environment and because there is still a 
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significant, though small, minority within the military 
hierarchy that will eagerly seize on any excuse to argue 
forcefully against liberalization”.400 
 
Figueiredo was expected to contend with a more 
assertive political opposition than his predecessors had to 
deal with and, moreover, the new President had at least 
five serious priorities to tackle: the need to reduce inflation, 
in those months running over 40%, chiefly by cutting 
government spending; the return to private hands of those 
public companies and services in which state ownership 
was not essential; implementation of measures to revitalize 
agriculture, and bring down or at least stabilize food prices; 
changes in the tax structure, along with other credit and 
fiscal devices to reduce significantly income and regional 
disparities; cut of massive foreign debt by increasing 
domestic savings in both the private and public sectors. 
 
The day after Figueiredo’s inauguration, on March 16, 
1979, Vice President Walter F. Mondale announced his 
decision to fly to Brazil and Venezuela the following week 
to confer with newly-inaugurated leaders of those two 
countries. The vice president had been scheduled to attend 
presidential inaugurals in both countries but canceled his 
plans so he would not be out of the United States while 
President Carter was involved with a Middle East mission, 
in Egypt and Israel. This was why Mrs. Mondale and Labor 
Secretary Ray Marshall represented the United States at the 
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ceremonies. The vice president's trip "[wa]s an indication of 
the importance President Carter attache[d] to good 
relations and high-level consultations" with the two Latin 
American countries.401  
In a memorandum written by Warren Christopher to 
Mrs. Mondale a few days before her participation in the 
inauguration ceremonies, he stated: 
 
“The primary objective of your trip is to manifest 
[…] our deep and abiding interest in cordial, cooperative 
and mutually beneficial relations with the incoming 
governments. […] Brazil, though oil poor, is an economic 
giant which sees itself as an emerging world power. Our 
relations are improving, but have been strained by 
recurrent tensions. We want our working relations with 
the new Figueiredo Administration to develop more 
effectively than they did with President Geisel”.402 
 
The United States attached a high importance on 
effective relations with Brazil, and on getting off on the 
right foot with its new government. U.S. interests in Brazil 
were large, because, as Christopher recalled: 
 
“Brazil has the largest and most sophisticated 
industrial complex south of the equator. Brazilian actions 
help shape the outlook for international trade and 
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finance, conventional arms restraint, and nuclear non-
proliferation. As Brazil develops, its cooperation will be 
increasingly important to the West”.403 
 
Since President Carter’s visit in March 1978, the 
bilateral relations had improved but were not warm yet. 
Washington was concerned about the growing conviction 
among Brazilians that the U.S. was unresponsive, or even 
hostile, to Brazil’s aspirations: disagreements over trade 
policies, financial issues, Law of the Sea, and nuclear 
program had led to suspicions in Brazil that Americans 
were either opposed to Brazil’s emergence as a global 
power, or did not understand Brazil’s needs.404  
In Christopher’s opinion: 
 
“The Figueiredo administration [would] mitigate the 
abrasiveness of the recent past. Figueiredo [was]  
personally warmer and more accessible than Geisel. The 
skilled new foreign Minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, 
intend[ed] to make better relations with the U.S. one of 
his priorities. But Brazil’s aggressive, often nationalistic 
drive for major global power status [was] almost an 
universal goal among Brazilian elites”.405  
 
The United States had clear in mind what objectives to 
pursue: to engage Brazil in a frank and open dialogue on 
matters of mutual interest and concern; to contain 
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inevitable conflicts by avoiding confrontations […], but 
without giving the impression of abandoning its overall 
policy objective; to highlight the importance of continuing 
the existing close consultations that had helped settle many 
disputes (especially in the commercial and financial 
sectors). The Brazilian objectives, instead, were a bit 
different: to keep lines of communications open with the 
U.S. as Brazil expanded its global activities; to maintain 
constructive relations without limiting its freedom of 
action; to secure U.S. understanding and sympathy for free 
access to world capital markets and rapid export growth.406 
On the two issues on which the United States and 
Brazil had had major tensions and estrangement, the Carter 
administration had clear expectations. On nuclear matters, 
Figueiredo was expected to take a close look at current 
programs because of rising costs, increasing technical 
problems, and the need for financial austerity. On human 
rights, Figueiredo intended to carry forward the political 
liberalization process and reduce economic inequalities.407 
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6.2 March 1979: Walter Mondale meets João 
Figueiredo. 
 
Vice president Mondale arrived in Brazil in the evening 
of March 21, 1979 and he was scheduled to meet President 
Figueiredo in the afternoon of the following day, March 22, 
1979.408 “When Mondale arrived in Brasilia from 
Washington”, Timothy Power writes, “he discovered an 
accelerating political opening and a new U.S.-Brazilian 
relationship uncolored by tensions over the issue of human 
rights”.409  
Unfortunately, there is no documental record available 
in order to know precisely what topics were tackled during 
the meeting and how good the reciprocal attitudes were. 
But the American press reported with enthusiastic tones 
about the Mondale-Figueiredo talks. The vice-President 
arrived in Brasilia declaring that he was there with the 
intent of further improving the already good relations 
between the U.S. and Brazil, “particularly through 
expanded scientific and economic cooperation”.410 For the 
New York Times: 
 
“Mondale [told] reporters that Figueiredo ha[d] 
accepted his offer to send Dr. Frank Press, President 
Carter's scientific adviser, and a team of specialists to 
consult with Brazilian scientists. Mondale add[ed] that 
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Figueiredo accepted his invite to come to U.S.  
[Furthermore, Mondale] Sa[id] his conversations touched 
only briefly on human rights and on Brazil's $5 billion 
deal to acquire nuclear processing facilities from West 
Germany, two subjects that [had] provoked crisis 
between Washington and Brasilia in '77”.411 
 
In a major effort to improve relations between the 
United States and Brazil, vice President Walter Mondale 
decided to back away from a confrontation over Brazil's 
nuclear energy program, which included plans to build a 
uranium reprocessing plant capable of producing weapons-
grade plutonium. 
In Mondale’s words, “the two-year controversy over 
the Carter administration's effort to stop West Germany 
from selling nuclear reprocessing technology to Brazil had 
been ‘greatly exaggerated’”.412 
Mondale also praised what he said was a significant 
improvement in the human rights situation in Brazil and 
Figueiredo's promise to return the country to democracy 
when he would leave office in six years.  
Consequently, Mondale wanted to stress the "great 
importance" the United States attached to its "constructive, 
mutually beneficial relationship" with Brazil, which had the 
world's 10th largest economy and which Mondale said was 
"a major factor in regional and world" affairs.413 
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Even before Mondale arrived Wednesday night, both 
Brazilian and U.S. diplomats here stressed that neither 
government had any interest in reopening the nuclear 
controversy, which, along with human rights, resulted in a 
major deterioration in U.S.-Brazilian relations after 
President Carter assumed office. 
There had been speculation that Mondale and 
Figueiredo, who accepted an invitation to visit the United 
States later this year, would discuss the possibility of 
renewing military ties. 
But, as long as the Washington Post told, that subject 
was not discussed. Mondale intended to underline how 
crucial the U.S. considered the Brazilian role also outside 
the hemispheric perimeter and therefore centered the talks 
with Figueiredo on global rather than bilateral issues: the 
new Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the status of SALT talks 
with the Soviet Union and efforts by the Carter 
administration to reduce inflation.414 
Mondale said he was confident, as a result of his talks 
in Brasilia, that Brazilian-U.S. relations would improve 
significantly in the years ahead, a sentiment echoed by 
Figueiredo who was described as "very satisfied" with his 
meeting with Mondale. 
The vice president went so far as to say during a press 
conference that there were now "no serious bilateral issues" 
standing in the way of excellent relations between the two 
countries. 
Once back to Washington, Mondale wrote to President 
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Carter reiterating the good impressions already stated 
before the press immediately after the bilateral meeting: 
 
“President Figueiredo seems genuinely interested in 
putting past irritants in our relationship behind him and 
in returning to the traditional warm relationship we have 
had with Brazil”.415 
 
Figueiredo accepted the invitation to visit Washington 
by the end of 1979, proving the Brazilian intension to re-
establish most cordial relations. On the other hand 
Mondale expressed some doubts that the role Brazil would 
play internationally in the near future would be as active as 
the United States might wish. Brazil was clearly 
preoccupied with developing its vast potential  and, as big 
oil consumer, would pay much attention in not irritating 
the OPEC countries. Mondale recommended caution in 
being over-enthusiastic in their praise for Brazil, also in 
order not to irritate the Spanish speaking countries of Latin 
America, always “suspicious about collusions between the 
United States and Brazil”.416 
 
A few hours after Mondale’s departure from Brasilia, 
the Brazilian government announced its decision to appoint 
the former chanceler Silveira as Brazilian ambassador in 
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Washington. The Washington Post commented the 
news: 
 
“Both American and Brazilian diplomats, including 
Brazil's new foreign minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, 
said the Mondale visit had contributed to improved 
relations between the two countries and that Silveira's 
appointment as ambassador to the United States should 
not be viewed as detrimental to better ties. 
There was some informed speculation here, 
however, that Silveira may have sought the post as 
ambassador to Washington as a way to monitor whatever 
new relationship develops between the two countries 
over the next several years. 
Silveira, 61, is known as an unconventional diplomat 
because of his acid tongue and his willingness to speak 
his mind in public.  […] 
Silveira, who had a warm relationship with former 
secretary of state Henry Kissinger, made no secret of his 
view that the Carter administration has been indecisive 
and clumsy in its handling of foreign policy. […] 
[However,] the Brazilians consider[ed] it a particular 
mark of respect for the country to which a former foreign 
minister is sent”.417 
 
The Brazilian government offered assurances that 
Silveira's appointment should not be viewed as an 
impediment to better ties.418  
                                                             
417 Brazil Names Carter Critic Ambassador to U.S “The Washington Post”, 
March 25, 1979. 
418 “The Associated Press”, April 30, 1979. 
216 
 
6.3 The Brazilian liberalization process and the path 
toward democratization.  
 
A few months after Mondale’s visit in March, early 
evidence indicated how serious the new Brazilian 
administration was about continuing the political openings 
begun by former president Geisel. Also the CIA was 
optimistic about the liberalization progress that Figueiredo 
was implementing: 
 
“President Figueiredo has been in office less than 
three months, but sufficient evidence has accumulated to 
allow some tentative judgments […]. The new President 
is indeed working toward the greater political openness 
he promised, building on the foundations laid by his 
predecessor. Figueiredo is making his liberalization 
moves deliberately and within an authoritarian 
framework, which in the Brazilian context is not 
contradictory”.419 
 
For the next six years ahead, Figueiredo had the 
specific policy mandate of carrying forward the 
liberalization process started in 1974, and some important 
political tasks awaited the Brazilian President. First, it was 
necessary to refine or modify the political party system as 
well as cultivate and launch civilian political figures who 
could readily step into leadership roles as military 
withdrew. Second, in the meantime, much of Figueiredo’s 
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political work had to be aimed at building a civilian 
constituency to serve as a base from which to launch a 
candidacy in the next elections. But the CIA warned: “all 
this and more must be accomplished in a manner that will 
not allow demagogic politicians to gain prominence and 
thereby arouse the apprehensions of conservative military 
officers”.420 
It was clear, hence, that the United States would 
support any effort toward democratization and the 
establishment of civilian rule after almost twenty years of 
military dictatorship. It is interesting to note how the U.S. 
attitude toward its Latin American partner changed as a 
consequence of the transformation of the Cold War. In 
1964, when the memory of the Cuban missile crisis was still 
vivid and Washington was worried about the Communist 
threat in the Southern part of the continent, the Johnson 
administration had not hesitated to support the overthrow 
of the Brazilian President João Goulart.  A bit more than a 
decade later, when the Cold War had taken the shape of 
détente and competition was more based on the power of 
ideology than on military power, the Carter administration 
offered unconditional support to the Brazilian political 
liberalization and democratization. Washington wanted its 
foreign policy to be the bearer of appealing ideas: through 
principles the Carter administration intended to affirm the 
primacy of the American role in the international scenario, 
through idealism the Carter administration intended to 
stress how far and different Washington and Moscow were. 
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In 1979, there was no doubt on what side of the bipolar 
fronts Brazil had chosen to stay and the United States 
wanted it to become a firm, but less authoritarian, ally 
within and outside the hemisphere. 
In the first months of the Figueiredo administration, 
Brazil had been effectively proceeding in a manner 
consistent with a more open political system. Some moves 
had been symbolic, like Figueiredo’s accessibility to the 
media and his regular meetings with pro-governmental 
political figures; other initiatives had been more politically 
significant. Among them: first, the announcement of an 
amnesty to all those charged with political offenses since 
the 1964 military takeover; second, the decision to take a 
moderate line toward students, rescinding the decree laws 
that over the years had been used to suppress student 
activism and punish university activists; and third, the will 
to mend fences with the Catholic Church, a frequent critic 
of the regime and traditional opponent of the military 
government.421 
 
In August 1979 the new Brazilian regime experienced 
several internal problems, and the Department of State in 
Washington wrote: 
 
“Public restiveness and economic problems are 
testing the resourcefulness of the Figueiredo 
administration. Although the five-month old government 
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has been mildly innovative, it has been either unwilling 
or unable to take definitive action on some crucial 
issues”.422  
 
A recent wave of strikes had affected cities in several 
states and also in the federal capital, inflation was spiraling, 
reaching almost 60%. These were the two major problems 
Figueiredo had to face in the first months of his mandate, 
and liberal clergymen as well as civilian politicians were 
side by side to stress the need for change. The record on the 
sociopolitical side was indeed positive: the President was 
gradually making himself and his ministers more accessible 
to the media; criticism of the regime, whether from strikers, 
union leaders, press, politicians, human rights groups was 
wide raging; the reform of the two-party system was 
formally under way. On some other sociopolitical changes, 
the government seemed instead being temporizing: the 
process of declaring a conditional amnesty for political 
opponents, a crucial issue for human rights activists, was 
definitely long in coming.423  
 
Instead, it would be just a matter of days: on August 28, 
1979 President Figueiredo promulgated the Law n.6683424, 
commonly known as the ‘Amnesty Law’ (Lei de Anistia), 
which granted the amnesty to all those that between 
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September 2, 1961 and August 15, 1979 had committed 
political or electoral crimes and to those who had their 
political rights suspended (namely politicians who had lost 
them under the Institutional Acts). Excluded were those 
guilty of acts of terrorism and of armed resistance to the 
government. Thomas Skidmore has defined the amnesty 
the most important early decision of the Figueiredo 
administration, because it was “a vital question to leave 
behind authoritarian rule and reintegrate into Brazilian 
society and politics the thousands of political exiles who 
had fled or been pursued abroad”.425 
A further step toward democratization was taken and 
Figueiredo had given “Brazilian politicians a lesson in the 
art of conciliation”.426 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 The ending of 1979 and 1980. 
 
The change at the top of the Brazilian leadership 
definitely marked a loosening of the tensions in the 
bilateral relationship between the two hemispheric giants. 
The United States and Brazil were ready to intensify 
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dialogue and cooperation, and leave behind 
misunderstandings and frictions. 
As agreed during Mondale’s trip to Brasilia, in October 
1979 Frank Press, President Carter’s scientific advisor, went 
to Brazil with technical agency representatives to discuss 
several cooperative Science and Technology (S&T)  
programs already under way, and to propose a selection of 
effective and achievable new programs. In the State  
Department, there was an increasing awareness that 
relations with Latin America were solid again and would 
likely continue to improve. “But the days of almost 
automatic U.S. hegemony [were] gone, replaced by a new 
spirit of independence”.427 In those last years, Brazil 
ascribed the highest priority to science and technology for 
national development. “Motivated by the desire to achieve 
economic development and importance commensurate 
with its size as the fifth largest nation in the world, Brazil 
ha[d] pursued vigorous industrial development at the 
expense of social welfare and consumer-oriented 
programs”.428   
The United States and Brazil had signed in 1971 a first 
agreement on Science and Technology cooperation, 
broadened in 1976 to include applied S&T and, under the 
Memorandum of Understanding, joint groups on S&T and 
Energy were established. Despite this framework, activities 
with Brazil had been modest due primarily to political 
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tensions. Now the time was ripe to move ahead on nuclear 
and human rights issues, and Brazil was mostly interested 
in cooperation on non-nuclear energy, agriculture, and 
space programs. On the U.S.-Brazilian space cooperation, 
the Carter administration intended to set up a Joint 
Planning Group to study a wide range of possibilities in 
space cooperation, with the United States ready to evaluate 
the extent to which they were willing to provide Brazil with 
space launch vehicle technology.429 
 
It is evident that human rights had virtually 
disappeared from the agenda, the Carter administration 
“had started to promote democracy in Brazil after 1978”.430 
Nevertheless, the international events that involved the 
United States at the end of 1979 diverted the American 
attention from the hemispheric relations and forced the 
Carter administration to focus on the new Cold War clash. 
On November 4, 1979 fifty-two Americans were held 
hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran by a group of 
Iranian students supporting the theocratic Iranian 
revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This situation 
would last for 444 days, until January 20, 1981, when the 
Reagan presidency was inaugurated. 
In December 1979, on Christmas day, the USSR 
invaded Afghanistan and the Carter administration was 
abruptly force to embrace the old-fashioned bipolar logic 
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again. To use Nancy Mitchell’s words, “Carter foreswore 
complexity and embraced old-fashioned dualism. But his 
inability to free the hostages in Iran made it impossible for 
him to free himself from the aura of weakness that had  
come to define him”.431 
 
At the dawn of 1980, these two events weakened the 
Carter administration, already experiencing at the time low 
public support and harsh criticism. The whole world could 
see the United States as a vulnerable actor which had lost 
its leadership.  
Human rights weren’t anymore a foreign policy tool, 
and Brazil was considered neither a critical actor nor the 
theatre for U.S. foreign policy. Rather, there was a 
continuing improvement in the bilateral relations, that 
facilitated a friendly and candid exchange of opinions. In 
fact, on March 24-25, 1980 the U.S.-Brazilian policy 
planning talks (within the framework of the Memorandum 
of Understanding) took place.432 Anthony Lake briefed 
Secretary Vance433 on the bilateral meeting, when the 
Brazilian willingness to cooperate with Washington in 
several areas clearly emerged: 
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“Brazil, while indicating that it would avoid 
undercutting U.S. efforts to deter Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan, was concerned that increasing East-West 
tension could adversely affect the West’s attention to the 
needs of developing nations and Brazil’s flexibility in 
pursuing a diversified foreign policy”.434 
 
Brazil was looking for a balanced relationship with the 
United States and also the Carter administration had the 
same attitude toward Brasilia. 1980 was however a year in 
which the American attention shifted to other global issues. 
And also the (un)availability of documents in the American 
archives proves that major foreign policy efforts were put 
in dealing with the Soviet Union and Iran. 
The United States was perceived, and probably 
perceived itself, as weak and ineffective in the international 
scenario. But, Mitchell notes, this was deeply wrong. 
“It is not simply hindsight – the knowledge that nine 
years later the Berlin Wall would crumble – that highlights 
the startling misperceptions of 1980”, also argued Nancy 
Mitchell. 435 Anyone could see, both the public opinion and 
government insiders, what the facts were: “during the 
Carter presidency, the United States normalized diplomatic 
relations with China, excluded the Soviet Union from the 
Middle East peace process, and saw a grave challenge to 
                                                             
434 Briefing Memorandum from Lake to the Secretary U.S.-Brazilian Policy 
Planning Talks, March 24-25, 1980, Confidential, April 24, 1980, Subject Files 
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Soviet control over Poland. Yes, there were setbacks in the 
Third World, but there were huge gains in Asia, the Middle 
East, and Eastern Europe”.436 These facts, however, were 
overlooked. Americans focused on their inability to stop 
Communism in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, and 
were not able to see that, actually, they were winning the 
Cold War. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
436 Idem. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS: SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
JIMMY CARTER’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
DIPLOMACY. 
 
During the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter 
had convinced his electorate through three simple 
concepts: he wanted to give America a president not 
isolated from his people; to bring the United States on the 
move again; and bring to the White House confidence, 
competence and compassion the three key-words for his 
presidency. Jimmy Carter managed to convince the 
American people and entered the White House. 
The four years of his presidency, however, were 
characterized by several international events. 
In this work, I have analyzed the foreign policy of the 
Carter administration toward Brazil, the Latin American 
country that in those years was experiencing a radical 
political change. The U.S-Brazilian relationship in the late 
1970s has always been considered the worst moment in the 
history of the bilateral relationship. It is inded true, but it 
was also a relationship that rapidly changed, and 
improved, and that passed through three phases: the shock 
period, the denial period, and the face-to-face period. I 
have analyzed the U.S.-Brazilian relation through the prism 
of the Carter administration’s human rights policy, which 
affected enormously the dialogue between Washington and 
Brasilia.  
Also, in the case of the Brazilian reactions to the human 
rights diplomacy, it is possible to highlight the three phases 
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of the Brazilian attitude toward the United States. 
The shock period coincided with the first months of the 
Carter administration and the publication of the human 
rights report on Brazil, as recipient country of foreign 
military aid. The Brazilians perceived this act as an 
interference in their internal affairs and reacted toughly, 
denouncing the 1952 Military Accord and refusing any 
economic aid for 1977. This was definitely the most difficult 
moment between the two countries, and any U.S. 
diplomatic effort either had bad results (the Christopher 
trip to Brasilia in March 1977) or no results at all (Rosalynn 
Carter’s visit in June 1977). 
The correspondence between Carter and Geisel 
probably helped improving the situation and thawing the 
reciprocal stances. 
The denial period followed, when a glimmer for a 
renewed dialogue was perceivable. It was the moment 
when Cyrus Vance went to Brasilia to meet both Geisel and 
Silveira, and formal cordiality was restored. But the human 
rights issue basically could not be tackled in bilateral 
conversations, because any U.S. attempt to deal with the 
topic went unanswered. 
President Carter’s visit to Brazil in March 1978 
represented a turning point. The decision to stop in Brasilia 
and Rio proved how central was Brazil for the regional and 
global policy of the United States. It was the first time in 30 
years that a U.S. president visited Brazil and this was a 
signal that could not be ignored. Carter’s friendly attitude, 
together with the fact that Geisel was accelerating the 
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domestic liberalization process, helped to restore kinder 
tones. 
The day when, in March 1979, Figueiredo was 
inaugurated as new Brazilian President can ideally 
represent also the beginning of the ‘face-to-face’ period in 
the bilateral relationship. The new Brazilian presidency 
immediately gave important signals with respect to the 
liberalization of the political situation, and the new foreign 
Minister proved his intention to be cooperative and cordial. 
Brazil was becoming a pivotal actor in the North-South 
dialogue and during the 1970s had been able to create a 
large diplomatic network with the European and Asian 
countries, as well as with the Middle East. Brazil was 
growing internationally and intended to be recognized as 
an equal partner. 
 
What it is possible to maintain is that the Carter 
administration, after the first months during which 
assumed a confrontational attitude, promoted an intense 
effort to keep alive the diplomatic relations with the 
Southern hemispheric giant. But, as Britta Crandall writes: 
“Despite these attempts to maintain the historical 
amicability between the two countries, for better or for 
worse, the Carter administration was not able to revive 
its unwritten alliance with Brazil. First, rather than being 
honoured by the attention bestowed on Brazil by 
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Washington, Brazil felt slighted for not being valued 
more”.437 
The Brazilian leadership was probably disappointed by 
the awareness that the regional special relationship of the 
previous years was gone; at the beginning of the 1970s the 
Washington-Brasilia axis had become very strong, also 
thanks to the Kissinger-Silveira personal friendship. As 
soon as the U.S. administration changed, so changed the 
quality of the dialogue. 
Historian Gaddis Smith also stresses that “to 
Brzezinski’s dismay, the Carter administration’s relations 
with Brazil began very badly” 438 and that during the 
presidential campaign Jimmy Carter had sharply criticized 
Henry Kissinger and his decision to give full support to a 
military dictatorship.  
The Brazilians were outraged for several reasons: the 
human rights report, the U.S. attempt not only to stop its 
nuclear program (interfering, again, in its domestic affairs), 
and “the way the United States went to Bonn, behind Rio’s 
back” and not respecting the 1976 Memorandum of 
Understanding. Summarizing in a brilliant way the U.S. 
attitude toward Brazil in the four years, Gaddis Smith 
wrote:  
 
“The administration struggled to undo the damage – 
without retreating entirely from its principles. Rosalynn 
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Carter Years”, Hill and Wang, 1986, p.129. 
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Carter visited Rio in June 1977, Secretary Vance in 
November 1977 and President himself in March 1978. 
The United States stopped protesting the nuclear deal 
with Germany, and nothing strident was said [anymore] 
about human rights. Instead, the United States began to 
praise Brazil for its movement toward a more open 
political system”.439 
 
 And, to use again Crandall’s words: 
“U.S. policy toward Brazil under the Carter 
administration was not marked by neglect; because 
Brazil was perceived as a nuclear problem, the State 
Department dedicated a lot of attention to Brazil. Policy 
makers and presidents alike expressed interest in Brazil 
and acknowledged it as a potential partner. This interest 
began to change in the late 1970s as more urgent issues 
trumped the peaceful –albeit potentially nuclear– 
Southern giant”.440 
 
Consequently, some questions inevitably arise: did 
Carter’s human rights policy play an effective and active 
role in Brazil’s political opening of the late 1970s? Did the 
human rights diplomacy act as one of the external factors 
that influence democratization processes, like the one Brazil 
had started to experience since 1974? Or, on the contrary, 
would Brazil have liberalized nevertheless, considering the 
political project that Ernesto Geisel had launched at the 
beginning of his government in March 1974? 
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By the end of 1977, Brazil had significantly improved 
its human rights record, and this result  was  probably due 
to its internal political efforts more than to foreign external 
pressures. Still, possibly an acceleration came because of 
the attention that the Carter administration suddenly paid 
to the Brazilian case. The outcry caused by the U.S. human 
rights report taught something to the Carter administration 
as well: that is to say that Brazil did not like at all any form 
of external pressure, interference, not even interest in its 
domestic affairs and that public accusation could cause a 
dangerous deterioration of diplomatic relations.  
 
A further reflection follows about the centrality of the 
role played by the Congress and congressional actors that, 
before and with Carter and Derian, contributed to 
institutionalize human rights into United States foreign 
policy. As widely discussed at the beginning of this work, it 
was Congress, under the 1976 Foreign Military Assistance 
Act, that required the publication by the State Department 
of annual human rights reports for each state receiving 
military assistance from the U.S.  
Stoyanov highlights this point: 
 
“The inauguration of the Carter administration thus 
coincided with the height of Congressional activism on 
human rights. This fact often obscures the difference 
between the administration’s approach and actions and 
those of Congress. [...] 
In addition, the PRM on human rights, prepared for 
Carter in July 1977 offers further proof that the need to 
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assuage Congressional concerns on human rights abuses 
in Latin America played an important part in the 
Administration’s actions”..441 
 
The U.S. Congress was fundamental in shaping U.S. 
foreign policy in the late 1970s and was the first actor to 
make human rights become a binding legal and political 
factor. Since the end of WWII human rights had bloomed 
as new international discourse, and the Cold War made it 
become a new terrain of competition where the two 
superpowers could confront each other. In Carter’s years, 
the United States approached the Cold War in a new way: 
ideology became the major field of competition, 
supplanting (or hoping to supplant) arms race and 
geopolitical rivalry. As Umberto Tulli highlights in a recent 
work, Carter’s choice to develop and support the human 
rights policy did not mean that the U.S. president ignored 
the Cold War imperatives, promoting moralism in U.S. 
foreign affairs at the expense of power. Still, after the 
Vietnam war, military (and even more war) was not an 
option anymore and this awareness persuaded president 
Carter to adapt the Cold War imperatives to the new 
international context of the Seventies. Jimmy Carter 
rejected a static view of the bipolar confrontation and, 
inspired by Brzezinski’s analysis of détente, according to 
                                                             
441 Stoyanov, Stoyan Moralism as Realism: Jimmy Carter’s Human Rights 
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which the U.S. stance towards the USSR had to be more 
reciprocal, assertive and competitive, decided to use 
human rights as ideological tool to use in the bipolar 
opposition.442  
Also Sarah Snyder shares this point of view, and she 
writes: “[…] In the aftermath of Vietnam, Carter’s support 
for human rights also could enhance American 
international prestige. […] Carter’s focus on human rights 
[could be] important for the United States place in the 
world”.443 According to this interpretation, Carter’s human 
rights policy was part of a very pragmatic tactic aiming at 
demonstrating how praiseworthy the U.S. democratic 
system was and at beating up morally on the Soviet Union.  
Samuel Moyn equally points out that “Carter’s 
leadership on human rights afforded not a substitute 
utopia but a sense of collective national recovery. It was the 
reestablishment of the country’s moral and missionary 
credentials in the world”.444 To do this, Jimmy Carter set up 
the human rights framework “for an overall sense of 
recovery of purpose from the errors of the whole Cold War 
era”.445 Human rights were a new dialectical means to use, 
not following “the erroneous principles and tactics of [U.S.] 
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adversaries”446 anymore, and that allowed to bring the 
American values back in the international scenario. 
Hence, a further reflection arises: did human rights 
play a role in the ending of the Cold War? 
Rosemary Foot has investigated the topic, surprised by 
the fact that Cold War’s ending was “not only unexpected, 
but also unexpectedly peaceful”.447 According to Foot’s 
interpretation, human rights contributed to the Cold War’s 
end: 
 
“The steadily growing association of human rights 
with legitimate rule challenged authoritarian 
governments. [...] The Helsinki process provided the 
means by which to express a common Western policy on 
rights, it acted as a focal point for domestic and trans-
national activist pressure, [..]. It also showed the 
dominance of the discourse on civil and political rights 
over that of economic, social, and cultural concerns, a 
dominance that remains controversial”.448 
 
Human rights were a discourse promoted by the 
Western hemisphere, but that actually were above any 
kind of ideological division. 
To introduce the respect of the person and of its 
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fundamental freedoms into the political international 
discourse was revolutionary and definitely farsighted, 
and much of the credit of this has to be attributed to 
Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. The credit of “elevati[ng] 
human rights to a policy of the state” belongs mostly to 
the Carter administration, which injected morality into 
international affairs. Moyn writes: “it was precisely the 
increasing role of human rights in Western social 
discourse, together with the collapse of alternative 
frameworks, which meant that practically all political 
concerns had to be reformulated in their terms and 
addressed by them”.449 Once entered the political 
discourse in the 1970s, human rights have always 
remained of great importance in international relations. 
Jimmy Carter made human rights a discourse difficult (if 
not impossible) to set aside and made possible their 
evolution “from morality to politics”, “from antipolitics 
to program”.450  Even though his has been a one-mandate 
presidency, Jimmy Carter has given a definite change to 
international politics. 
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11) 
o Staff Offices – Press (Advance) – Anne Edwards 
(Boxes n. 2, 19, 21) 
o Staff Offices – Press Granum (Box n. 103) 
o President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File – Plains File 
(Box n. 1) 
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o Donated Material Paperd of Walter Mondale 
(Collection #133) (Boxes n. 1, 2, 3, 4) 
o Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential – 1976 Presidential 
Campaign Issues Office – Noel Sterrett Clippings – 
Foreign Issues (Box n. 138) 
o Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential – 1976 Presidential 
Campaign Issues Office – Press Office – Betty 
Rainwater Subject Files (Box n. 376)  
 
 CENTRO DE PESQUISA E 
DOCUMENTAÇÃO/FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS 
(RIO DE JANEIRO) 
  
o AAS mre be 1976.00.00 
o AAS mre be 1977.06.01 
o AAS mre be 1977.01.27 
o AAS mre d 1974.03.26 
o AAS mre d 1974.04.23 
 
